The abrogation of the cease fire agreement was a most compelling necessity, stated Sri Lankan Ambassador in Washington, Bernard Goonetilleke making an in-depth analysis before a Washington discussion group. He added that the past twenty odd years are testimony to the fact that Tigers only agree to negotiate as a mere ploy; to buy time to regroup, to replenish and to strengthen their fighting capability
When adequately ready to fight, they walk away from negotiations, as they have done at each series of talks. That was not all; they were brazen enough to take the lives of those who initiated two rounds of talks viz. the former Indian Prime Minister Gandhi and President Premadasa and very nearly took the life of President Kumaratunga, in all three instances employing suicide bombers. When things were no going their way, they blamed the international community as being partisan and unjust.

The full text of Ambassador Goonetilleke’s speech is given below:

I am privileged, to be able to share with you, some thoughts on Sri Lanka’s attempts at conflict resolution and peace negotiation with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam or the LTTE, which, the FBI earlier this month introduced as, “one of the most dangerous and deadly extremists in the world.”

I regret that Dr. Peter Chalk, who was to speak on “The International Dimension of the LTTE,” could not be with us today. However, as intended, I shall focus on the Ceasefire Agreement, the peace process and the role of the international community, while Dr. Stanley Samarasinghe will speak on how Sri Lanka could realistically resolve the conflict.

You are aware that Sri Lanka is a multi-ethnic, multi-religious democracy, in fact, one of the oldest democracies in South Asia. You are also aware that the LTTE shuns democracy, and intends, through terrorism, to establish a mono-ethnic, mono-political separate state in Sri Lanka’s north and east. This separate state will encompass approximately 30% of the country’s landmass, and is intended for Sri Lankan Tamils, who, according to the1981 census, comprise approximately 12% of the county’s population. The majority of these Tamils, incidentally, live outside the north and the east.

LTTE Leader, Prabhakaran in a speech on November 27, last year said, and I quote, “We are struggling only to regain our sovereignty in our own historical land where we have lived for centuries, the sovereignty which we lost to colonial occupiers.” The sovereignty he spoke of ended in 1560, when the Portuguese defeated Jaffna’s ruler, Cankili 1, more than 200 years before the U.S. declaration of independence. Note that Cankili’s rule at that time was limited to Jaffna, and did not extend to present day northern and eastern provinces.

The LTTE demand for a separate state, called “Tamil Eelam,” at best, can be described as “fictitious,” for there was never, at any time in Sri Lanka’s history, “a traditional Tamil homeland,” as the Vadukkodai Resolution of 1976, declared based on an erroneous claim by the first British colonial Secretary Hugh Cleghorn.

Sri Lanka is a small island, home to 20 million, similar in size to West Virginia, or is twice the size of the island of Hawaii. It has been home to many ethnic groups for over 2000 years, who migrated north to south and south to north over the years. Thus, the Sinhalese, Tamils, Moors, Burghers, Malays and other communities, too numerous to be listed, can all rightfully claim the island as their traditional homeland.

Sri Lanka’s Ceasefire agreement or the CFA and its recent abrogation have been very much in the news these days. My familiarity with the CFA runs back to the time of its presentation in draft form by Norway, to its signature in February 2002, to its implementation, or more to the point, its brazen violation by the LTTE, from day one. I recall my critical remark in early November 2005, that a glaring defect of the CFA was the inordinate haste of its conclusion, denying the opportunity, particularly to the Sri Lanka government, to deeply scrutinize it.

The eagerness to conclude the CFA with least delay, was due to the fact, that by Christmas 2001, the government had agreed to an informal ceasefire initiated by the LTTE, and Norway, in its wisdom, considered it desirable to have a formal agreement signed before the informal ceasefire began to unravel. In retrospect, at least some of the CFA’s shortcomings could have been addressed, if the parties had more time to consider the ramifications of individual articles of the agreement, including practicability of timelines indicated in the CFA.

On January 3, 2008, the government gave notice to abrogate the CFA, which became operational on January 17, 2008. Since then, many close observers of Sri Lanka’s conflict and the peace process, Co-Chairs of the Tokyo Donor Conference viz. Norway, Japan, the US and the EU, other friends of Sri Lanka and the civil society, have expressed concern. The sentiments commonly expressed have been that withdrawal from the CFA would escalate fighting, leading to heavy civilian casualties and violation of human rights, that there is no military solution to the conflict, that a solution can be found only through negotiation, and that parties to the conflict should return to the CFA.

First, the government’s notice of abrogation on January 3 was not out of the ordinary, as Article 4.4 of the CFA provided for either party to withdraw by giving 14 days notice to Norway. The government action to abide by the agreement, contrasts with the LTTE’s actions with respect to the previous truce, where the LTTE commenced hostilities following several hours of notice, on April 18 1995.

Second, the demand of a return to the CFA is like requesting a return to the make-believe world in which Sri Lankans lived since 2002. True, the CFA halted open hostilities and saved many lives. However, those who are familiar with the CFA would recall that the LTTE began violating the agreement willy-nilly, within weeks of signing it. By end April 2007, Tigers had amassed a catalogue of 3800 violations as determined by the Nordic monitors, as against some 300 minor violations by the government forces. I vividly recall how one of those initial violations took me to Kilinochchi for a meeting with late Tamilselvan. That encounter proved, beyond any doubt, how fickle the Tigers were, about upholding the nascent CFA. Throughout the CFA, they engaged in serious truce violations such as, assassinating moderate Tamil politicians, officials and members of the armed forces; murdering political opponents; engaging in suicide bombings; abducting civilians for ransom; and conscripting child soldiers, despite the tripartite agreement signed with the government and UNICEF. It was during this so-called “ceasefire,” that the Tigers assassinated foreign minister Lakshman Kadirgamar, made two attempts to kill another Tamil minister, Douglas Devananda, using female suicide bombers, and employed yet another female suicide bomber in an attempt to assassinate the commander of the Sri Lanka Army. I wonder, which country, among those who ask Sri Lanka today to return to the CFA, would agree to continue with a charade of that nature, in the face of such grave provocations.

It is a fact that a ceasefire agreement existed until recently. However, the violations listed by Nordic monitors clearly establish that the Tigers never ceased firing. What remained of the CFA, until its recent abrogation, was an agreement on paper, rendered defunct by the Tigers, from day one. In this backdrop, it is ironical that, after the government served notice to withdraw from the CFA, the LTTE solemnly declared, it would uphold the CFA 100%! However, none of those critical of the government’s decision, thought it fit to ask the Tigers why they failed to uphold the CFA 100% since inception.

Third, critics predict that Sri Lanka’s withdrawal from the CFA would result in increased levels of violence. If the Tigers had been genuine about a negotiated settlement, they had a golden opportunity in November 2005, when President Mahinda Rajapaksa was sworn in as President of Sri Lanka. The President, in his inaugural speech, said, “I reaffirm my commitment & determination to pursue the peace process to achieve an honorable peace that will respect the aspirations of all communities in our country…. To achieve this noble goal, my Government will be ready to engage the L.T.T.E. in discussing a political solution, when the L.T.T.E. declares their readiness to resume negotiations, which they unilaterally abandoned.” Two days after the inauguration, Prabhakaran acknowledged President Rajapaksa as a pragmatic man and said that he would give him time to find a solution to the conflict.

Pause for a moment to examine the difference between the words and the deeds of the Tigers.

Eight days later, on December 5, 2005, the Tigers carried out their first claymore mine attack against the armed forces. This was followed by killing scores of civilians in isolated villages, bombing of a market place in Trincomalee, employing a suicide bomber to assassinate the Army Commander, killing the third most senior officer of the army and detonating claymore mines targeting a bus carrying civilian passengers, taking the lives of over 60 passengers.

Thus, sane thinking would indicate that it was not the abrogation of the CFA that would lead to increased violence, but it was the ever increasing violence and grave provocations that led the government to abrogate the CFA.

Fourth, Sri Lanka shares the view of its friends, the US included, that the conflict can only be resolved politically, not militarily. President Rajapaksa said so on the day of his inauguration, and has, since, repeated it many times. If you think that the political leadership says one thing, and the military is pursuing its own agenda, Army Commander Sarath Fonseka, said at a media briefing on January 12, 2008, and I quote, “Ultimately, any solution will have to be political. But there can be a political solution only after the LTTE has laid down arms.”

Fifth, on the subject of the CFA, Sri Lanka has attempted no less than six series of negotiations, since 1985. Of those, only the last three, in 1995, 2002/2003 and 2006 were conducted in an environment of CFAs. This demonstrates that a CFA, while being a useful tool, is not essential for negotiations, if parties to the conflict are serious about a resolution. What is essential is to conduct negotiations in good faith until a lasting solution to the conflict is agreed upon.

Finally, a “ceasefire” by its very definition, is a temporary measure, until it is replaced by a more permanent arrangement. Similarly, the CFA signed between the government and the LTTE was a temporary suspension of hostilities until negotiations were concluded. After the Tigers unilaterally moved away from negotiations in April 2003, it took Norway nearly three years to bring them back to the table. When they repeated their performance in October 2006, there seemed little prospect of their return. Neither can the government be confident that the Tigers would be any less fickle in future peace talks, than they have been during the last two decades.

Thus, it is regrettable that the international community has failed to understand the complex dynamics that have played out over nearly three decades in Sri Lanka. With the ease of the uninformed, some countries repeatedly call on the government and the LTTE, to shun hostilities and to resume peace talks. The reality is that Sri Lanka has attempted negotiations with the Tigers on six different occasions, viz., in 1985 at Thimpu with Indian mediation; in 1987 with Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi taking the lead; during 1989/90 with President Premadasa; in 1995 with President Chandrika Kumaratunga; during 2002/03 with Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe; and with President Mahinda Rajapaksa in 2006. The past twenty odd years are testimony to the fact that Tigers only agree to negotiate as a mere ploy; to buy time to regroup, to replenish and to strengthen their fighting capability. When adequately geared to fight, they walk away from negotiations, as they have done at each series of talks. That was not all; they were brazen enough to take the lives of those who initiated two rounds of talks viz. the former Indian Prime Minister Gandhi and President Premadasa and very nearly took the life of President Kumaratunga, in all three instances employing suicide bombers.

We ought to ask, then, how serious were the Tigers, when they sat at the negotiating table. I can authoritatively speak of the six meetings we had in Bangkok, Oslo, Berlin, and Hakone, between September 2002 and March 2003, as I was part of the government team. The LTTE insisted that the two sides focus on banal issues, or to borrow late Balasingham’s own words, “the existential problems” faced by the Tamil civilians in the north and the east first, and only after resolving them, to discuss issues leading to a settlement of the conflict. Our plea that we utilize the time to discuss both issues simultaneously fell on deaf ears.
Against this background of Tiger stonewalling, Norway made a valiant bid in Oslo, in November 2002, to persuade the leader of the LTTE delegation to agree on a compromise, where the LTTE agreed to the terminology “the parties agreed to explore a solution founded on the principle of internal self –determination in areas of historical habitation of the Tamil-speaking peoples, based on federal structure with an united Sri Lanka…” and, for the first time, agreed to initiate discussions on substantive political issues leading to a political solution, such as: Power-sharing between the center and the region, as well as within the center; Geographical region; Human rights protection; Political and administrative mechanism; Public finance; and Law and order. That was a refreshing breakthrough, given the tense atmosphere in Oslo the previous evening. That was also a landmark decision, as the LTTE agreed to climb down from its demand for a separate state, and the government agreed to a solution based on a federal structure, a concession successive governments failed to concede to the Tamil minority.

What followed thereafter is history. Opposition soon built up against the leader of the LTTE delegation in his own camp, and he abruptly ended a crucial visit to Wanni, following Prabhakaran pressurizing him to retract. He returned to London, a sick and broken man and went into isolation, severing all connections with the LTTE, Norway and the rest of the world. Later, he painstakingly tried to explain there was no agreement in Oslo for a solution based on a federal arrangement!

The final meeting held in Hakone, Japan, in March 2003, was an eye opener, as that meeting clarified beyond any doubt that the LTTE had reverted to its old position of not discussing any substantive issue to resolve the conflict. On par with the understanding reached in Oslo, the International Adviser on Human Rights, Ian Martin, presented a paper, and the late Balasingham came up with reasons why they could not agree to international monitoring of human rights. His response was that Sri Lanka’s national Human Rights Commission was equal to the task. When pressed to focus on other substantive issues agreed upon in Oslo, Balasingham sheepishly said he had no mandate to discuss any of those subjects, proving that he had been prohibited from engaging in discussing substantive issues by the LTTE leadership.

I have traced the history of negotiations, not to heap blame on late Balasingham, or even on the LTTE. All what I want to say is, that the LTTE had a clear strategy then, as it does now, and that is, to establish a separate state by hook or by crook, irrespective of the deaths it would cause to the Tamil people it claims to represent, and destruction to the country. After all, Prabhakaran has given permission to his cadres to kill him if he wavers from the commitment he made for a separate state. And, the slogan of the LTTE still remains “The thirst of the Tigers is the Homeland of Tamil Eelam.”

Against this backdrop, the question we ask from those who urge the government to seek a negotiated settlement is, are they asking us to negotiate with the LTTE once again? If the LTTE demand for a separate state is non-negotiable, what exactly are we going to negotiate with them? There are more questions. How can a democratically elected government hand over a part of its sovereign territory to an undemocratic entity like the LTTE, which engages in terrorism? What is the fate of the Muslim and Sinhala people, living in the areas claimed by the LTTE, as the traditional homeland of the Tamils?

Finally, we have to ask, who would guarantee that this time around, the LTTE will not walk away from the negotiating table. Some may even ask, if the players were different, for example, would the US negotiate with a terrorist group, which has used suicide bombers to assassinate one president, nearly killed another president, and assassinated several secretaries, including the Secretary of State? There are certain individuals, who try to draw parallels between the LTTE demands with the American demand for independence from Britain. However, in my view, the more appropriate comparison is to describe the LTTE to the secessionist Confederates, who tried to break away from the Union. As President Abraham Lincoln said in his First Inaugural Address on March 4, 1861,“Plainly, the central idea of secession, is the essence of anarchy."

Likewise, “Physically speaking, we can not separate. We cannot remove our respective sections from each other nor build an impassable wall between them” Sri Lankan government too, being a representative entity like the Union, finds secession wholly unacceptable, and seeks friendship of all its citizens, and genuine peace, as President Lincoln did, where all citizens in the country can co-exist as equals in harmony, as they did for many centuries. Throughout the conflict, Sri Lanka’s friends have remained steadfastly supportive of a negotiated solution to the conflict.

The Tigers, however, see this involvement as being partial toward the government. In his Heroes Day speech in November 2007, referring to the role of the international community, Prabhakaran, said, “This partisan and unjust conduct of the international community has severely undermined the confidence our people had in them. And it has paved the way for the breakdown of the ceasefire and the peace efforts.”

Despite the stance of Tigers, Sri Lanka is indeed appreciative of the positive role played by the international community in the war on terrorism. The ban on the LTTE, first by India, the U.S., the U.K., followed by Canada and the 27 member EU, has helped dampen the Tigers’ increasing ability to raise funds for their war chest.

The U.S. ban on one of the LTTE front organizations, the Tamil Rehabilitation Organization (TRO) in November 2007, was a significant blow to the Tiger fundraising capabilities. This kind of international action is critical to make the Tigers realize they do not have an endless fount of resources to carry on a relentless terrorist campaign to achieve its major political objective, a separate state, by force of arms.

The international community also needs to persuade the LTTE to return to the negotiating table, and to hang in there until a satisfactory comprise is reached. Only such action will drive home the message that undemocratic methods of seizing power as the Tigers currently employ, are unacceptable to the civilized world.
The international community needs to be cognizant that democracies cannot take extra-constitutional measures, and, political solutions to conflicts require discussion, debate and compromise before consensus is reached.

As you may be aware, after deliberating for one and a half years, the All Party Representative Committee (APRC), comprising the political spectrum of the country, submitted its proposals for devolution to the President, two days ago. Complex arrangements for devolution and power sharing, that also involve constitutional changes and consultation of the people, are inevitably, an incremental process. It is necessary to remind the international community, that this is only a beginning of an evolving process, which requires its fullest and continuing support.

Abrogation de CFA : Une nécessité la plus contraignante - l'Ambassadeur Bernard Goonatilleke
Automatically translated into French thanks to WorldLingo
L'abrogation de l'accord de cessez-le-feu était une nécessité la plus contraignante, ambassadeur indiqué de Sri Lankan à Washington, Bernard Goonetilleke faisant une analyse détaillée devant un groupe de discussion de Washington. Il a ajouté que les vingt dernières années impaires sont témoignage au fait que les tigres acceptent seulement de négocier comme seul stratagème ; pour acheter l'heure de regrouper, pour compléter le niveau et renforcer de leurs possibilités de combat
si en juste proportion prêts pour combattre, ils marchent loin des négociations, comme ils ont fait à chaque série d'entretiens. Ce n'était pas tout ; ils étaient assez d'airain pour prendre les vies de ceux qui lancent deux séries des entretiens à savoir l'ancien premier ministre indien Gandhi et Président Premadasa et a presque tout à fait pris la vie du Président Kumaratunga, dans chacun des trois exemples employant des bombardiers de suicide. Quand les choses n'étaient aucun aller leur manière, elles ont blâmé la communauté internationale en tant qu'étant partisanes et injustes.

L'à texte intégral de la parole de l'Ambassadeur Goonetilleke's est donné ci-dessous :

Je suis privilégié, pour pouvoir partager avec toi, quelques pensées sur les tentatives du Sri Lanka de résolution de conflit et négociation de paix avec les tigres de libération d'Eelam tamoul ou du LTTE, qui, le FBI plus tôt ce mois présenté comme, « un des extrémistes les plus dangereux et les plus mortels au monde. »

Je regrette ce Dr. La craie de Peter, qui était de parler « de la dimension internationale du LTTE, » ne pourrait pas être avec nous aujourd'hui. Cependant, comme prévu, je me concentrerai sur l'accord de cessez-le-feu, le processus de paix et le rôle de la communauté internationale, alors que Dr. Stanley Samarasinghe parlera de la façon dont le Sri Lanka pourrait normalement résoudre le conflit.

Vous vous rendez compte que le Sri Lanka soit une démocratie multi-ethnique et multi-religieuse, en fait, une des démocraties les plus anciennes en Asie du sud. Vous vous rendez également compte que le LTTE évite la démocratie, et prévoit, par le terrorisme, pour établir un état séparé dans le nord du Sri Lanka et un est mono-ethniques et mono-politiques. Cet état séparé entourera approximativement 30% des masses continentales du pays, et est prévu pour les Tamoul de Sri Lankan, qui, selon le recensement the1981, comportent approximativement 12% de la population du comté. La majorité de ces Tamoul, par ailleurs, de phase en dehors du nord et de l'est.

Le chef de LTTE, Prabhakaran dans un discours le 27 novembre, l'année dernière dit, et je cite, « nous luttons pour regagner seulement notre souveraineté dans notre propre terre historique où nous avons vécu pendant des siècles, la souveraineté que nous avons perdue aux occupants coloniaux. » La souveraineté qu'il a parlé de finie en 1560, quand le Portugais a défait la règle de Jaffna, Cankili 1, plus de 200 ans avant les États-Unis déclaration de l'indépendance. Notez que la règle de Cankili à ce moment-là a été limitée à Jaffna, et ne vous êtes pas prolongé aux provinces nordiques et orientales actuelles.

La demande de LTTE d'un état séparé, appelée « Eelam tamoul, » au mieux, peut être décrite comme « factice, » pour il n'y avait jamais, à tout moment dans l'histoire du Sri Lanka, « une patrie tamoule traditionnelle, » comme résolution de Vadukkodai de 1976, avouée basé sur une réclamation incorrecte par le premier secrétaire colonial britannique Hugh Cleghorn.

Le Sri Lanka est une petite île, maison à 20 millions, semblable dans la taille à la Virginie Occidentale, ou est deux fois plus grand que l'île d'Hawaï. Il a été à la maison à beaucoup de groupes ethniques pendant plus de 2000 années, qui ont émigré au nord aux sud et aux sud au nord au cours des années. Ainsi, le Sinhalese, Tamoul, amarre, Burghers, Malais et d'autres communautés, trop nombreuses être énuméré, peuvent tout légitime réclamer l'île en tant que leur patrie traditionnelle.

L'accord du cessez-le-feu du Sri Lanka ou les CFA et son abrogation récente ont été infiniment dans les nouvelles de nos jours. Ma connaissance du CFA fonctionne de nouveau à la période de sa présentation sous forme d'ébauche par la Norvège, à sa signature en février 2002, à son exécution, ou à plus au point, sa violation d'airain par le LTTE, du jour un. Je rappelle ma remarque critique dans le novembre 2005 tôt, celui qu'un défaut éclatant du CFA était la rapidité excessive de sa conclusion, niant l'occasion, en particulier au gouvernement du Sri Lanka, de le contrôler profondément.

L'ardeur pour conclure le CFA avec mineurs retardent, étaient due au fait, celui par Christmas 2001, le gouvernement avait été d'accord sur un cessez-le-feu sans cérémonie lancé par le LTTE, et la Norvège, dans sa sagesse, l'a considérée souhaitable faire signer un accord formel avant que le cessez-le-feu sans cérémonie ait commencé à se démêler. Dans la rétrospection, au moins certaines des imperfections du CFA pourraient avoir été adressées, si les parties avaient plus de temps pour considérer les ramifications de différents articles de l'accord, y compris la praticabilité des chronologies indiquées dans le CFA.

Le 3 janvier 2008, le gouvernement a donné la notification abrogent le CFA, qui est devenu opérationnel le 17 janvier 2008. Depuis lors, beaucoup d'observateurs étroits du conflit du Sri Lanka et du processus de paix, Co-Chaises de la conférence de distributeur de Tokyo à savoir La Norvège, le Japon, les USA et l'UE, d'autres amis du Sri Lanka et la société civile, ont exprimé des inquiétudes. Les sentiments généralement exprimés ont été que le retrait du CFA escaladerait le combat, menant aux accidents civils et à la violation lourds des droits de l'homme, qu'il n'y a aucune solution militaire au conflit, qu'une solution peut être trouvée seulement par la négociation, et que les parties au conflit devraient retourner au CFA.

D'abord, la notification du gouvernement de l'abrogation le 3 janvier n'était pas hors de l'ordinaire, car l'article 4.4 du CFA a prévu pour l'une ou l'autre partie pour se retirer en donnant 14 jours de préavis en Norvège. L'action de gouvernement à respecter l'accord, contrastes avec les actions du LTTE en ce qui concerne la trêve précédente, où le LTTE a débuté des hostilités après plusieurs heures de notification, le 18 avril 1995.

En second lieu, la demande d'un retour au CFA est comme demander un retour au monde de faire-croyance en lequel Sri Lankans a vécu depuis 2002. Vrais, les CFA stoppés ouvrent des hostilités et ont sauvé beaucoup de vies. Cependant, ceux qui sont au courant du CFA se rappelleraient que le LTTE a commencé à violer l'accord willy-nilly, dans des semaines de le signer. Par l'extrémité l'avril 2007, les tigres avaient amassé un catalogue des violations 3800 comme déterminé par les moniteurs nordiques, par comparaison avec environ 300 violations mineures par les forces de gouvernement. Je me rappelle vividly comment une de ces violations initiales m'a porté à Kilinochchi pour une réunion avec défunt Tamilselvan. Cette rencontre s'est avérée, au delà de n'importe quel doute, comment inconsistant les tigres étaient, au sujet de confirmer le CFA naissant. Dans tout le CFA, ils se sont engagés dans des violations sérieuses de trêve comme, assassinant les politiciens, les fonctionnaires et les membres tamoul modérés des forces armées ; meutre des adversaires politiques ; s'engager dans des bombardements de suicide ; civils enlevants pour la rançon ; et soldats enrôlants d'enfant, en dépit de l'accord tripartite signé avec le gouvernement et l'UNICEF. Il était pendant ce prétendu « cessez-le-feu, » que les tigres ont assassiné le ministre des affaires étrangères Lakshman Kadirgamar, fait deux tentatives de tuer un autre ministre tamoul, Douglas Devananda, en utilisant les bombardiers femelles de suicide, et utilisé encore un autre bombardier femelle de suicide afin d'essayer d'assassiner le commandant de l'armée du Sri Lanka. Je me demande, que le pays, parmi ceux qui demandent le Sri Lanka aujourd'hui de retourner au CFA, accepterait de continuer une charade de cette nature, face à de telles provocations graves.

C'est un fait qu'un accord de cessez-le-feu a existé jusque récemment. Cependant, les violations énumérées par les moniteurs nordiques établissent clairement que les tigres n'ont jamais cessé de mettre le feu. Ce qui est resté du CFA, jusqu'à son abrogation récente, était un accord sur le papier, rendu ancien par les tigres, du jour un. En ce contexte, il est ironique que, après que le gouvernement ait fait la mise en demeure de se retirer du CFA, le LTTE solennellement avoué, il confirmerait le CFA 100% ! Cependant, aucune de ceux critiques de la décision du gouvernement, pensée qu'elle est allée pour demander aux tigres pourquoi ils n'ont pas confirmé le CFA 100% depuis le commencement.

Troisièmement, les critiques prévoient que le retrait du Sri Lanka du CFA aurait comme conséquence les plus grands niveaux de la violence. Si les tigres avaient été véritables au sujet d'un règlement négocié, ils ont eu une occasion magnifique en novembre 2005, quand le Président Mahinda Rajapaksa a été juré dedans comme président du Sri Lanka. Le président, dans son discours inaugural, a déclaré, « je réaffirme mon engagement et détermination pour poursuivre le processus de paix pour réaliser une paix honorable qui respectera les aspirations de toutes les communautés dans notre pays…. Pour réaliser ce but noble, mon gouvernement sera prêt à engager le L.T.T.E. en discutant une solution politique, quand le L.T.T.E. déclare leur promptitude pour reprendre les négociations, qu'ils ont unilatéralement abandonnées. » Pendant deux jours après l'inauguration, Prabhakaran a reconnu le Président Rajapaksa en tant qu'homme pragmatique et a indiqué qu'il lui donnerait l'heure de trouver une solution au conflit.

Faites une pause pendant un moment pour examiner la différence entre les mots et les contrats des tigres.

Pendant huit jours plus tard, le 5 décembre 2005, les tigres ont effectué leur première attaque de mine de claymore contre les forces armées. Ceci a été suivi de tuer une masse de civils dans les villages d'isolement, bombardement d'un marché dans Trincomalee, utilisant un bombardier de suicide pour assassiner le commandant d'armée, tuant le tiers la plupart de dirigeant aîné de l'armée et détonant des mines de claymore visant un autobus transportant les passagers civils, prenant les vies de plus de 60 passagers.

Ainsi, la pensée raisonnable indiquerait que ce n'était pas l'abrogation du CFA qui mènerait à la violence accrue, mais c'était la violence toujours croissante et les provocations graves que cela a mené le gouvernement abrogent le CFA.

Quatrièmement, le Sri Lanka partage l'opinion de ses amis, USA inclus, que le conflit peut seulement être résolu politiquement, pas militairement. Le Président Rajapaksa a déclaré ainsi le jour de son inauguration, et, puisque, l'a répété beaucoup de fois. Si vous pensez que la conduite politique indique une chose, et les militaires poursuivent son propre ordre du jour, commandant Sarath Fonseka d'armée, dit à des médias donnant des instructions le 12 janvier 2008, et je cite, « finalement, n'importe quelle solution devrai être politique. Mais il peut y a une solution politique seulement après que le LTTE a fixé des bras. Le »

cinquième, au sujet du CFA, Sri Lanka n'a essayé aucune moins de six séries de négociations, depuis 1985. De ceux, les seulement trois derniers, en 1995, 2002/2003 et 2006 ont été conduits dans un environnement de CFAs. Ceci démontre qu'un CFA, tout en étant un outil utile, n'est pas essentiel pour des négociations, si les parties au conflit sont sérieuses au sujet d'une résolution. Ce qui est essentiel est de conduire des négociations en bonne foi jusqu'à ce qu'une solution durable au conflit soit convenue.

En conclusion, un « cessez-le-feu » par sa définition même, est une mesure provisoire, jusqu'à ce qu'il soit remplacé par une disposition plus permanente. De même, le CFA signé entre le gouvernement et le LTTE était une suspension provisoire des hostilités jusqu'à ce qu'on ait conclu des négociations. Après que les tigres aient unilatéralement éloigné des négociations en avril 2003, cela a pris à la Norvège presque trois ans pour les apporter de nouveau à la table. Quand ils ont répété leur exécution en octobre 2006, là semblé peu de perspective de leur retour. Ni l'un ni l'autre ne mettent en boîte le gouvernement soient confiants que les tigres seraient moins inconsistants dans de futurs entretiens de paix, qu'elles ont eu lieu pendant les deux dernières décennies.

Ainsi, il est regrettable que la communauté internationale n'a pas compris la dynamique complexe qui ont joué dehors l'excédent presque pendant trois décennies au Sri Lanka. Avec la facilité du non informé, quelques pays invitent à plusieurs reprises le gouvernement et le LTTE, pour éviter des hostilités et pour reprendre des entretiens de paix. La réalité est que le Sri Lanka a essayé des négociations avec les tigres à six occasions différentes, à savoir, en 1985 chez Thimpu avec la médiation indienne ; en 1987 avec le premier ministre Rajiv Gandhi prenant la tête ; pendant le 1989/90 avec le Président Premadasa ; en 1995 avec le Président Chandrika Kumaratunga ; pendant le 2002/03 avec le premier ministre Ranil Wickremesinghe ; et avec le Président Mahinda Rajapaksa en 2006. Les vingt dernières années impaires sont témoignage au fait que les tigres acceptent seulement de négocier comme seul stratagème ; pour acheter l'heure de regrouper, compléter le niveau et renforcer de leurs possibilités de combat. Une fois en juste proportion embrayés pour combattre, ils marchent loin des négociations, comme ils ont fait à chaque série d'entretiens. Ce n'était pas tout ; ils étaient assez d'airain pour prendre les vies de ceux qui lancent deux séries des entretiens à savoir l'ancien premier ministre indien Gandhi et Président Premadasa et a presque tout à fait pris la vie du Président Kumaratunga, dans chacun des trois exemples employant des bombardiers de suicide.

Nous devons demander, puis, comment sérieux étaient les tigres, quand ils se sont reposés à la table de négociation. Je peux avec autorité parler réunions des six que nous avons eues à Bangkok, Oslo, Berlin, et Hakone, entre les septembre 2002 et mars 2003, car je faisais partie de l'équipe de gouvernement. Le LTTE a insisté sur le fait que les deux côtés se concentrent sur les questions banales, ou pour emprunter les propres mots de défunt Balasingham, « les problèmes existentiels » considérés par les civils tamoul dans le nord et le premier est, et seulement après les résoudre, pour discuter des questions menant à un règlement du conflit. Notre réclamation que nous utilisons l'heure de discuter les deux questions simultanément est tombée sur les oreilles sourdes.
Dans cette perspective du tigre stonewalling, la Norvège a fait un vaillant offrir à Oslo, en novembre 2002, pour persuader le chef de la délégation de LTTE d'être d'accord sur un compromis, où le LTTE était d'accord sur la terminologie « les parties acceptées pour explorer une solution fondée selon le principe de l'autodétermination interne dans les secteurs de l'habitation historique des peuples Tamil-parlants, basé sur la structure fédérale avec le Sri Lanka uni… » et, pour la première fois, accepté de lancer des discussions sur les questions politiques substantives menant à une solution politique, comme : De partage du pouvoir entre le centre et la région, aussi bien que dans le centre ; Région géographique ; Protection de droits de l'homme ; Mécanisme politique et administratif ; Finances publiques ; et loi et ordre. C'était une percée régénérateuse, donnée l'atmosphère tendue à Oslo la soirée précédente. C'était également une décision importante, car le LTTE était d'accord sur l'élever vers le bas de sa demande d'un état séparé, et le gouvernement était d'accord sur une solution basée sur une structure fédérale, gouvernements successifs d'une concession n'est pas concédé à la minorité tamoule.

Ce qui a suivi ensuite est histoire. L'opposition s'est bientôt accumulée contre le chef de la délégation de LTTE dans son propre camp, et il a abruptement fini une visite cruciale à Wanni, suivant Prabhakaran le pressurisant pour se rétracter. Il est revenu à Londres, à un homme malade et cassé et est entré dans l'isolement, divisant tous les raccordements avec le LTTE, la Norvège et le reste du monde. Plus tard, il a soigneusement essayé d'expliquer là n'était aucun accord à Oslo pour une solution basée sur un arrangement fédéral !

La réunion finale tenue dans Hakone, Japon, en mars 2003, était un ouvreur d'oeil, en tant que cette réunion clarifiée au delà de n'importe quel doute que le LTTE avait retourné dans sa vieille position de ne pas discuter n'importe quelle question substantive à la résolution le conflit. Sur le pair avec l'arrangement atteint à Oslo, le conseiller international sur des droits de l'homme, Ian Martin, a présenté un papier, et le défunt Balasingham a proposé des raisons pour lesquelles ils ne pourraient pas être d'accord sur la surveillance internationale des droits de l'homme. His response was that Sri Lanka’s national Human Rights Commission was equal to the task. When pressed to focus on other substantive issues agreed upon in Oslo, Balasingham sheepishly said he had no mandate to discuss any of those subjects, proving that he had been prohibited from engaging in discussing substantive issues by the LTTE leadership.

I have traced the history of negotiations, not to heap blame on late Balasingham, or even on the LTTE. All what I want to say is, that the LTTE had a clear strategy then, as it does now, and that is, to establish a separate state by hook or by crook, irrespective of the deaths it would cause to the Tamil people it claims to represent, and destruction to the country. After all, Prabhakaran has given permission to his cadres to kill him if he wavers from the commitment he made for a separate state. And, the slogan of the LTTE still remains “The thirst of the Tigers is the Homeland of Tamil Eelam.”

Against this backdrop, the question we ask from those who urge the government to seek a negotiated settlement is, are they asking us to negotiate with the LTTE once again? If the LTTE demand for a separate state is non-negotiable, what exactly are we going to negotiate with them? There are more questions. How can a democratically elected government hand over a part of its sovereign territory to an undemocratic entity like the LTTE, which engages in terrorism? What is the fate of the Muslim and Sinhala people, living in the areas claimed by the LTTE, as the traditional homeland of the Tamils?

Finally, we have to ask, who would guarantee that this time around, the LTTE will not walk away from the negotiating table. Some may even ask, if the players were different, for example, would the US negotiate with a terrorist group, which has used suicide bombers to assassinate one president, nearly killed another president, and assassinated several secretaries, including the Secretary of State? There are certain individuals, who try to draw parallels between the LTTE demands with the American demand for independence from Britain. However, in my view, the more appropriate comparison is to describe the LTTE to the secessionist Confederates, who tried to break away from the Union. As President Abraham Lincoln said in his First Inaugural Address on March 4, 1861,“Plainly, the central idea of secession, is the essence of anarchy."

Likewise, “Physically speaking, we can not separate. We cannot remove our respective sections from each other nor build an impassable wall between them” Sri Lankan government too, being a representative entity like the Union, finds secession wholly unacceptable, and seeks friendship of all its citizens, and genuine peace, as President Lincoln did, where all citizens in the country can co-exist as equals in harmony, as they did for many centuries. Throughout the conflict, Sri Lanka’s friends have remained steadfastly supportive of a negotiated solution to the conflict.

The Tigers, however, see this involvement as being partial toward the government. In his Heroes Day speech in November 2007, referring to the role of the international community, Prabhakaran, said, “This partisan and unjust conduct of the international community has severely undermined the confidence our people had in them. And it has paved the way for the breakdown of the ceasefire and the peace efforts.”

Despite the stance of Tigers, Sri Lanka is indeed appreciative of the positive role played by the international community in the war on terrorism. The ban on the LTTE, first by India, the U.S., the U.K., followed by Canada and the 27 member EU, has helped dampen the Tigers’ increasing ability to raise funds for their war chest.

The U.S. ban on one of the LTTE front organizations, the Tamil Rehabilitation Organization (TRO) in November 2007, was a significant blow to the Tiger fundraising capabilities. This kind of international action is critical to make the Tigers realize they do not have an endless fount of resources to carry on a relentless terrorist campaign to achieve its major political objective, a separate state, by force of arms.

The international community also needs to persuade the LTTE to return to the negotiating table, and to hang in there until a satisfactory comprise is reached. Only such action will drive home the message that undemocratic methods of seizing power as the Tigers currently employ, are unacceptable to the civilized world.
The international community needs to be cognizant that democracies cannot take extra-constitutional measures, and, political solutions to conflicts require discussion, debate and compromise before consensus is reached.

As you may be aware, after deliberating for one and a half years, the All Party Representative Committee (APRC), comprising the political spectrum of the country, submitted its proposals for devolution to the President, two days ago. Complex arrangements for devolution and power sharing, that also involve constitutional changes and consultation of the people, are inevitably, an incremental process. It is necessary to remind the international community, that this is only a beginning of an evolving process, which requires its fullest and continuing support.

Abrogación del CFA: Una necesidad que obliga lo más - embajador Bernard Goonatilleke
Automatically translated into Spanish thanks to WorldLingo
La abrogación del acuerdo del alto el fuego era una necesidad que obligaba lo más, embajador indicado en Washington, Bernard Goonetilleke de Sri Lankan que hacía un análisis profundizado antes de un grupo de discusión de Washington. Él agregó que los últimos veinte años impares son testimonio al hecho de que los tigres acuerdan solamente negociar como trabajo mero; para comprar hora de reagrupar, llenar y consolidar su capacidad que lucha
cuando adecuadamente son listos para luchar, caminan lejos de negociaciones, como han hecho en cada serie de negociaciones. Ése no era todo; eran bastante descarados tomar las vidas de los que iniciaron dos redondos de negociaciones viz el primer ministro indio anterior Gandhi y presidente Premadasa y tomó casi completamente la vida de presidente Kumaratunga, en los tres casos empleando bombarderos del suicidio. Cuando las cosas no eran el ningún ir su manera, culparon a comunidad internacional como siendo partisanas e injustas.

El con texto completo del discurso de embajador Goonetilleke se da abajo:

Soy privilegiado, poder compartir con usted, algunos pensamientos en las tentativas de Sri Lanka en la resolución del conflicto y la negociación de la paz con los tigres de la liberación del Tamil Eelam o el LTTE, que, el FBI anterior este mes introducido como, “uno de los extremistas más peligrosos y más mortales del mundo.”

Lamento a ese Dr. La tiza de Peter, que era hablar en “la dimensión internacional del LTTE,” no podría estar con nosotros hoy. Sin embargo, según lo previsto, me centraré en el acuerdo del alto el fuego, el proceso de la paz y el papel de la comunidad internacional, mientras que el Dr. Stanley Samarasinghe hablará en cómo Sri Lanka podría resolver realista el conflicto.

Usted está enterado que Sri Lanka es una democracia multi-ethnic, multi-religiosa, de hecho, una de las más viejas democracias de Asia del Sur. Usted está también enterado que el LTTE evita democracia, y piensa, con terrorismo, para establecer un estado separado en el norte de Sri Lanka y un este mono-étnicos, mono-políticos. Este estado separado abarcará el aproximadamente 30% de los landmass del país, y se piensa para los Tamils de Sri Lankan, que, según el censo the1981, abarcan el aproximadamente 12% de la población del condado. La mayoría de estos Tamils, incidentemente, vivos fuera del norte y del este.

El líder de LTTE, Prabhakaran en un discurso el 27 de noviembre, dicho el año pasado, y cotizo, “estamos luchando para recuperar solamente nuestra soberanía en nuestra propia tierra histórica en donde hemos vivido por siglos, la soberanía que perdimos a los inquilinos coloniales.” La soberanía que él habló de haber terminado en 1560, cuando el portugués derrotó la regla de Jaffna, Cankili 1, más de 200 años antes de los E.E.U.U. declaración de la independencia. Observe que la regla de Cankili en aquel momento fue limitada a Jaffna, y no extendió a las provincias norteñas y del este actuales.

La demanda de LTTE para un estado separado, llamada “Tamil Eelam,” en el mejor de los casos, puede ser descrita como “ficticio,” para nunca había, en cualquier momento en la historia de Sri Lanka, “una patria tradicional del Tamil,” como la resolución de Vadukkodai de 1976, declarada basado en una demanda errónea por la primera secretaria colonial británica Hugh Cleghorn.

Sri Lanka es una isla pequeña, hogar a 20 millones, similar de tamaño a Virginia Occidental, o es dos veces el tamaño de la isla de Hawaii. Ha sido casero a muchos grupos étnicos por más de 2000 años, que emigraron al norte al sur y al sur al norte sobre los años. Así, el Sinhalese, Tamils, amarra, Burghers, Malays y otras comunidades, demasiado numerosas ser enumerado, pueden todos legítimo demandar la isla como su patria tradicional.

El acuerdo del alto el fuego de Sri Lanka o los CFA y su abrogación reciente han estado mucho en las noticias actualmente. Mi familiaridad con el CFA funciona de nuevo a la época de su presentación en forma de bosquejo por Noruega, a su firma en febrero de 2002, a su puesta en práctica, o más al punto, su violación descarada por el LTTE, a partir del día uno. Recuerdo mi observación crítica en el noviembre de 2005 temprano, de que que un defecto que se deslumbraba del CFA era la rapidez excesiva de su conclusión, negando la oportunidad, particularmente al gobierno de Sri Lanka, de escudriñarlo profundamente.

La impaciencia para concluir el CFA con lo menos retrasa, era debido al hecho, de que de Christmas 2001, el gobierno había convenido un alto el fuego informal iniciado por el LTTE, y Noruega, en su sabiduría, la consideraba deseable hacer un acuerdo formal firmar antes de que el alto el fuego informal comenzara a desenredar. En la retrospección, por lo menos algunos de los defectos del CFA se habrían podido tratar, si los partidos tenían más tiempo para considerar las ramificaciones de los artículos individuales del acuerdo, incluyendo la factibilidad de los timelines indicados en el CFA.

El 3 de enero de 2008, el gobierno dio el aviso abroga el CFA, que llegó a ser operacional el 17 de enero de 2008. Desde entonces, muchos observadores cercanos del conflicto y del proceso de la paz, Co-Sillas de Sri Lanka de la conferencia dispensadora de aceite de Tokio viz Noruega, Japón, los E.E.U.U. y el EU, otros amigos de Sri Lanka y la sociedad civil, han expresado la preocupación. Los sentimientos expresados comúnmente han sido que el retiro del CFA extendería luchar, conduciendo a las víctimas civiles y a la violación pesadas de derechos humanos, que no hay solución militar al conflicto, que una solución se puede encontrar solamente con la negociación, y que los partidos al conflicto deben volver al CFA.

Primero, el aviso del gobierno de la abrogación el 3 de enero no estaba fuera de lo común, pues el artículo 4.4 del CFA previo cualquier parte para retirarse dando el aviso de 14 días a Noruega. La acción del gobierno a seguir el acuerdo, contrastes con las acciones del LTTE con respecto a la tregua anterior, donde el LTTE comenzó hostilidades después de varias horas del aviso, el 18 de abril de 1995.

En segundo lugar, la demanda de una vuelta al CFA es como la petición de una vuelta al mundo de la hacer-creencia en el cual Sri Lankans vivió desde 2002. Verdad, el CFA paró hostilidades abiertas y ahorró muchas vidas. Sin embargo, los que están al corriente del CFA recordarían que el LTTE comenzó a violar el acuerdo willy-nilly, dentro de semanas de firmarlo. Por el extremo el abril de 2007, los tigres habían amontonado un catálogo de las violaciones 3800 según lo determinado por los monitores nórdicos, en contraste con unas 300 violaciones de menor importancia por las fuerzas del gobierno. Vividly recuerdo cómo una de esas violaciones iniciales me llevó a Kilinochchi para una reunión con último Tamilselvan. Ese encuentro probó, más allá de cualquier duda, cómo es voluble eran los tigres, sobre mantener el CFA naciente. A través del CFA, engancharon a violaciones serias de la tregua por ejemplo, asesinando políticos del Tamil, funcionarios y a miembros moderados de las fuerzas armadas; asesinar a opositores políticos; acoplamiento a bombardeos del suicidio; civiles que secuestran para el rescate; y soldados del niño que reclutan, a pesar de el acuerdo tripartito firmado con el gobierno y la Unicef. Estaba durante este “alto el fuego supuesto,” que los tigres asesinaron a Ministro de Asuntos Exteriores Lakshman Kadirgamar, hecho dos tentativas de matar a otro ministro del Tamil, Douglas Devananda, usando bombarderos femeninos del suicidio, y empleado otro bombardero femenino del suicidio en un intento por asesinar al comandante del ejército de Sri Lanka. Me pregunto, a que el país, entre los que piden que Sri Lanka hoy vuelva al CFA, acordaría continuar con una charada de esa naturaleza, frente a tales provocations graves.

Es un hecho de que existió un acuerdo del alto el fuego hasta hace poco tiempo. Sin embargo, las violaciones enumeradas por los monitores nórdicos establecen claramente que los tigres nunca dejaron de encender. Qué permanecía del CFA, hasta su abrogación reciente, era un acuerdo en el papel, hecho difunto por los tigres, a partir del día uno. ¡En este contexto, es irónico que, después de que el gobierno sirviera el aviso de retirarse del CFA, el LTTE declarado solemnemente, él mantendría el CFA 100%! Sin embargo, ningunos de ésos críticos de la decisión del gobierno, pensamiento que cupo para preguntar a los tigres porqué no pudieron mantener el CFA 100% desde el inicio.

Tercero, los críticos predicen que el retiro de Sri Lanka del CFA daría lugar a niveles crecientes de la violencia. Si los tigres habían sido genuinos sobre un establecimiento negociado, tenían una excelente oportunidad en noviembre de 2005, cuando juraron presidente Mahinda Rajapaksa adentro como presidente de Sri Lanka. El presidente, en su discurso inaugural, dijo, “reafirmo mi comisión y determinación para perseguir el proceso de la paz para alcanzar una paz honorable que respete las aspiraciones de todas las comunidades en nuestro país…. Para alcanzar esta meta noble, mi gobierno será listo contratar el L.T.T.E. en discutir una solución política, cuando el L.T.T.E. declara su preparación para reasumir las negociaciones, que abandonaron unilateral.” Dos días después de la inauguración, Prabhakaran reconoció a presidente Rajapaksa como hombre pragmático y dijo que él le daría hora de encontrar una solución al conflicto.

Deténgase brevemente por un momento para examinar la diferencia entre las palabras y los hechos de los tigres.

Ocho días más adelante, el 5 de diciembre de 2005, los tigres realizaron su primer ataque de la mina del claymore contra las fuerzas armadas. Esto fue seguida matando a cuentas de civiles en las aldeas aisladas, el bombardear de un mercado en Trincomalee, empleando un bombardero del suicidio para asesinar al comandante del ejército, matando al tercero la mayoría del antiguo funcionario del ejército y detonando las minas del claymore que apuntaban un autobús que llevaba a pasajeros civiles, tomando las vidas sobre de 60 pasajeros.

Así, el pensamiento sano indicaría que no era la abrogación del CFA que conduciría a la violencia creciente, pero era la violencia cada vez mayor y los provocations graves que ése condujo el gobierno abrogan el CFA.

Cuarto, Sri Lanka comparte la opinión sus amigos, los E.E.U.U. incluidos, que el conflicto se puede resolver solamente político, no no militar. Presidente Rajapaksa dijo así que en el día de su inauguración, y, puesto que, lo ha repetido muchas veces. Si usted piensa que la dirección política dice una cosa, y los militares están persiguiendo su propia agenda, comandante Sarath Fonseka del ejército, dicho en los medios que resumen el 12 de enero de 2008, y cotizo, “en última instancia, cualquier solución tengo que ser político. Pero puede haber una solución política solamente después que el LTTE ha colocado los brazos. El”

quinto, a propósito del CFA, Sri Lanka no ha procurado ninguna menos de seis series de negociaciones, desde 1985. De ésos, solamente el tres pasados, en 1995, 2002/2003 y 2006 fueron conducidos en un ambiente de CFAs. Esto demuestra que un CFA, mientras que siendo una herramienta útil, no es esencial para las negociaciones, si los partidos al conflicto son serios sobre una resolución. Cuál es esencial es conducir negociaciones de buena fé hasta que una solución duradera al conflicto se conviene en.

Finalmente, un “alto el fuego” por su misma definición, es una medida temporal, hasta que es substituido por un arreglo más permanente. Semejantemente, el CFA firmó entre el gobierno y el LTTE era una suspensión temporal de hostilidades hasta que las negociaciones fueron concluidas. Después de que los tigres se movieran unilateral lejos de negociaciones en abril de 2003, tomó a Noruega casi tres años para traerlos de nuevo a la tabla. Cuando repitieron su funcionamiento en octubre de 2006, allí parecido poca perspectiva de su vuelta. Ni unos ni otros pueden el gobierno sean confidentes que los tigres serían menos volubles en las negociaciones futuras de la paz, que ellos han sido durante las dos décadas pasadas.

Así, es deplorable que la comunidad internacional no ha podido entender las dinámicas complejas que han jugado hacia fuera el excedente casi tres décadas en Sri Lanka. Con la facilidad del mal informado, algunos países invitan en varias ocasiones el gobierno y el LTTE, para evitar hostilidades y para reasumir negociaciones de la paz. La realidad es que Sri Lanka ha procurado negociaciones con los tigres en seis diversas ocasiones, viz, en 1985 en Thimpu con la mediación india; en 1987 con el primer ministro Rajiv Gandhi que toma el plomo; durante 1989/90 con presidente Premadasa; en 1995 con presidente Chandrika Kumaratunga; durante 2002/03 con el primer ministro Ranil Wickremesinghe; y con presidente Mahinda Rajapaksa en 2006. Los últimos veinte años impares son testimonio al hecho de que los tigres acuerdan solamente negociar como trabajo mero; para comprar hora de reagrupar, de llenar y de consolidar su capacidad que lucha. Cuando están engranados adecuadamente para luchar, caminan lejos de negociaciones, como han hecho en cada serie de negociaciones. Ése no era todo; eran bastante descarados tomar las vidas de los que iniciaron dos redondos de negociaciones viz el primer ministro indio anterior Gandhi y presidente Premadasa y tomó casi completamente la vida de presidente Kumaratunga, en los tres casos empleando bombarderos del suicidio.

Ought pedir, después, cómo son serios eran los tigres, cuando se sentaron en la tabla de negociación. Puedo autoritariamente hablar reuniones que teníamos en Bangkok, Oslo, Berlín, y Hakone de las seis, entre el septiembre de 2002 y marzo de 2003, pues era parte del equipo del gobierno. El LTTE insistió que los dos lados se centran en ediciones banales, o pedir prestadas propias palabras de último Balasingham, “los problemas existenciales” hechos frente por los civiles del Tamil en el norte y el primer del este, y solamente después de resolverlos, para discutir las ediciones que conducían a un establecimiento del conflicto. Nuestra súplica que utilizamos la época de discutir ambas ediciones simultáneamente cayó en los oídos sordos.
En este contexto del tigre stonewalling, Noruega hizo que un valeroso hace una oferta en Oslo, en noviembre de 2002, persuadir al líder de la delegación de LTTE convenir en un compromiso, donde el LTTE convino la terminología “los partidos acordados para explorar una solución fundada en el principio de la autodeterminación interna en áreas del habitation histórico de la gente de Tamil-discurso, basado en la estructura federal con Sri Lanka unida…” y, acordado por primera vez iniciar discusiones sobre las ediciones políticas substantivas que conducen a una solución política, por ejemplo: Energía-compartiendo entre el centro y la región, así como dentro del centro; Región geográfica; Protección de los derechos humanos; Mecanismo político y administrativo; Finanzas públicas; y ley y orden. Eso era una brecha de restauración, dada la atmósfera tensa en Oslo la tarde anterior. Eso era también una decisión de señal, pues el LTTE convino la subida abajo de su demanda para un estado separado, y el gobierno convino una solución basada en una estructura federal, gobiernos sucesivos de una concesión no podidos para conceder a la minoría del Tamil.

Qué siguió después de eso es historia. La oposición pronto se acumuló contra el líder de la delegación de LTTE en su propio campo, y él terminó precipitadamente una visita crucial a Wanni, siguiendo Prabhakaran que lo presurizaba para contraer. Él volvió a Londres, a un hombre enfermo y quebrado y entró el aislamiento, separando todas las conexiones con el LTTE, Noruega y el resto del mundo. ¡Más adelante, él intentó cuidadosamente explicar allí no era ningún acuerdo en Oslo para una solución basada en un arreglo federal!

La reunión final celebrada en Hakone, Japón, en marzo de 2003, era un abrelatas del ojo, como esa reunión clarificada más allá de cualquier duda que el LTTE hubiera invertido a su vieja posición de no discutir ninguna edición substantiva para resolver el conflicto. En la igualdad con la comprensión alcanzada en Oslo, el consejero internacional en derechos humanos, Ian Martin, presentó un papel, y el último Balasingham subió con razones por las que no podrían convenir la supervisión internacional de derechos humanos. His response was that Sri Lanka’s national Human Rights Commission was equal to the task. When pressed to focus on other substantive issues agreed upon in Oslo, Balasingham sheepishly said he had no mandate to discuss any of those subjects, proving that he had been prohibited from engaging in discussing substantive issues by the LTTE leadership.

I have traced the history of negotiations, not to heap blame on late Balasingham, or even on the LTTE. All what I want to say is, that the LTTE had a clear strategy then, as it does now, and that is, to establish a separate state by hook or by crook, irrespective of the deaths it would cause to the Tamil people it claims to represent, and destruction to the country. After all, Prabhakaran has given permission to his cadres to kill him if he wavers from the commitment he made for a separate state. And, the slogan of the LTTE still remains “The thirst of the Tigers is the Homeland of Tamil Eelam.”

Against this backdrop, the question we ask from those who urge the government to seek a negotiated settlement is, are they asking us to negotiate with the LTTE once again? If the LTTE demand for a separate state is non-negotiable, what exactly are we going to negotiate with them? There are more questions. How can a democratically elected government hand over a part of its sovereign territory to an undemocratic entity like the LTTE, which engages in terrorism? What is the fate of the Muslim and Sinhala people, living in the areas claimed by the LTTE, as the traditional homeland of the Tamils?

Finally, we have to ask, who would guarantee that this time around, the LTTE will not walk away from the negotiating table. Some may even ask, if the players were different, for example, would the US negotiate with a terrorist group, which has used suicide bombers to assassinate one president, nearly killed another president, and assassinated several secretaries, including the Secretary of State? There are certain individuals, who try to draw parallels between the LTTE demands with the American demand for independence from Britain. However, in my view, the more appropriate comparison is to describe the LTTE to the secessionist Confederates, who tried to break away from the Union. As President Abraham Lincoln said in his First Inaugural Address on March 4, 1861,“Plainly, the central idea of secession, is the essence of anarchy."

Likewise, “Physically speaking, we can not separate. We cannot remove our respective sections from each other nor build an impassable wall between them” Sri Lankan government too, being a representative entity like the Union, finds secession wholly unacceptable, and seeks friendship of all its citizens, and genuine peace, as President Lincoln did, where all citizens in the country can co-exist as equals in harmony, as they did for many centuries. Throughout the conflict, Sri Lanka’s friends have remained steadfastly supportive of a negotiated solution to the conflict.

The Tigers, however, see this involvement as being partial toward the government. In his Heroes Day speech in November 2007, referring to the role of the international community, Prabhakaran, said, “This partisan and unjust conduct of the international community has severely undermined the confidence our people had in them. And it has paved the way for the breakdown of the ceasefire and the peace efforts.”

Despite the stance of Tigers, Sri Lanka is indeed appreciative of the positive role played by the international community in the war on terrorism. The ban on the LTTE, first by India, the U.S., the U.K., followed by Canada and the 27 member EU, has helped dampen the Tigers’ increasing ability to raise funds for their war chest.

The U.S. ban on one of the LTTE front organizations, the Tamil Rehabilitation Organization (TRO) in November 2007, was a significant blow to the Tiger fundraising capabilities. This kind of international action is critical to make the Tigers realize they do not have an endless fount of resources to carry on a relentless terrorist campaign to achieve its major political objective, a separate state, by force of arms.

The international community also needs to persuade the LTTE to return to the negotiating table, and to hang in there until a satisfactory comprise is reached. Only such action will drive home the message that undemocratic methods of seizing power as the Tigers currently employ, are unacceptable to the civilized world.
The international community needs to be cognizant that democracies cannot take extra-constitutional measures, and, political solutions to conflicts require discussion, debate and compromise before consensus is reached.

As you may be aware, after deliberating for one and a half years, the All Party Representative Committee (APRC), comprising the political spectrum of the country, submitted its proposals for devolution to the President, two days ago. Complex arrangements for devolution and power sharing, that also involve constitutional changes and consultation of the people, are inevitably, an incremental process. It is necessary to remind the international community, that this is only a beginning of an evolving process, which requires its fullest and continuing support.

Abrogazione di CFA: Una necessità costringente - ambasciatore Bernard Goonatilleke
Automatically translated into Italian thanks to WorldLingo
L'abrogazione dell'accordo del fuoco di cess era una necessità costringente, l'ambasciatore di Sri Lanka dichiarato a Washington, Bernard Goonetilleke che fa un'analisi approfondita prima di un gruppo di discussione de Washington. Ha aggiunto che i venti anni dispari scorsi sono testimonianza al fatto che le tigri accosentono soltanto per negoziare come stratagemma puro; per comprare il tempo di raggruppare, riempire e rinforzare la loro possibilità di combattimento
quando aspetti adeguatamente per combattere, camminano via dalle trattative, come hanno fatto ad ogni serie di colloqui. Quello non era tutto; erano abbastanza brazen occorrere le vite di coloro che inizia due tondi dei colloqui cioè l'ex Primo Ministro indiano Gandhi ed il presidente Premadasa e quasi completamente ha occorr la vita del presidente Kumaratunga, in tutti e tre i casi impiegante i bombardieri di suicide. Quando le cose erano andare il loro senso, hanno incolpato della Comunità internazionale come essendo partigiane ed unjust.

L'a testo integrale di discorso dell'ambasciatore Goonetilleke è dato qui sotto:

Sono privilegiato, potere ripartirmi con voi, alcuni pensieri sui tentativi della Sri Lanka di risoluzione di conflitto e la trattativa di pace con Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam o il LTTE, che, il FBI più presto questo mese introdotto come, “uno degli estremisti più pericolosi e più mortali nel mondo.„

Mi rammarico quel Dott. Il gesso del Peter, che era di parlare “sulla dimensione internazionale del LTTE,„ non potrebbe essere con noi oggi. Tuttavia, come previsto, metterò a fuoco sull'accordo di cessate il fuoco, sul processo di pace e sul ruolo della Comunità internazionale, mentre il Dott. Stanley Samarasinghe parlerà su come la Sri Lanka potrebbe risolvere realisticamente il conflitto.

Siete informati che la Sri Lanka è una democrazia multi-ethnic e multi-religiosa, infatti, una di più vecchie democrazie in Asia del Sud. Siete inoltre informati che il LTTE evita la democrazia ed intende, con terrorismo, stabilire un mono-etnico, separato mono-politico dichiarate nel nord e nell'est della Sri Lanka. Questo separato dichiara comprenderà circa 30% dei landmass del paese ed è inteso per i Tamils di Sri Lanka, che, secondo il censimento the1981, contengono circa 12% la popolazione della contea. La maggior parte di questi Tamils, incidentalmente, in tensione fuori del nord e dell'est.

Capo di LTTE, Prabhakaran in un discorso il 27 novembre, l'anno scorso detto e cito, “stiamo lottando per riguadagnare soltanto la nostra sovranità nella nostra propria terra storica in cui abbiamo vissuto per i secoli, la sovranità che abbiamo perso agli occupanti coloniali.„ La sovranità che ha parlato della conclusa di in 1560, quando il Portoghese ha sconfitto il righello del Jaffna, Cankili 1, più di 200 anni prima degli Stati Uniti dichiarazione di indipendenza. Si noti la regola di che Cankili a quel tempo è stato limitato a Jaffna e non ha non estendere alle province nordiche ed orientali attuali.

La richiesta di LTTE di un separato dichiara, chiamato “Tamil Eelam,„ nel migliore dei casi, può essere descritta come “fittizio,„ per ci non era mai, in qualunque momento nella storia della Sri Lanka, “una patria tradizionale del Tamil,„ come la risoluzione di Vadukkodai di 1976, dichiarata basato su un reclamo errato dalla prima segretaria coloniale britannica Hugh Cleghorn.

La Sri Lanka è una piccola isola, sede a 20 milioni, simile nel formato alla Virginia dell'Ovest, o è due volte il formato dell'isola dell'Hawai. È stato domestico a molti gruppi etnici per oltre 2000 anni, che hanno migrato a nord a sud ed a sud al nord nel corso degli anni. Quindi, il Sinhalese, Tamils, attracca, Burghers, Malays ed altre Comunità, troppo numerose essere elencato, possono tutti legittimo esigere l'isola come loro patria tradizionale.

L'accordo di cessate il fuoco della Sri Lanka o i CFA e la relativa abrogazione recente sono stati molto nelle notizie attualmente. La mia familiarità con il CFA decorre di nuovo al periodo della relativa presentazione nella versione provvisoria dalla Norvegia, alla relativa firma nel febbraio 2002, alla relativa esecuzione, o a più al punto, la relativa violazione brazen dal LTTE, dal giorno uno. Ricordo la mia osservazione critica nel novembre 2005 in anticipo, quello che un difetto abbagliante del CFA era la rapidità eccessiva della relativa conclusione, negante l'occasione, specialmente al governo della Sri Lanka, profondamente controllarlo.

L'entusiasmo per concludere il CFA con minimi fa ritardare, era dovuto il fatto, quello da Natale 2001, il governo aveva accosentito ad un cessate il fuoco informale iniziato dal LTTE e la Norvegia, nella relativa saggezza, la ha auspicata fare firmare un accordo ufficiale prima che il cessate il fuoco informale cominciasse a unravel. Nella riesaminazione, almeno alcune delle imperfezioni del CFA potrebbero essere indirizzate, se i partiti avessero più tempo di considerare le ramificazioni di diversi articoli dell'accordo, compreso realizzabilità dei timelines indicati nel CFA.

Il 3 gennaio 2008, il governo ha dato l'avviso abrogate il CFA, che è diventato il 17 gennaio 2008 operativo. Da allora, molti osservatori vicini del conflitto della Sri Lanka e del processo di pace, Co-Sedie del congresso erogatore de Tokyo cioè La Norvegia, il Giappone, gli Stati Uniti e l'UE, altri amici della Sri Lanka e la società civile, hanno espresso la preoccupazione. I sentimenti espressi comunemente sono stati che il ritiro dal CFA intensificherebbe il combattimento, conducendo agli incidenti civili ed alla violazione pesanti dei diritti dell'uomo, che non ci è soluzione militare al conflitto, che una soluzione può essere trovata soltanto con la trattativa e che i partiti al conflitto dovrebbero rinviare al CFA.

In primo luogo, l'avviso del governo dell'abrogazione il 3 gennaio non era dall'ordinario, poichè l'articolo 4.4 del CFA ha previsto per il uno o il altro partito per ritirarsi dando di 14 giorni di preavviso in Norvegia. L'azione di governo da attenersi il 18 aprile 1995 all'accordo, contrasti con le azioni del LTTE riguardo alla tregua precedente, dove il LTTE ha cominciato le ostilità dopo parecchie ore dell'avviso.

In secondo luogo, la richiesta di un ritorno al CFA è come la richiesta del ritorno al mondo di fa-cred in cui Sri Lankans ha vissuto dal 2002. Allineare, i CFA fermati aprono le ostilità ed hanno conservato molte vite. Tuttavia, coloro che è al corrente del CFA ricorderebbero che il LTTE ha cominciato a violare l'accordo willy-nilly, nelle settimane di sign esso. Dall'estremità l'aprile 2007, le tigri avevano raccolto un catalogo delle violazioni 3800 come determinato dai video nordici, in confronto circa 300 violazioni secondarie dalle forze di governo. Vividly ricordo come una di quelle violazioni iniziali lo ha preso a Kilinochchi per una riunione con Tamilselvan ritardato. Quell'incontro è risultato, oltre tutto il dubbio, quanto fickle le tigri erano, circa il sostegno del CFA nascente. Durante il CFA, si sono agganciati nelle violazioni serie di tregua come, assassinando i politici del Tamil, i funzionari ed i membri moderati delle forze munite; assassinio degli avversari politici; agganciandosi nei bombardamenti di suicide; civili rapenti per il riscatto; e soldati conscripting del bambino, malgrado l'accordo tripartito firmato con il governo ed il UNICEF. Era durante questo cosiddetto “cessate il fuoco,„ che le tigri hanno assassinato il ministro straniero Lakshman Kadirgamar, reso a due tentativi di uccidere un altro ministro del Tamil, Douglas Devananda, usando i bombardieri femminili di suicide ed impiegato ancora un altro bombardiere femminile di suicide nel tentativo d'assassinare il comandante dell'esercito della Sri Lanka. Mi domando, che il paese, fra coloro che chiede oggi alla Sri Lanka di rinviare al CFA, accosentirebbe per continuare con un charade di quella natura, di fronte a tali provocations gravi.

È un fatto che un accordo di cessate il fuoco ha esistito fino a poco tempo fa. Tuttavia, le violazioni elencate dai video nordici stabiliscono chiaramente che le tigri non sono cessato mai di infornare. Che cosa è rimasto del CFA, fino alla relativa abrogazione recente, era un accordo su carta, resa defunct dalle tigri, dal giorno uno. In questo contesto, è ironico che, dopo che il governo abbia notificato la diffida ritirarsi dal CFA, il LTTE dichiarato solennemente, esso sosterrebbe il CFA 100%! Tuttavia, nessun di quelli critici della decisione del governo, pensiero che si è adattare per chiedere alle tigri perchè non sono riuscito a sostenere il CFA 100% da inizio.

In terzo luogo, i critici predicono che il ritiro della Sri Lanka dal CFA provocherebbe i livelli aumentati della violenza. Se le tigri fossero state genuine circa uno stabilimento negoziato, hanno avute un'occasione dorata nel novembre 2005, quando il presidente Mahinda Rajapaksa è stato giurato dentro come presidente della Sri Lanka. Il presidente, nel suo discorso inaugurale, ha dichiarato, “riaffermo il miei impegno & determinazione per perseguire il processo di pace per realizzare una pace onorata che rispetterà le aspirazioni di tutte le Comunità nel nostro paese…. Realizzare questo obiettivo nobile, il mio governo sarà aspetta per agganciare il L.T.T.E. nella discussione della soluzione politica, quando il L.T.T.E. dichiara la loro prontezza per riprendere le trattative, che hanno abbandonato unilateralmente.„ Due giorni dopo l'inaugurazione, Prabhakaran ha riconosciuto il presidente Rajapaksa come uomo pragmatico ed ha detto che gli dare il tempo di trovare una soluzione al conflitto.

Faccia una pausa per un momento per esaminare la differenza fra le parole e gli atti delle tigri.

Otto giorni più successivamente, il 5 dicembre 2005, le tigri hanno effettuato il loro primo attacco della miniera del claymore contro le forze munite. Ciò è stata seguita uccidendo massa di civili in villaggi isolati, bombardamento di di mercato in Trincomalee, impiegando un bombardiere di suicide per assassinare il comandante dell'esercito, mortale il terzo la maggior parte del funzionario di grado elevato dell'esercito e facente esplodere le miniere del claymore che designano un bus come bersaglio che trasporta i passeggeri civili, occorrente le vite oltre di 60 passeggeri.

Quindi, pensare sensato indicherebbe che non fosse l'abrogazione del CFA che condurrebbe alla violenza aumentata, ma era la violenza in continuo aumento ed i provocations che gravi quello ha condotto il governo abrogate il CFA.

Il quarto, Sri Lanka ripartisce il punto di vista dei relativi amici, Stati Uniti inclusi non militarmente, che il conflitto può essere risolto soltanto politicamente. Il presidente Rajapaksa dichiarato così il giorno della sua inaugurazione e, poiché, lo ha ripetuto molte volte. Se pensate che la direzione politica dica una cosa ed i militari stanno perseguendo il relativo proprio ordine del giorno, il comandante Sarath Fonseka dell'esercito, ad esempio ai mezzi che riassumono il 12 gennaio 2008 e cito, “infine, tutta la soluzione dovrò essere politico. Ma ci può essere una soluzione politica solo dopo che il LTTE ha indicato le armi. „

Il quinto, a proposito del CFA, Sri Lanka ha tentato non meno di sei serie delle trattative, dal 1985. Di quelli, i soltanto ultimi tre, in 1995, in 2002/2003 e in 2006 sono stati condotti in un ambiente di CFAs. Ciò dimostra che un CFA, mentre è un attrezzo utile, non è essenziale per le trattative, se i partiti al conflitto sono serii circa una risoluzione. Che cosa è essenziale è di condurre le trattative in buona fede fino ad accordare una soluzione durevole al conflitto.

Per concludere, “un cessate il fuoco„ tramite la relativa definizione stessa, è una misura provvisoria, fino a sostituirlo esso tramite un provvedimento più permanente. Similmente, il CFA ha firmato fra il governo e il LTTE era una sospensione provvisoria delle ostilità fino a concludere le trattative. Dopo che le tigri si muovano unilateralmente via dalle trattative nell'aprile 2003, ha occorr alla Norvegia quasi tre anni per portarlo di nuovo alla tabella. Quando hanno ripetuto le loro prestazioni nell'ottobre 2006, là sembrato poco prospetto del loro ritorno. Nessuno inscatolano il governo sono sicuri che le tigri sarebbero affatto meno fickle nei colloqui futuri di pace, che hanno avuti luogo durante le ultime due decadi.

Quindi, è spiacevole che la Comunità internazionale non è riuscito a capire i dynamics complessi che hanno giocato fuori l'eccedenza quasi tre decadi in Sri Lanka. Con la facilità del non informato, alcuni paesi invitano ripetutamente il governo e il LTTE, per evitare le ostilità e per riprendere i colloqui di pace. La realtà è che la Sri Lanka ha tentato le trattative con le tigri in sei occasioni differenti, cioè, in 1985 a Thimpu con la mediazione indiana; in 1987 con il Primo Ministro Rajiv Gandhi che prende il comando; durante il 1989/90 con il presidente Premadasa; in 1995 con il presidente Chandrika Kumaratunga; durante il 2002/03 con il Primo Ministro Ranil Wickremesinghe; e con il presidente Mahinda Rajapaksa in 2006. I venti anni dispari scorsi sono testimonianza al fatto che le tigri accosentono soltanto per negoziare come stratagemma puro; per comprare tempo di raggruppare, riempire e rinforzare la loro possibilità di combattimento. Una volta innestati adeguatamente per combattere, camminano via dalle trattative, come hanno fatto ad ogni serie di colloqui. Quello non era tutto; erano abbastanza brazen occorrere le vite di coloro che inizia due tondi dei colloqui cioè l'ex Primo Ministro indiano Gandhi ed il presidente Premadasa e quasi completamente ha occorr la vita del presidente Kumaratunga, in tutti e tre i casi impiegante i bombardieri di suicide.

Dobbiamo chiedere, quindi, quanto serie erano le tigri, quando si sono sedute alla tabella di negoziazione. Posso autorevolmente parlare riunioni che abbiamo avuti a Bangkok, Oslo, Berlino e Hakone delle sei, fra il settembre 2002 e marzo 2003, poichè facevo parte della squadra di governo. Il LTTE ha insistito che i due lati mettono a fuoco sulle edizioni banali, o prendere in prestito le proprie parole del Balasingham ritardato, “i problemi existential„ considerati dai civili del Tamil nel nord e nel primo orientale e solo dopo la risoluzione loro, per discutere le edizioni che conducono ad uno stabilimento del conflitto. La nostra richiesta che utilizziamo il momento di discutere simultaneamente entrambe le edizioni è caduto sugli orecchi sordi.
Di fronte a questa situazione della tigre che stonewalling, la Norvegia ha fatto un valiant fare un'offerta a Oslo, nel novembre 2002, persaudere il capo della delegazione di LTTE di accosentiree su un compromesso, dove il LTTE accosentito alla terminologia “i partiti ha accosentito per esplorare una soluzione fondata per principio dell'auto interno - determinazione nelle zone del habitation storico della gente Tamil-parlante, basato sulla struttura federale con la Sri Lanka unita…„ e, per la prima volta, accosentito per iniziare le discussioni sulle edizioni politiche sostanziali che conducono ad una soluzione politica, come: Alimentazione-ripartendosi fra il centro e la regione, così come all'interno del centro; Regione geografica; Protezione di diritti dell'uomo; Meccanismo politico ed amministrativo; Finanza pubblica; e legge ed ordine. Quella era un'innovazione rinfrescante, data all'atmosfera teso a Oslo la sera precedente. Quella era inoltre una decisione di limite, poichè il LTTE ha accosentito per arrampicarsi giù dalla relativa richiesta di un separato dichiara ed il governo accosentito ad una soluzione basata su una struttura federale, governi successivi di concessione non riusciti per concedere alla minoranza del Tamil.

Che cosa è seguito da allora in poi è storia. L'opposizione presto si è accumulata contro il capo della delegazione di LTTE nel suo proprio accampamento ed ha concluso bruscamente una chiamata cruciale a Wanni, seguente Prabhakaran che lo pressurizza per ritrarrre. Ha rinviato a Londra, ad un uomo ammalato e rotto ed ha entrato in isolamento, dividente tutti i collegamenti con il LTTE, la Norvegia ed il resto del mondo. Più successivamente, ha provato scrupoloso a spiegare là era accordo a Oslo per una soluzione basata su una disposizione federale!

La riunione finale tenutasi nel marzo 2003 in Hakone, Giappone, era un apri dell'occhio, come quella riunione chiarita oltre tutto il dubbio che il LTTE aveva ritornato alla relativa vecchia posizione di discussione dell'alcun'edizione sostanziale per risolvere il conflitto. Sul par con la comprensione ha raggiunto a Oslo, il consigliere internazionale sui diritti dell'uomo, Ian Martin, ha presentato un documento e il Balasingham ritardato ha fornito le ragioni per le quali non potrebbero accosentiree al controllo internazionale dei diritti dell'uomo. His response was that Sri Lanka’s national Human Rights Commission was equal to the task. When pressed to focus on other substantive issues agreed upon in Oslo, Balasingham sheepishly said he had no mandate to discuss any of those subjects, proving that he had been prohibited from engaging in discussing substantive issues by the LTTE leadership.

I have traced the history of negotiations, not to heap blame on late Balasingham, or even on the LTTE. All what I want to say is, that the LTTE had a clear strategy then, as it does now, and that is, to establish a separate state by hook or by crook, irrespective of the deaths it would cause to the Tamil people it claims to represent, and destruction to the country. After all, Prabhakaran has given permission to his cadres to kill him if he wavers from the commitment he made for a separate state. And, the slogan of the LTTE still remains “The thirst of the Tigers is the Homeland of Tamil Eelam.”

Against this backdrop, the question we ask from those who urge the government to seek a negotiated settlement is, are they asking us to negotiate with the LTTE once again? If the LTTE demand for a separate state is non-negotiable, what exactly are we going to negotiate with them? There are more questions. How can a democratically elected government hand over a part of its sovereign territory to an undemocratic entity like the LTTE, which engages in terrorism? What is the fate of the Muslim and Sinhala people, living in the areas claimed by the LTTE, as the traditional homeland of the Tamils?

Finally, we have to ask, who would guarantee that this time around, the LTTE will not walk away from the negotiating table. Some may even ask, if the players were different, for example, would the US negotiate with a terrorist group, which has used suicide bombers to assassinate one president, nearly killed another president, and assassinated several secretaries, including the Secretary of State? There are certain individuals, who try to draw parallels between the LTTE demands with the American demand for independence from Britain. However, in my view, the more appropriate comparison is to describe the LTTE to the secessionist Confederates, who tried to break away from the Union. As President Abraham Lincoln said in his First Inaugural Address on March 4, 1861,“Plainly, the central idea of secession, is the essence of anarchy."

Likewise, “Physically speaking, we can not separate. We cannot remove our respective sections from each other nor build an impassable wall between them” Sri Lankan government too, being a representative entity like the Union, finds secession wholly unacceptable, and seeks friendship of all its citizens, and genuine peace, as President Lincoln did, where all citizens in the country can co-exist as equals in harmony, as they did for many centuries. Throughout the conflict, Sri Lanka’s friends have remained steadfastly supportive of a negotiated solution to the conflict.

The Tigers, however, see this involvement as being partial toward the government. In his Heroes Day speech in November 2007, referring to the role of the international community, Prabhakaran, said, “This partisan and unjust conduct of the international community has severely undermined the confidence our people had in them. And it has paved the way for the breakdown of the ceasefire and the peace efforts.”

Despite the stance of Tigers, Sri Lanka is indeed appreciative of the positive role played by the international community in the war on terrorism. The ban on the LTTE, first by India, the U.S., the U.K., followed by Canada and the 27 member EU, has helped dampen the Tigers’ increasing ability to raise funds for their war chest.

The U.S. ban on one of the LTTE front organizations, the Tamil Rehabilitation Organization (TRO) in November 2007, was a significant blow to the Tiger fundraising capabilities. This kind of international action is critical to make the Tigers realize they do not have an endless fount of resources to carry on a relentless terrorist campaign to achieve its major political objective, a separate state, by force of arms.

The international community also needs to persuade the LTTE to return to the negotiating table, and to hang in there until a satisfactory comprise is reached. Only such action will drive home the message that undemocratic methods of seizing power as the Tigers currently employ, are unacceptable to the civilized world.
The international community needs to be cognizant that democracies cannot take extra-constitutional measures, and, political solutions to conflicts require discussion, debate and compromise before consensus is reached.

As you may be aware, after deliberating for one and a half years, the All Party Representative Committee (APRC), comprising the political spectrum of the country, submitted its proposals for devolution to the President, two days ago. Complex arrangements for devolution and power sharing, that also involve constitutional changes and consultation of the people, are inevitably, an incremental process. It is necessary to remind the international community, that this is only a beginning of an evolving process, which requires its fullest and continuing support.

CFA Abschaffung: Eine unwiderstehlichste Notwendigkeit - Botschafter Bernard Goonatilleke
Automatically translated into German thanks to WorldLingo
Die Abschaffung der aufhörenfeuervereinbarung war eine unwiderstehlichste Notwendigkeit, angegebener Sri Lankan Botschafter in Washington, Bernard Goonetilleke, das eine eingehende Analyse vor einer Washington Diskussion Gruppe bildet. Er addierte, daß die letzten Zwanzig ungeraden Jahre Zeugnis zur Tatsache sind, daß Tiger nur damit einverstanden sind, als bloßer Trick zu vermitteln; Zeit kaufen umzugruppieren, ihre kämpfende Fähigkeit zu ergänzen und zu verstärken
, wenn ausreichend bereit, um zu kämpfen, gehen sie weg von den Vermittlungen, wie sie an jeder Reihe Gesprächen getan haben. Alles das war nicht; sie waren genug unverschämt, die Leben von denen zu dauern, die zwei Umläufe von Gesprächen nämlich einleiten der ehemalige indische Premierminister Gandhi und Präsident Premadasa und dauerte sehr nahe das Leben des Präsidenten Kumaratunga, in allen drei Fällen Selbstmordbomber einsetzend. Als Sachen kein gehen ihre Weise waren, tadelten sie die internationale Gemeinschaft als seiend parteigängerisch und unjust.

Das Ganztext der Rede des Botschafters Goonetillekes wird unten gegeben:

Ich bin, teile mit Ihnen, etwas Gedanken auf Versuchen Sris Lanka an der Konfliktauflösung und Friedensvermittlung mit den Befreiung-Tigern von Tamil Eelam oder das LTTE privilegiert, das, das FBI früh dieser Monat wie eingeführt, „einer der gefährlichsten und tödlichsten Extremisten in der Welt.“

Ich bedauere diesen Dr. Peter Kreide, die, über „das internationale Maß des LTTE zu sprechen war,“ könnte nicht mit uns heute sein. Jedoch, wie beabsichtigt, konzentriere ich auf die Ceasefire-Vereinbarung, den Friedensprozeß und die Rolle der internationalen Gemeinschaft, während Dr. Stanley Samarasinghe spricht über, wie Sri Lanka den Konflikt realistisch beheben könnte.

Sie beachten, daß Sri Lanka eine multiethnische, multi-fromme Demokratie tatsächlich eine der ältesten Demokratien in Südasien ist. Sie beachten auch, daß das LTTE Demokratie und, durch Terrorismus meidet, um einen Mono-ethnischen, Mono-politischen unterschiedlichen Zustand im Norden Sris Lanka und einen Osten herzustellen beabsichtigt. Dieser unterschiedliche Zustand gibt ungefähr 30% der landmass des Landes um und ist für Sri Lankan Tamils bestimmt, die, entsprechend Zählung the1981, ungefähr 12% von der Bevölkerung der Grafschaft enthalten. Die Majorität dieser Tamils übrigens Phasen außerhalb des Nordens und des Ostens.

LTTE Führer, Prabhakaran in einer Rede am 27. November, das letzte Jahr gesagt, und ich veranschlage, „wir kämpfen, um unsere Hoheit in unserem eigenen historischen Land, in dem wir für Jahrhunderte, die gelebt haben Hoheit nur wiederzugewinnen, die wir verloren zu den Kolonialbeschäftigern.“ Die Hoheit, die er von beendet 1560 sprach, als der Portugiese Lehre Jaffnas besiegte, Cankili 1, mehr als 200 Jahre vor den US Unabhängigkeitserklärung. Merken Sie, daß Richtlinie Cankilis zu dieser Zeit auf Jaffna begrenzt wurde, und verlängerte nicht auf heutige Nord- und östliche Provinzen.

Die LTTE Nachfrage nach einem unterschiedlichen Zustand, bestenfalls genannt „Tamil Eelam,“, kann beschrieben werden, wie „erfunden,“ für es nie, jederzeit in der Geschichte Sris Lanka, „eine traditionelle Tamilheimaten,“ als die Vadukkodai Auflösung von 1976 gab, erklärt gegründet auf einem fehlerhaften Anspruch von der ersten britischen Kolonialsekretärin Hugh Cleghorn.

Sri Lanka ist eine kleine Insel, Haus bis 20 Million, in der Größe zu West Virginia ähnliches oder ist zweimal die Größe der Insel von Hawaii. Es ist zu vielen ethnischen Gruppen für rüber 2000 Jahre Haupt gewesen, die nördlich zum Süden und zum Süden zum Norden über den Jahren abwanderten. So macht der Sinhalese, Tamils, Burghers, Malaiianer fest und andere Gemeinschaften, zu zahlreich verzeichnet zu werden, können alle die Insel als ihre traditionelle Heimat rechtmäßig behaupten.

Ceasefirevereinbarung Sris Lanka oder die CFA und seine neue Abschaffung sind sehr viel in den Nachrichten diese Tage gewesen. Meine Vertrautheit mit dem CFA läuft zurück zu der Zeit seiner Darstellung in der Entwurfform durch Norwegen, zu seiner Unterschrift im Februar 2002, zu seiner Implementierung oder mehr zum Punkt, seine unverschämte Verletzung durch das LTTE, von Tag einer. Ich rufe meine kritische Anmerkung in frühem November 2005, das, das ein glänzender Defekt des CFA die ungeregelte Eile seiner Zusammenfassung war zurück und verweigere die Gelegenheit, besonders zur Sri Lanka Regierung, sie tief nachzuforschen.

Die Begierde, zum des CFA mit wenigen zu folgern verzögert, lag an der Tatsache, die durch Christmas 2001, hatte die Regierung einem formlosen Ceasefire zugestimmt, der durch das LTTE eingeleitet wurde, und Norwegen, in seiner Klugheit, betrachtete sie wünschenswert, eine formale Vereinbarung unterzeichnen zu lassen, bevor der formlose Ceasefire anfing zu entwirren. Im Rückblick konnten mindestens einige der Fehler des CFAS, wenn die Parteien mehr Zeit, hatten die Verzweigungen der einzelnen Artikel der Vereinbarung zu betrachten, einschließlich Durchführbarkeit der timelines adressiert worden sein, die im CFA angezeigt wurden.

Am 3. Januar 2008 gab die Regierung Nachricht abschaffen den CFA, der am 17. Januar 2008 funktionsfähig wurde. Seit damals viele sorgfältige Beobachter von Konflikt Sris Lanka und von Friedensprozeß, Co-Stühle der Tokyo Spenderkonferenz nämlich Norwegen, Japan, die US und das EU, andere Freunde von Sri Lanka und die Zivilgesellschaft, haben Interesse ausgedrückt. Die allgemein ausgedrückten Gefühle sind gewesen, daß Zurücknahme vom CFA sich das Kämpfen entwickeln würde und zu schwere Zivilunfall und Verletzung der menschlichen Rechte führen würde, daß es keine militärische Lösung zum Konflikt gibt, daß eine Lösung nur durch Vermittlung gefunden werden kann und daß Parteien zum Konflikt zum CFA zurückkommen sollten.

Zuerst war die Nachricht der Regierung der Abschaffung am 3. Januar nicht aus dem üblichen heraus, da Artikel 4.4 des CFA für jede Partei sorgte, um zurückzutreten, indem er die 14 Tagesnachricht nach Norwegen gab. Die Regierung Tätigkeit, zum, Kontraste am 18. April 1995 unterzuwerfen mit den Tätigkeiten des LTTES in Bezug auf den vorhergehenden Waffenstillstand, in dem das LTTE Feindseligkeiten nach einigen Stunden der Nachricht begann.

Zweitens ist die Nachfrage einer Rückkehr zum CFA wie das Bitten um eine Rückkehr zur Bildenglauben Welt, in der Sri Lankans seit 2002 lebte. Zutreffend, hielt der CFA geöffnete Feindseligkeiten an und speicherte viele Leben. Jedoch würden die, die mit dem CFA vertraut sind, daß das LTTE anfing die, Vereinbarung willy-nilly zu verletzen, innerhalb der Wochen des Unterzeichnens sie zurückrufen. Durch Ende April 2007, hatten Tiger einen Katalog der Verletzungen 3800 angesammelt, wie von den nordischen Monitoren, verglichen mit ca. 300 kleinen Verletzungen durch die Regierung Kräfte festgestellt. Ich rufe vividly zurück, wie eine jener Ausgangsverletzungen mich Kilinochchi für eine Sitzung mit spätem Tamilselvan nahm. Dieses Treffen prüfte, über jedem möglichem Zweifel, wie unbeständig die Tiger waren, über das Unterstützen des werdenden CFA hinaus. Während des CFA engagierten sich sie in den ernsten Waffenstillstandverletzungen wie und ermordeten gemäßigte Tamilpolitiker, Beamte und Mitglieder der bewaffneten Kräfte; Ermordung der politischen Konkurrenten; Engagieren in den Selbstmordbombardierungen; entführende Zivilisten für Lösegeld; und einziehende Kindsoldaten, trotz des Dreier-übereinkommens unterzeichnet mit der Regierung und dem UNICEF. Es war während dieses sogenannten „Ceasefire,“, dem die Tiger Außenminister Lakshman Kadirgamar ermordeten, gebildet zwei Versuche, einen anderen Tamilminister, Douglas Devananda mit weiblichen Selbstmordbombern und eingesetztem dennoch einem anderen weiblichem Selbstmordbomber zu töten, um den Kommandanten der Sri Lanka Armee zu ermorden. Ich wundere mich, den Land, unter denen, die Sri Lanka heute bitten, zum CFA zurückzugehen, sein würde, mit einer Scharade dieser Natur fortzusetzen, angesichts solcher ernster Provokationen.

Es ist eine Tatsache, daß eine Ceasefirevereinbarung bis vor kurzem bestand. Jedoch stellen die Verletzungen, die durch nordische Monitoren verzeichnet werden offenbar her, daß die Tiger nie aufhörten abzufeuern. Was vom CFA, bis seine neue Abschaffung blieb, war eine Vereinbarung über das Papier, gemacht verstorben durch die Tiger, von Tag einer. In diesem Hintergrund ist es ironisch, daß, nachdem die Regierung Nachricht diente, vom CFA zurückzutreten, das ernst erklärte LTTE, es den CFA 100% unterstützen würde! Jedoch keine von denen kritisch gegenüber der Entscheidung der Regierung, Gedanke, den sie paßte, um die Tiger zu fragen, warum sie den CFA 100% seit Gründung unterstützen nicht konnten.

Drittens sagen Kritiker voraus, daß Zurücknahme Sris Lanka vom CFA erhöhte Niveaus der Gewalttätigkeit ergeben würde. Wenn die Tiger über eine verhandelte Regelung echt gewesen waren, hatten sie eine günstige Gelegenheit im November 2005, als Präsident Mahinda Rajapaksa innen als Präsident von Sri Lanka geschworen wurde. Der Präsident, in seiner Eröffnungsrede, sagte, „ich versichere meine Verpflichtung u. Ermittlung nochmals, um den Friedensprozeß auszuüben, um einen achtbaren Frieden zu erzielen, der respektiert die Aspirationen aller Gemeinschaften in unserem Land…. Um dieses vortreffliche Ziel zu erzielen, ist meine Regierung bereit sich das L.T.T.E. zu engagieren. wenn eine politische Lösung, wenn das L.T.T.E. besprochen wird. erklärt ihre Schnelligkeit, um Vermittlungen wiederaufzunehmen, die sie verließen einseitig.“ Zwei Tage nach der Einweihung, bestätigte Prabhakaran Präsidenten Rajapaksa als pragmatischer Mann und sagte, daß er ihm Zeit geben würde, eine Lösung zum Konflikt zu finden.

Pausieren Sie während eines Momentes, um den Unterschied zwischen den Wörtern und den Briefen der Tiger zu überprüfen.

Acht Tage später am 5. Dezember 2005 führten die Tiger ihren ersten claymore Grube Angriff gegen die bewaffneten Kräfte durch. Dieses wurde vom Töten der Kerben der Zivilisten in lokalisierten Dörfern, Bombardieren eines Marktplatzes in Trincomalee gefolgt und setzte einen Selbstmordbomber ein, um den Armee-Kommandanten, tötete den Third der meiste Vorgesetzte der Armee und bringt die claymore Gruben zu ermorden zur detonation, die einen Bus zielen, der Zivilpassagiere befördert und dauerte die Leben von über 60 Passagieren.

So würde das gesunde Denken anzeigen, daß es nicht die Abschaffung des CFA war, der zu erhöhte Gewalttätigkeit führen würde, aber es war die ständig zunehmende Gewalttätigkeit und ernste Provokationen, die die die Regierung führte, abschaffen den CFA.

Viertens teilt Sri Lanka die Ansicht seiner Freunde, die nicht militärisch eingeschlossenen US, daß der Konflikt nur politisch behoben werden kann. Präsident Rajapaksa, der so am Tag seiner Einweihung gesagt wird, und hat, da, es viele Male wiederholt. Wenn Sie, daß die politische Führung sagt, eine Sache denken und das Militär seine eigene Tagesordnung, Armee-Kommandanten Sarath Fonseka ausübt, an den Mitteln gesagt, die am 12. Januar 2008 unterweisen und ich, „schließlich veranschlage, jede mögliche Lösung muß politisch sein. Aber es kann eine politische Lösung geben, erst nachdem das LTTE Arme niedergelegt hat. “

Fünftes, bezüglich des CFA, Sri Lanka hat keine weniger als sechs Reihen Vermittlungen, seit 1985 versucht. Von denen wurden die nur letzten drei, 1995, 2002/2003 und 2006 in ein Klima von CFAs geleitet. Dieses zeigt, daß ein CFA, beim Sein ein nützliches Werkzeug, nicht für Vermittlungen wesentlich ist, wenn Parteien zum Konflikt über eine Auflösung ernst sind. Was wesentlich ist, ist, Vermittlungen gutgläubig zu leiten, bis eine dauerhafte Lösung zum Konflikt vereinbart ist.

Schließlich ist ein „Ceasefire“ durch seine Definition, ein temporäres Maß, bis es durch eine dauerhaftere Anordnung ersetzt wird. Ähnlich, unterzeichnete der CFA zwischen der Regierung und dem LTTE war eine temporäre Aufhebung von Feindseligkeiten, bis Vermittlungen gefolgert waren. Nachdem die Tiger einseitig weg von den Vermittlungen im April 2003 bewogen, dauerte es Norwegen fast drei Jahre, um sie zurück zu der Tabelle zu holen. Als sie ihre Leistung im Oktober 2006 wiederholten, wenig Aussicht ihrer Rückkehr dort geschienen. Keine machen die Regierung sind überzeugt, daß die Tiger in den zukünftigen Friedensgesprächen irgendwie weniger unbeständig sein würden, als sie sind gewesen während der letzten zwei Dekaden ein.

So ist es bedauerlich, daß die internationale Gemeinschaft die komplizierte Dynamik hat verstehen nicht gekonnt, die heraus überschuß fast drei Dekaden in Sri Lanka gespielt haben. Mit der Mühelosigkeit des nicht informierten, ersuchen einige Länder wiederholt die Regierung und um das LTTE, um Feindseligkeiten zu meiden und Friedensgespräche wieder aufzunehmen. Die Wirklichkeit ist, daß Sri Lanka Vermittlungen mit den Tigern bei sechs unterschiedlichen Gelegenheiten nämlich 1985 bei Thimpu mit indischer Vermittlung versucht hat; 1987 mit Premierminister Rajiv Gandhi, der die Leitung nimmt; während 1989/90 mit Präsidenten Premadasa; 1995 mit Präsidenten Chandrika Kumaratunga; während 2002/03 mit Premierminister Ranil Wickremesinghe; und mit Präsidenten Mahinda Rajapaksa 2006. Die letzten Zwanzig ungeraden Jahre sind Zeugnis zur Tatsache, daß Tiger nur damit einverstanden sind, als bloßer Trick zu vermitteln; Zeit kaufen, ihre kämpfende Fähigkeit umzugruppieren, zu ergänzen und zu verstärken. Wenn sie ausreichend übersetzt werden, um zu kämpfen, gehen sie weg von den Vermittlungen, wie sie an jeder Reihe Gesprächen getan haben. Alles das war nicht; sie waren genug unverschämt, die Leben von denen zu dauern, die zwei Umläufe von Gesprächen nämlich einleiten der ehemalige indische Premierminister Gandhi und Präsident Premadasa und dauerte sehr nahe das Leben des Präsidenten Kumaratunga, in allen drei Fällen Selbstmordbomber einsetzend.

Wir sollen bitten dann wie die Tiger ernst waren, als sie am vermittelnden Tisch sassen. Ich kann von den sechs Sitzungen, die wir in Bangkok, Oslo hatten, Berlin und Hakone maßgebend sprechen, zwischen September 2002 und März 2003, da ich ein Teil der Regierung Mannschaft war. Das LTTE beharrte, daß die zwei Seiten auf banale Ausgaben konzentrieren, oder späten Balasinghams eigene Wörter zu borgen, „die existentiellen Probleme“, die von den Tamilzivilisten im Norden und im Ostersten und erst nach das Beheben sie, um die Ausgaben zu besprechen gegenübergestellt wurden, die zu eine Regelung des Konflikts führen. Unser Vorwand, daß wir die Zeit verwenden, beide Ausgaben gleichzeitig zu besprechen, fiel auf taube Ohren.
Vor diesem Hintergrund vom stonewalling Tiger, ließ Norwegen valiant in Oslo bieten im November 2002 den Führer der LTTE Delegation zu überzeugen, über einen Kompromiß einig zu sein, in dem das LTTE, das der Terminologie „die Parteien zugestimmt wurde, damit einverstanden war, eine Lösung zu erforschen, die auf der Grundregel des internem Selbst - Ermittlung in den Bereichen der historischen Behausung der Tamil-sprechenden Völker gegründet wurde, basiert auf Bundesstruktur mit einem vereinigten Sri Lanka…“ und zum ersten Mal damit einverstanden gewesen, Diskussionen auf den substantivischen politischen Ausgaben einzuleiten, die zu eine politische Lösung, wie führen: zwischen der Mitte und der Region, sowie innerhalb der Mitte Energie-teilen; Geographische Region; Schutz der menschlichen Rechte; Politische und administrative Einheit; Allgemeine Finanzierung; und Gesetz und Auftrag. Der war ein erneuernder Durchbruch, der angespannten Atmosphäre in Oslo den vorhergehenden Abend gegeben. Die war auch eine Grenzsteinentscheidung, da das LTTE Aufstieg unten von seiner Nachfrage nach einem unterschiedlichen Zustand zustimmte, und die Regierung einer Lösung zustimmte, die auf einer Bundesstruktur, die aufeinanderfolgenden Regierungen eines Zugeständnis basierte, die zur Tamilminorität zugestehen nicht können wurden.

Was danach folgte, ist Geschichte. Opposition baute bald gegen den Führer der LTTE Delegation in seinem eigenen Lager auf, und er beendete unerwartet einen entscheidenden Besuch zu Wanni und folgte Prabhakaran, das ihn unter Druck setzt, um zurückzuziehen. Er kam zu London, zu einem kranken und defekten Mann zurück und stieg in die Lokalisierung ein und trennte alle Anschlüsse mit dem LTTE, Norwegen und den Rest der Welt. Später versuchte er sorgfältig, dort zu erklären war keine Vereinbarung in Oslo für eine Lösung, die auf einer Bundesanordnung basierte!

Die abschließende Sitzung, die im März 2003 in Hakone, Japan stattgefunden wurde war ein Auge öffner, als diese Sitzung, die über jedem möglichem Zweifel hinaus erklärt wurde, den das LTTE in seine alte Position des Besprechens keiner substantivischen Ausgabe, um den Konflikt zu beheben umgeschalten hatte. Auf Gleichheit mit dem Verständnis erreichte in Oslo, der internationale Berater auf menschlichen Rechten, Ian Martin, darstellte ein Papier, und das späte Balasingham kam oben mit Gründen, warum sie nicht der internationalen überwachung der menschlichen Rechte zustimmen konnten. His response was that Sri Lanka’s national Human Rights Commission was equal to the task. When pressed to focus on other substantive issues agreed upon in Oslo, Balasingham sheepishly said he had no mandate to discuss any of those subjects, proving that he had been prohibited from engaging in discussing substantive issues by the LTTE leadership.

I have traced the history of negotiations, not to heap blame on late Balasingham, or even on the LTTE. All what I want to say is, that the LTTE had a clear strategy then, as it does now, and that is, to establish a separate state by hook or by crook, irrespective of the deaths it would cause to the Tamil people it claims to represent, and destruction to the country. After all, Prabhakaran has given permission to his cadres to kill him if he wavers from the commitment he made for a separate state. And, the slogan of the LTTE still remains “The thirst of the Tigers is the Homeland of Tamil Eelam.”

Against this backdrop, the question we ask from those who urge the government to seek a negotiated settlement is, are they asking us to negotiate with the LTTE once again? If the LTTE demand for a separate state is non-negotiable, what exactly are we going to negotiate with them? There are more questions. How can a democratically elected government hand over a part of its sovereign territory to an undemocratic entity like the LTTE, which engages in terrorism? What is the fate of the Muslim and Sinhala people, living in the areas claimed by the LTTE, as the traditional homeland of the Tamils?

Finally, we have to ask, who would guarantee that this time around, the LTTE will not walk away from the negotiating table. Some may even ask, if the players were different, for example, would the US negotiate with a terrorist group, which has used suicide bombers to assassinate one president, nearly killed another president, and assassinated several secretaries, including the Secretary of State? There are certain individuals, who try to draw parallels between the LTTE demands with the American demand for independence from Britain. However, in my view, the more appropriate comparison is to describe the LTTE to the secessionist Confederates, who tried to break away from the Union. As President Abraham Lincoln said in his First Inaugural Address on March 4, 1861,“Plainly, the central idea of secession, is the essence of anarchy."

Likewise, “Physically speaking, we can not separate. We cannot remove our respective sections from each other nor build an impassable wall between them” Sri Lankan government too, being a representative entity like the Union, finds secession wholly unacceptable, and seeks friendship of all its citizens, and genuine peace, as President Lincoln did, where all citizens in the country can co-exist as equals in harmony, as they did for many centuries. Throughout the conflict, Sri Lanka’s friends have remained steadfastly supportive of a negotiated solution to the conflict.

The Tigers, however, see this involvement as being partial toward the government. In his Heroes Day speech in November 2007, referring to the role of the international community, Prabhakaran, said, “This partisan and unjust conduct of the international community has severely undermined the confidence our people had in them. And it has paved the way for the breakdown of the ceasefire and the peace efforts.”

Despite the stance of Tigers, Sri Lanka is indeed appreciative of the positive role played by the international community in the war on terrorism. The ban on the LTTE, first by India, the U.S., the U.K., followed by Canada and the 27 member EU, has helped dampen the Tigers’ increasing ability to raise funds for their war chest.

The U.S. ban on one of the LTTE front organizations, the Tamil Rehabilitation Organization (TRO) in November 2007, was a significant blow to the Tiger fundraising capabilities. This kind of international action is critical to make the Tigers realize they do not have an endless fount of resources to carry on a relentless terrorist campaign to achieve its major political objective, a separate state, by force of arms.

The international community also needs to persuade the LTTE to return to the negotiating table, and to hang in there until a satisfactory comprise is reached. Only such action will drive home the message that undemocratic methods of seizing power as the Tigers currently employ, are unacceptable to the civilized world.
The international community needs to be cognizant that democracies cannot take extra-constitutional measures, and, political solutions to conflicts require discussion, debate and compromise before consensus is reached.

As you may be aware, after deliberating for one and a half years, the All Party Representative Committee (APRC), comprising the political spectrum of the country, submitted its proposals for devolution to the President, two days ago. Complex arrangements for devolution and power sharing, that also involve constitutional changes and consultation of the people, are inevitably, an incremental process. It is necessary to remind the international community, that this is only a beginning of an evolving process, which requires its fullest and continuing support.

Abrogation do CFA: Uma necessidade compelindo - embaixador Bernard Goonatilleke
Automatically translated into Portuguese thanks to WorldLingo
O abrogation do acordo do fogo cessar era uma necessidade compelindo, embaixador indicado em Washington, Bernard Goonetilleke de Sri Lankan que faz uma análise in-depth antes de um grupo de discussão de Washington. Adicionou que os vinte anos impares passados são testimony ao fato que os tigres concordam somente negociar como um mero ploy; para comprar a hora de regroup, para reabastecer e strengthen sua potencialidade de combate
quando adequadamente prontos para lutar, andam longe das negociações, como fizeram em cada série das conversas. Aquele não era todo; eram brazen bastante fazer exame das vidas daqueles que inicíam dois círculos das conversas viz. o ministro principal Indian anterior Gandhi e presidente Premadasa e fêz exame muito quase da vida do presidente Kumaratunga, em todos os três exemplos empregando bombardeiros do suicide. Quando as coisas não eram nenhum ir sua maneira, responsabilizaram a comunidade internacional como sendo partisan e unjust.

O cheio - o texto do discurso do embaixador Goonetilleke é dado abaixo:

Eu sou privilegiado, compartilho com você, alguns pensamentos em tentativas de Sri Lanka na definição do conflito e negociação da paz com os tigres do Liberation do Tamil Eelam ou o LTTE, que, o FBI mais cedo este mês introduzido como, “um dos extremists os mais perigosos e os mais mortais no mundo.”

Eu lamento esse Dr. O giz de Peter, que era falar “na dimensão internacional do LTTE,” não poderia ser com nós hoje. Entretanto, como pretendido, eu focalizarei no acordo do Ceasefire, no processo da paz e no papel da comunidade internacional, quando Dr. Stanley Samarasinghe falará em como Sri Lanka poderia realìstica resolver o conflito.

Você está ciente que Sri Lanka é uma democracia multi-ethnic, multi-religiosa, no fato, uma das democracias as mais velhas em 3Sul da Ásia. Você está também ciente que o LTTE shuns a democracia, e pretende, com o terrorismo, para estabelecer um estado separado no norte de Sri Lanka e um leste mono-étnicos, mono-políticos. Este estado separado abrangerá aproximadamente 30% dos landmass do país, e é pretendido para os Tamils de Sri Lankan, que, de acordo com o census the1981, compreendem aproximadamente 12% da população do condado. A maioria destes Tamils, incidentally, vivos fora do norte e do leste.

O líder de LTTE, Prabhakaran em um discurso novembro em 27, dito o ano passado, e eu cito, “nós estamos esforçando-nos para regain somente nosso sovereignty em nossa própria terra histórica onde nós vivemos por séculos, o sovereignty que nós perdemos aos occupiers coloniais.” O sovereignty que falou do terminado em 1560, quando o português derrotou a régua de Jaffna, Cankili 1, mais de 200 anos antes dos ESTADOS UNIDOS. declaração de independência. Anote que a régua de Cankili estêve limitada naquele tempo a Jaffna, e não o estendeu às províncias do norte e orientais atuais do dia.

A demanda de LTTE para um estado separado, chamada “Tamil Eelam,” no melhor dos casos, pode ser descrita como “fictitious,” para havia nunca, em qualquer altura que dentro na história de Sri Lanka, “um homeland tradicional do Tamil,” como a definição de Vadukkodai de 1976, declarada baseado em uma reivindicação errônea pela primeira secretária colonial britânica Hugh Cleghorn.

Sri Lanka é um console pequeno, repouso a 20 milhões, similar no tamanho a Virgínia ocidental, ou é duas vezes o tamanho do console de Havaí. Foi home a muitos grupos étnicos por sobre 2000 anos, que migrou para o norte ao sul e ao sul ao norte sobre os anos. Assim, o Sinhalese, Tamils, amarra, Burghers, Malays e outras comunidades, demasiado numerosas para ser alistado, podem tudo rightfully reivindicar o console como seu homeland tradicional.

O acordo do Ceasefire de Sri Lanka ou os CFA e seu abrogation recente estiveram muito muito na notícia estes dias. Minha familiaridade com o CFA funciona para trás à época de sua apresentação no formulário de esboço por Noruega, a sua assinatura em fevereiro 2002, a sua execução, ou a mais ao ponto, sua violação brazen pelo LTTE, do dia um. Eu recordo minha observação crítica de novembro adiantado 2005, aquele que um defeito brilhando do CFA era o haste inordinate de sua conclusão, negando a oportunidade, particularmente ao governo de Sri Lanka, de scrutinize profundamente o.

A ânsia para conclir o CFA com menos atrasa, era devido ao fato, aquele por Christmas 2001, o governo tinha concordado a um ceasefire informal iniciado pelo LTTE, e Noruega, em sua sabedoria, considerou-a desejável ter um acordo formal assinado antes que o ceasefire informal começou a unravel. No retrospect, pelo menos alguns dos shortcomings do CFA poderiam ter sido dirigidos, se os partidos tivessem mais tempo para considerar os ramifications de artigos individuais do acordo, including o practicability dos timelines indicados no CFA.

Janeiro em 3, 2008, o governo deu a observação revoga o CFA, que se tornou operacional janeiro em 17, 2008. Desde então, muitos observadores próximos do conflito de Sri Lanka e o processo da paz, Co-Cadeiras da conferência fornecedora de Tokyo viz. Noruega, Japão, os E.U. e o EU, outros amigos de Sri Lanka e a sociedade civil, expressaram o interesse. Os sentiments expressados geralmente foram que a retirada do CFA escalaria a luta, conduzindo às víctimas civis e à violação pesadas de direitas humanas, que não há nenhuma solução militar ao conflito, que uma solução pode ser encontrada somente com a negociação, e que os partidos ao conflito devem retornar ao CFA.

Primeiramente, a observação do governo do abrogation janeiro em 3 não era fora do ordinário, porque o artigo 4.4 do CFA forneceu para um ou outro partido para se retirar dando a observação de 14 dias a Noruega. A ação do governo a abide pelo acordo, contrastes com as ações do LTTE com respeito ao truce precedente, onde o LTTE começou hostilidades depois de diversas horas da observação, abril em 18 1995.

Em segundo, a demanda de um retorno ao CFA é como o pedido de um retorno ao mundo faç-acreditar em que Sri Lankans viveu desde 2002. Verdadeiros, os CFA parados abrem hostilidades e conservaram muitas vidas. Entretanto, aqueles que são familiares com o CFA recordariam que o LTTE começou a violating o acordo willy-nilly, dentro das semanas de assiná-lo. Pela extremidade abril 2007, tigres amassed um catálogo das violações 3800 como determinado pelos monitores Nordic, em contraste com umas 300 violações menores pelas forças do governo. Eu recordo vividly como uma daquelas violações iniciais fêz exame de me a Kilinochchi para uma reunião com Tamilselvan atrasado. Esse encontro provou, além de toda a dúvida, como fickle os tigres eram, sobre upholding o CFA nascent. Durante todo o CFA, acoplaram em violações sérias do truce como, assassinating políticos do Tamil, oficiais e membros moderados das forças armadas; assassinando oponentes políticos; acoplar em bombardeios do suicide; civis sequestrando para o ransom; e soldados conscripting da criança, apesar do acordo tripartite assinado com o governo e a UNICEF. Era durante este “ceasefire so-called,” que os tigres assassinated o ministro extrangeiro Lakshman Kadirgamar, feito duas tentativas de matar um outro ministro do Tamil, Douglas Devananda, usando bombardeiros fêmeas do suicide, e bombardeiro empregado contudo outro fêmea do suicide em uma tentativa de assassinate o comandante do exército de Sri Lanka. Eu quero saber, que o país, entre aqueles que pedem Sri Lanka hoje para retornar ao CFA, concordaria continuar com um charade dessa natureza, na cara de tais provocations graves.

É um fato que um acordo do ceasefire existiu até recentemente. Entretanto, as violações alistadas por monitores Nordic estabelecem claramente que os tigres nunca cessaram de atear fogo. O que remanesceu do CFA, até seu abrogation recente, era um acordo no papel, rendido defunct pelos tigres, do dia um. Neste backdrop, é ironical que, depois que o governo serviu à observação se retirar do CFA, o LTTE declarado solemnly, ele uphold o CFA 100%! Entretanto, nenhuma daqueles críticos da decisão do governo, pensamento que coube para perguntar aos tigres porque não uphold o CFA 100% desde o inception.

Em terceiro lugar, os críticos predizem que a retirada de Sri Lanka do CFA resultaria em níveis aumentados da violência. Se os tigres fossem genuínos sobre um estabelecimento negociado, tiveram uma oportunidade dourada em novembro 2005, quando o presidente Mahinda Rajapaksa foi jurado dentro como o presidente de Sri Lanka. O presidente, em seu discurso inaugural, disse, “eu reaffirm meus compromisso & determinação para perseguir o processo da paz para conseguir uma paz honorável que respeite os aspirations de todas as comunidades em nosso país…. Para conseguir este objetivo nobre, meu governo estará pronto para acoplar o L.T.T.E. em discutir uma solução política, quando o L.T.T.E. declara sua prontidão para recomeçar as negociações, que abandonaram unilaterally.” Dois dias após o inauguration, Prabhakaran reconheceu o presidente Rajapaksa como um homem pragmatic e disse que lhe daria a hora de encontrar uma solução ao conflito.

Pause por um momento para examinar a diferença entre as palavras e as ações dos tigres.

Oito dias mais tarde, dezembro em 5, 2005, os tigres realizaram seu primeiro ataque da mina do claymore de encontro às forças armadas. Isto foi seguido matando contagens dos civis nas vilas isoladas, bombardear de um lugar de mercado em Trincomalee, empregando um bombardeiro do suicide para assassinate o comandante do exército, matando o third a maioria de oficial sênior do exército e detonating as minas do claymore que alvejam uma barra-ônibus que carrega passageiros civis, fazendo exame das vidas sobre de 60 passageiros.

Assim, pensar são indicaria que não era o abrogation do CFA que conduziria à violência aumentada, mas era a violência everincreasing e os provocations que graves aquele conduziu ao governo revogam o CFA.

Em quarto, Sri Lanka compartilha da opinião seus amigos, os E.U. incluídos, que o conflito pode somente ser resolvido polìtica, não militar. O presidente Rajapaksa dito assim no dia de seu inauguration, e, desde que, repetiu-o muitas vezes. Se você pensar que a liderança política diz de uma coisa, e as forças armadas estiverem perseguindo sua própria agenda, comandante Sarath Fonseka do exército, dito nos meios que instruem janeiro em 12, 2008, e eu citar, “finalmente, toda a solução tiver que ser político. Mas pode haver uma solução política somente depois que o LTTE colocou os braços. O”

quinto, no assunto do CFA, Sri Lanka não tentou nenhuma mais menos de seis séries das negociações, desde 1985. Daqueles, os somente o últimos três, em 1995, em 2002/2003 e em 2006 foram conduzidos em um ambiente de CFAs. Isto demonstra que um CFA, ao ser uma ferramenta útil, não é essencial para negociações, se os partidos ao conflito forem sérios sobre uma definição. O que é essencial é conduzir negociações na fé boa até que uma solução durável ao conflito esteja concordada.

Finalmente, um “ceasefire” por sua definição very, é uma medida provisória, até que esteja substituído por um arranjo mais permanente. Similarmente, o CFA assinou entre o governo e o LTTE foi uma suspensão provisória das hostilidades até que as negociações estiveram conclídas. Depois que os tigres se moveram unilaterally longe das negociações em abril 2003, fêz exame Noruega de quase três anos para trazê-los para trás à tabela. Quando repetiram seu desempenho em outubro 2006, parecido lá pouco prospeto de seu retorno. Nenhuns enlatam o governo sejam confiáveis que os tigres seriam mais menos fickle nas conversas futuras da paz, do que eles realizaram-se durante as últimas duas décadas.

Assim, é regrettable que a comunidade internacional não compreendeu a dinâmica complexa que jogou para fora o excesso quase três décadas em Sri Lanka. Com a facilidade do uninformed, alguns países convidam repetidamente o governo e o LTTE, para shun hostilidades e para recomeçar conversas da paz. A realidade é que Sri Lanka tentou negociações com os tigres em seis ocasiões diferentes, viz., em 1985 em Thimpu com mediation Indian; em 1987 com ministro principal Rajiv Gandhi que faz exame da ligação; durante 1989/90 com presidente Premadasa; em 1995 com presidente Chandrika Kumaratunga; durante 2002/03 com ministro principal Ranil Wickremesinghe; e com presidente Mahinda Rajapaksa em 2006. Os vinte anos impares passados são testimony ao fato que os tigres concordam somente negociar como um mero ploy; para comprar a hora de regroup, reabastecer e strengthen sua potencialidade de combate. Quando engrenados adequadamente para lutar, andam longe das negociações, como fizeram em cada série das conversas. Aquele não era todo; eram brazen bastante fazer exame das vidas daqueles que inicíam dois círculos das conversas viz. o ministro principal Indian anterior Gandhi e presidente Premadasa e fêz exame muito quase da vida do presidente Kumaratunga, em todos os três exemplos empregando bombardeiros do suicide.

Nós ought pedir, a seguir, como sérios eram os tigres, quando se sentaram na tabela negociando. Eu posso authoritatively falar reuniões que nós tivemos em Banguecoque, Oslo, Berlim, e Hakone das seis, entre setembro 2002 e março 2003, porque eu era parte da equipe do governo. O LTTE insistiu que os dois lados focalizam em edições banal, ou para pedir próprias palavras de Balasingham atrasado, “os problemas existential” enfrentados pelos civis do Tamil no norte e no primeiro do leste, e somente após ter resolvido os, discutir as edições que conduzem a um estabelecimento do conflito. Nosso plea que nós utilizamos o momento de discutir simultaneamente ambas as edições caiu nas orelhas surdas.
Contra esse fundo do tigre que stonewalling, Noruega fêz um valiant oferecer em Oslo, em novembro 2002, para persuadir o líder do delegation de LTTE concordar com um acordo, onde o LTTE concordasse à terminologia “os partidos concordados explorar uma solução fundada no princípio do self interno - determinação nas áreas de habitation histórico dos povos Tamil-faladores, baseado na estrutura federal com um Sri unido Lanka…” e, para a primeira vez, concordado iniciar discussões nas edições políticas substantivas que conduzem a uma solução política, como: Poder-compartilhando entre o centro e a região, as well as dentro do centro; Região geográfica; Proteção das direitas humanas; Mecanismo político e administrativo; Finanças públicas; e lei e ordem. Aquela era uma descoberta refrescando, dada a atmosfera tensa em Oslo a noite precedente. Aquele era também uma decisão de marco, porque o LTTE concordou à escalada para baixo de sua demanda para um estado separado, e o governo concordado a uma solução baseada em uma estrutura federal, governos sucessivos de uma concessão não concede ao minority do Tamil.

O que seguiu depois disso é história. A oposição construída logo acima de encontro ao líder do delegation de LTTE em seu próprio acampamento, e terminaram abruptamente uma visita crucial a Wanni, seguindo Prabhakaran que pressuriza o para retrair. Retornou a Londres, a um homem doente e quebrado e entrou na isolação, severing todas as conexões com o LTTE, Noruega e o descanso do mundo. Mais tarde, não tentou painstakingly explicar lá era nenhum acordo em Oslo para uma solução baseada em um arranjo federal!

A reunião final realizada em Hakone, Japão, em março 2003, era um opener do olho, como essa reunião esclarecida além de toda a dúvida que o LTTE reverted a sua posição velha de não discutir nenhuma edição substantiva para resolver o conflito. No par com a compreensão alcançou em Oslo, conselheiro internacional em direitas humanas, Ian Martin, apresentou um papel, e o Balasingham atrasado veio acima com razões porque não poderiam concordar à monitoração internacional de direitas humanas. His response was that Sri Lanka’s national Human Rights Commission was equal to the task. When pressed to focus on other substantive issues agreed upon in Oslo, Balasingham sheepishly said he had no mandate to discuss any of those subjects, proving that he had been prohibited from engaging in discussing substantive issues by the LTTE leadership.

I have traced the history of negotiations, not to heap blame on late Balasingham, or even on the LTTE. All what I want to say is, that the LTTE had a clear strategy then, as it does now, and that is, to establish a separate state by hook or by crook, irrespective of the deaths it would cause to the Tamil people it claims to represent, and destruction to the country. After all, Prabhakaran has given permission to his cadres to kill him if he wavers from the commitment he made for a separate state. And, the slogan of the LTTE still remains “The thirst of the Tigers is the Homeland of Tamil Eelam.”

Against this backdrop, the question we ask from those who urge the government to seek a negotiated settlement is, are they asking us to negotiate with the LTTE once again? If the LTTE demand for a separate state is non-negotiable, what exactly are we going to negotiate with them? There are more questions. How can a democratically elected government hand over a part of its sovereign territory to an undemocratic entity like the LTTE, which engages in terrorism? What is the fate of the Muslim and Sinhala people, living in the areas claimed by the LTTE, as the traditional homeland of the Tamils?

Finally, we have to ask, who would guarantee that this time around, the LTTE will not walk away from the negotiating table. Some may even ask, if the players were different, for example, would the US negotiate with a terrorist group, which has used suicide bombers to assassinate one president, nearly killed another president, and assassinated several secretaries, including the Secretary of State? There are certain individuals, who try to draw parallels between the LTTE demands with the American demand for independence from Britain. However, in my view, the more appropriate comparison is to describe the LTTE to the secessionist Confederates, who tried to break away from the Union. As President Abraham Lincoln said in his First Inaugural Address on March 4, 1861,“Plainly, the central idea of secession, is the essence of anarchy."

Likewise, “Physically speaking, we can not separate. We cannot remove our respective sections from each other nor build an impassable wall between them” Sri Lankan government too, being a representative entity like the Union, finds secession wholly unacceptable, and seeks friendship of all its citizens, and genuine peace, as President Lincoln did, where all citizens in the country can co-exist as equals in harmony, as they did for many centuries. Throughout the conflict, Sri Lanka’s friends have remained steadfastly supportive of a negotiated solution to the conflict.

The Tigers, however, see this involvement as being partial toward the government. In his Heroes Day speech in November 2007, referring to the role of the international community, Prabhakaran, said, “This partisan and unjust conduct of the international community has severely undermined the confidence our people had in them. And it has paved the way for the breakdown of the ceasefire and the peace efforts.”

Despite the stance of Tigers, Sri Lanka is indeed appreciative of the positive role played by the international community in the war on terrorism. The ban on the LTTE, first by India, the U.S., the U.K., followed by Canada and the 27 member EU, has helped dampen the Tigers’ increasing ability to raise funds for their war chest.

The U.S. ban on one of the LTTE front organizations, the Tamil Rehabilitation Organization (TRO) in November 2007, was a significant blow to the Tiger fundraising capabilities. This kind of international action is critical to make the Tigers realize they do not have an endless fount of resources to carry on a relentless terrorist campaign to achieve its major political objective, a separate state, by force of arms.

The international community also needs to persuade the LTTE to return to the negotiating table, and to hang in there until a satisfactory comprise is reached. Only such action will drive home the message that undemocratic methods of seizing power as the Tigers currently employ, are unacceptable to the civilized world.
The international community needs to be cognizant that democracies cannot take extra-constitutional measures, and, political solutions to conflicts require discussion, debate and compromise before consensus is reached.

As you may be aware, after deliberating for one and a half years, the All Party Representative Committee (APRC), comprising the political spectrum of the country, submitted its proposals for devolution to the President, two days ago. Complex arrangements for devolution and power sharing, that also involve constitutional changes and consultation of the people, are inevitably, an incremental process. It is necessary to remind the international community, that this is only a beginning of an evolving process, which requires its fullest and continuing support.

Cfa-Abrogation: Tvinga nödvändigheten - ambassadör Bernard Goonatilleke
Automatically translated into Swedish thanks to WorldLingo
Abrogationen av upphörningen avfyrar överenskommelse var tvinga nödvändigheten, den påstod srilankesiska ambassadören i Washington, Bernard Goonetilleke danande en djupgående analys för en Washington diskussionsgrupp. Han tillfogade att de förgångna tjugo udda åren är vittnesbörden till faktumet att tigrar instämm endast för att förhandla som en bara grej; till köptid att regroup, fylla på och förstärka deras stridighetkapacitet
, när ordna till tillräckligt för att slåss, går de i väg från förhandlingar, som de har gjort på varje serie av samtal. Allt det var inte; de skamlöst sätta sig över nog som tar liven av de som initierade två rundor av samtal viz. den tidigare indiska premiärministern Gandhi och presidenten Premadasa och tog mycket nästan livet av presidenten Kumaratunga, tre anföra som exempel sammanlagt att använda självmordsbombarear. Då saker var inget gå som var deras långt, klandrade de internationellt samfund som vara partisan- och orättvisa.

Det fullt - text av ambassadörGoonetillekes anförande ges nedanfört:

Förmiddag I privilegierade, delar med dig, några tankar på Sri Lanka försök på konfliktupplösning och fredförhandling med befrielsetigrarna av Tamil Eelam eller LTTEN, som, FBIEN tidigare denna introducerade månad som, ”en av de farligaste och mest dödliga extremisterna i världen.”,

Jag beklagar den Dr. Peter krita, som var att tala på ”landskampen, dimensionerar av LTTEN,” kunde inte vara med oss i dag. Emellertid, som påtänkt, fokuserar jag på Ceasefireöverenskommelsen, den processaa freden och rollen av internationellt samfund, stundDr. Stanley ska Samarasinghe talar på hur Sri Lanka kunde realistiskt lösa konflikten.

Du är medveten, att Sri Lanka är ett multi-ethnic, mång--klosterbrodern demokrati, i faktum, en av de äldsta demokratierna i södra Asien. Du är också medveten, att LTTEN skyr demokrati och ämnar, till och med terrorism, upprätta enperson som tillhör en etnisk minoritet, mono-politiskt avskiljer statligt i Sri Lanka nord och öst. Detta ska separata statligt encompass ungefärligt 30% av landets landmass och ämnas för srilankesiska Tamils, som, enligt folkräkningen the1981, består av ungefärligt 12% av län befolkning. Majoriteten av dessa Tamils, incidentally som är levande utanför norden och öst.

LTTE-ledare, Prabhakaran i ett anförande på November 27 som i fjol sägs, och jag citerar, ”kämpar vi endast för att återvinna vår suveränitet i vårt egna historiska land, var vi har bott sedan århundraden tillbaka, suveräniteten som oss som är borttappada till koloniala occupiers.”, Suveräniteten som han talade av avslutat i 1560, när portugisen besegrade Jaffnas linjal, Cankili 1, mer än 200 år för U.S.NA. förklaring av självständighet. Notera att Cankilis härskar begränsades då till Jaffna och inte fördjupa till närvarande nordlig och östlig landsort för dagen.

LTTE-begäran för ett separat statligt som kallas ”Tamil Eelam,” på bäst, kan beskrivas, som ”fiktivt,” för det fanns aldrig, när som helst i Sri Lanka historia, ”ett traditionellt Tamilhemland,” som den Vadukkodai upplösningen av 1976, förklarat baserat på ett felaktigt fordrar vid den första brittiska koloniala sekreteraren Hugh Cleghorn.

Sri Lanka är en liten ö, hem till 20 miljoner, liknande storleksanpassa in till West Virginia eller är två gånger storleksanpassa av ön av Hawaii. Det har varit hem- till många folkgrupper för över 2000 år, som migrated north till söder och söder till norden över åren. Således kan sinhalesen, Tamils, heder, borgare, Malays och andra gemenskaper som för är talrika att listas, alla rightfully fordra ön som deras traditionella hemland.

Sri Lanka Ceasefireöverenskommelse eller CFANA och dess nya abrogation har varit mycket i nyheterna dessa dagar. Min förtrolighet med CFAEN kör tillbaka till tiden av dess presentation formulerar in bildar vid Norge, till dess häfte i Februari 2002, till dess genomförande eller mer till peka, dess skamlösa kränkning vid LTTEN, från dag en. Jag återkallar min kritiska anmärkning i tidig sort November 2005, det som att glo hoppar av av CFAEN var den inordinate hasten av dess avslutning som förnekar tillfället, bestämt till den Sri Lanka regeringen, djupt att undersöka mycket noggrant det.

Ivern att avsluta CFAEN med least fördröjningen, var tack vare faktumet, som av Jul 2001, regeringen hade instämmt till en informell ceasefire som var initierad vid LTTEN, och Norge, i dess vishet som var ansedd det som var önskvärt för att ha en formell överenskommelse att undertecknas, för den informella ceasefiren började att riva upp. I återblick åtminstone kunde några av CFA'SENS ofullkomlighet ha tilltalats, om partierna hade mer tid att betrakta följderna av individartiklar av överenskommelsen, inklusive practicability av timelines som indikerades i CFAEN.

På Januari 3, 2008, gav sig regeringen märker abrogate CFAEN, som blev fungerande på Januari 17, 2008. Sedan dess bearbetar många nära observatörer av Sri Lanka konflikt och freden, Co-Stolar av Tokyo den Donor konferensen viz. Norge, Japan, USNA och EG, andra vänner av Sri Lanka och det borgerliga samhället, har uttryckt bekymmer. Känslorna som uttrycks gemensamt har varit att tillbakadragande från den skulle CFAEN eskalerar stridighet och att leda till civila olycksoffer för skurkrollen och kränkningen av mänsklig rättighet, att det inte finns någon militär lösning till konflikten, att en lösning kan finnas endast till och med förhandling, och att partier till konflikten bör gå tillbaka till CFAEN.

Först märker regeringen av abrogation på Januari 3 var inte ut ur det vanliga, som artikel 4.4 av CFAEN förutsatt att för antingen parti för att återta, genom att ge 14 dagar, märker till Norge. Den regerings- handlingen att stå ut med vid överenskommelsen, kontraster med LTTE'SENS handlingar med hänsyn till det föregående stilleståndet, var LTTEN började hostilitetar efter, flera timmar av märker, på April 18 1995.

Understödja begäran av en retur till CFAEN är något liknande som ber en retur till, göra-tror världen som Sri Lankans bodde i efter 2002. Riktiga öppnar sparade de stannade CFANA hostilitetar och många liv. Emellertid de, som är förtrogen med den CFA skulle återkallelsen, som LTTEN började överträdelse överenskommelsen willy-nilly, inom veckor av att underteckna den. Vid avsluta April 2007, tigrar hade hopat en katalog av kränkningar 3800, som beslutsamt vid nordbon övervakar, som mot några kränkningar för 300 minderårig vid de regerings- styrkorna. Jag återkallar vividly hur en av de initiala kränkningar tog mig till Kilinochchi för ett möte med sena Tamilselvan. Det bevisade möte, det okända någon tvivlar, hur fickle tigrarna var, om att försvara den begynna CFAEN. Alltigenom CFAEN, dämpar de som är förlovade i allvarliga stilleståndkränkningar liksom och att lönnmörda Tamilpolitikar, representanter och medlemmar av krigsmakten; mörda politiska motståndarear; inkoppling i självmordsbombarear; röva bort civilister för ransom; och kalla in till militärtjänstgöring barnsoldater, illvilja som den tripartite överenskommelsen undertecknade med regeringen och UNICEFEN. Det var under denna so-called ”ceasefire,”, som tigrarna lönnmördade utrikesministern Lakshman Kadirgamar som gjordes två försök att döda en annan Tamilminister, Douglas Devananda, genom att använda kvinnliga självmordsbombarear och användes ännu en kvinnlig självmordsbombare i ett försök att lönnmörda commanderen av den Sri Lanka armén. Jag undrar, som landet, bland de, som frågar Sri Lanka i dag att gå tillbaka till CFAEN, skulle instämm för att fortsätta med en charad av den natur, i vända mot av sådan allvarliga provokationer.

Det är ett faktum att en ceasefireöverenskommelse fanns till för en tid sedan. Emellertid övervakar kränkningarna som listas av Nordbo upprättar klart att tigrarna upphörde aldrig skottlossning. Vad återstod av CFAEN, till dess nya abrogation, var en överenskommelse på pappers-, framfört defunct vid tigrarna, från dag en. I denna bakgrund är det ironical att, efter den tjänade som regeringen har märkt för att återta från CFAEN, LTTEN som förklarades solemnly, det skulle försvarar CFAEN 100%! Emellertid inga av de som är kritiska av regering beslut, tanke det som är färdigt att fråga tigrarna varför de missade för att försvara CFAEN 100% efter inception.

Third förutsäger kritiker att Sri Lanka tillbakadragande från det CFA skulle resultatet, i ökande jämnar av våld. Om tigrarna hade varit äktaa om en förhandlad bosättning, hade de ett guld- tillfälle i November 2005, då presidenten Mahinda Rajapaksa svors in som president av Sri Lanka. Presidenten, i hans invigningstal, sade, ”intygar på nytt jag min förpliktelse & beslutsamhet att förfölja den processaa freden för att uppnå en hedervärd fred som ska respekt gemenskaperna för ambitioner allra i vårt land…., För att uppnå detta nobla mål, ska min regering är ordnar till för att koppla in L.T.T.E.EN. i att diskutera en politisk lösning, när L.T.T.E.EN. förklarar deras readiness till meritförteckningförhandlingar, som de övergav unilateralt.”, Två dagar efter invigningen, bekräftade sade Prabhakaran presidenten Rajapaksa som en pragmatisk man och att han skulle ger honom tid att finna en lösning till konflikten.

Pausen för att ett ögonblick ska undersöka skillnaden mellan uttrycker och gärningarna av tigrarna.

Åtta mer sistnämnda dagar, på December 5, 2005, bar tigrarna ut deras min attack för första claymore mot krigsmakten. Detta följdes, genom att döda massor av civilister i isolerade byar, att bombardera av en marknadsföra, förlägger i Trincomalee som använder en självmordsbombare för att lönnmörda armékommendörkaptenen som dödar thirden som mest pensionär kommenderar av armén, och detonera claymore bryter att uppsätta som mål en bussa som bär civila passagerare som tar liven av över 60 passagerare.

Således indikerar förnuftigt skulle tänkande att det inte var abrogationen av CFAEN som skulle bly- till ökande våld, men det var det everincreasing våld, och allvarliga provokationer, som ledde regeringen, abrogate CFAEN.

Fourth delar Sri Lanka beskåda av dess vänner, den inklusive USEN, att konflikten kan endast lösas politiskt, inte militarily. Presidenten Rajapaksa sade så på dagen av hans invigning, och, sedan, har upprepat det många tider. Om du funderare, som de politiska ledarskapnågot att säga ett ting och militären förföljer dess egna dagordning, armékommendörkaptenen Sarath Fonseka som sägs på massmedia som sammanfattar på Januari 12, 2008 och mig, citerar, ”Ultimately, måste någon ska lösning att vara politisk. Men det kan finnas en politisk lösning, efter endast LTTEN har lagt besegrar beväpnar. ”

Har femte, på betvinga av CFAEN, Sri Lanka försökt inga mindre än sex serier av förhandlingar, efter 1985. Av de förades de endast sist trena, i 1995, 2002/2003 och 2006 i en miljö av CFAs. Detta visar, att en CFA, stunder som är ett användbart bearbetar, är inte nödvändigt för förhandlingar, om partier till konflikten är allvarliga om en upplösning. Vad är nödvändig, är att föra förhandlingar i bra tro, tills en hållbar lösning till konflikten instämmas upon.

Slutligen ”är en ceasefire” vid dess very definition, ett tillfälligt mäter, tills den byts ut av en mer permanent ordning. På motsvarande sätt, undertecknade CFAEN mellan regeringen och LTTEN var en tillfällig upphängning av hostilitetar, tills förhandlingar avslutades. Efter tigrarna som unilateralt var rörda i väg från förhandlingar i April 2003, tog det Norge nästan tre år för att komma med dem baksida till bordlägga. När de upprepade deras kapacitet i Oktober 2006, där den verkade lite utsikten av deras retur. Neither can det regerings- är säkra, att tigrarna skulle är any mindre fickle i framtida fredssamtal, än dem har ägt rum under de sist två årtiondena.

Således är det beklagligt att internationellt samfund har missat för att förstå den komplexa dynamiken som har lekt ut över nästan tre årtionden i Sri Lanka. Med lindra av det uninformed, appellen för några länder upprepade gånger på regeringen och LTTEN, att sky hostilitetar och till meritförteckningfredssamtal. Verkligheten är att Sri Lanka har försökt förhandlingar med tigrarna på olika sex orsakar, viz., i 1985 på Thimpu med indisk mediation; i 1987 med premiärministern Rajiv Gandhi som tar det bly-; under 1989/90 med presidenten Premadasa; i 1995 med presidenten Chandrika Kumaratunga; under 2002/03 med premiärministern Ranil Wickremesinghe; och med presidenten Mahinda Rajapaksa i 2006. De förgångna tjugo udda åren är vittnesbörden till faktumet att tigrar instämm endast för att förhandla som en bara grej; till köptid att regroup, fylla på och förstärka deras stridighetkapacitet. När de tillräckligt utrustas för att slåss, går de i väg från förhandlingar, som de har gjort på varje serie av samtal. Allt det var inte; de skamlöst sätta sig över nog som tar liven av de som initierade två rundor av samtal viz. den tidigare indiska premiärministern Gandhi och presidenten Premadasa och tog mycket nästan livet av presidenten Kumaratunga, tre anföra som exempel sammanlagt att använda självmordsbombarear.

Vi ought att fråga, då, hur allvarliga var tigrarna, när de satt på förhandla, bordlägga. Jag kan authoritatively tala av de sex mötena som vi hade i Bangkok, Oslo, Berlin och Hakone, mellan September 2002 och mars 2003, som jag var delen av det regerings- laget. LTTEN insisterade att de två sidorna fokuserar på banalt utfärdar, eller att låna egna sena Balasinghams uttrycker, ”de existentiella problemen” som vändas mot av Tamilcivilisterna i norden och det östliga första, och endast når att ha löst dem, för att diskutera utfärdar att leda till en bosättning av konflikten. Vår vädjan, att vi använder tiden att diskutera båda, utfärdar avverkning på dövt gå i ax samtidigt.
Mot denna bakgrund av tigern som stonewalling, gjorde Norge ett tappert anbud i Oslo, i November 2002, för att övertala ledare av LTTE-delegationen för att instämma på en kompromiss, var LTTEN som instämmas till terminologin ”partierna som instämmas för att undersöka en lösning som grundas på principen av inre självbestämmande i områden av den historiska boningen av Tamil-tala, bemannar, baserade på federalt strukturerar med en eniga Sri Lanka…”, och för den första tiden, instämmt till invigda diskussioner på väsentligt politiskt utfärdar att leda till en politisk lösning, liksom: Driva-dela mellan centrera och regionen, as well as inom centrera; Geografisk region; Mänsklig rättighetskydd; Politisk och administrativ mekanism; Offentlig finans; och lag och beställer. Det var ett uppfriskande genombrott som gavs den spända atmosfären i Oslo den föregående aftonen. Det var också ett landmarkbeslut, som LTTENA som instämmas för att klättra, besegrar från dess begäran för ett separat påstår, och regeringen till en lösning som baseras på ett federalt, strukturerar överens, på varandra följande regeringar för ett medgivande som missas för att medge till Tamilminoriteten.

Vad följde därefter, är historia. Opposition som byggdes snart upp mot ledare av LTTE-delegationen i hans egna läger och han avslutade plötsligt ett avgörande besök till Wanni, efter Prabhakaran som pressurizing honom för att dra tillbaka. Han gick tillbaka till London, en sjuk och bruten man och gick in i isolering som avskiljer alla anslutningar med LTTEN, Norge och vila av världen. Mer sistnämnd försökte han painstakingly att förklara där var ingen överenskommelse i Oslo för en lösning som baserades på en federal ordning!

Finalmötet som rymdes i Hakone, Japan, i mars 2003, var en synaöppnare, som den mötet klargj橬一j det okända något tvivel, som LTTEN hade återvänt till dess gammalt, placerar av att inte diskutera någon substantiv utfärdar för att lösa konflikten. På par med överenskommelsen som nåddes i Oslo, framlade landskampkonsulenten på mänsklig rättighet, Ian Martin, ett pappers-, och den sena Balasinghamen kom med resonerar upp varför de inte kunde instämma till landskampövervakning av mänsklig rättighet. His response was that Sri Lanka’s national Human Rights Commission was equal to the task. When pressed to focus on other substantive issues agreed upon in Oslo, Balasingham sheepishly said he had no mandate to discuss any of those subjects, proving that he had been prohibited from engaging in discussing substantive issues by the LTTE leadership.

I have traced the history of negotiations, not to heap blame on late Balasingham, or even on the LTTE. All what I want to say is, that the LTTE had a clear strategy then, as it does now, and that is, to establish a separate state by hook or by crook, irrespective of the deaths it would cause to the Tamil people it claims to represent, and destruction to the country. After all, Prabhakaran has given permission to his cadres to kill him if he wavers from the commitment he made for a separate state. And, the slogan of the LTTE still remains “The thirst of the Tigers is the Homeland of Tamil Eelam.”

Against this backdrop, the question we ask from those who urge the government to seek a negotiated settlement is, are they asking us to negotiate with the LTTE once again? If the LTTE demand for a separate state is non-negotiable, what exactly are we going to negotiate with them? There are more questions. How can a democratically elected government hand over a part of its sovereign territory to an undemocratic entity like the LTTE, which engages in terrorism? What is the fate of the Muslim and Sinhala people, living in the areas claimed by the LTTE, as the traditional homeland of the Tamils?

Finally, we have to ask, who would guarantee that this time around, the LTTE will not walk away from the negotiating table. Some may even ask, if the players were different, for example, would the US negotiate with a terrorist group, which has used suicide bombers to assassinate one president, nearly killed another president, and assassinated several secretaries, including the Secretary of State? There are certain individuals, who try to draw parallels between the LTTE demands with the American demand for independence from Britain. However, in my view, the more appropriate comparison is to describe the LTTE to the secessionist Confederates, who tried to break away from the Union. As President Abraham Lincoln said in his First Inaugural Address on March 4, 1861,“Plainly, the central idea of secession, is the essence of anarchy."

Likewise, “Physically speaking, we can not separate. We cannot remove our respective sections from each other nor build an impassable wall between them” Sri Lankan government too, being a representative entity like the Union, finds secession wholly unacceptable, and seeks friendship of all its citizens, and genuine peace, as President Lincoln did, where all citizens in the country can co-exist as equals in harmony, as they did for many centuries. Throughout the conflict, Sri Lanka’s friends have remained steadfastly supportive of a negotiated solution to the conflict.

The Tigers, however, see this involvement as being partial toward the government. In his Heroes Day speech in November 2007, referring to the role of the international community, Prabhakaran, said, “This partisan and unjust conduct of the international community has severely undermined the confidence our people had in them. And it has paved the way for the breakdown of the ceasefire and the peace efforts.”

Despite the stance of Tigers, Sri Lanka is indeed appreciative of the positive role played by the international community in the war on terrorism. The ban on the LTTE, first by India, the U.S., the U.K., followed by Canada and the 27 member EU, has helped dampen the Tigers’ increasing ability to raise funds for their war chest.

The U.S. ban on one of the LTTE front organizations, the Tamil Rehabilitation Organization (TRO) in November 2007, was a significant blow to the Tiger fundraising capabilities. This kind of international action is critical to make the Tigers realize they do not have an endless fount of resources to carry on a relentless terrorist campaign to achieve its major political objective, a separate state, by force of arms.

The international community also needs to persuade the LTTE to return to the negotiating table, and to hang in there until a satisfactory comprise is reached. Only such action will drive home the message that undemocratic methods of seizing power as the Tigers currently employ, are unacceptable to the civilized world.
The international community needs to be cognizant that democracies cannot take extra-constitutional measures, and, political solutions to conflicts require discussion, debate and compromise before consensus is reached.

As you may be aware, after deliberating for one and a half years, the All Party Representative Committee (APRC), comprising the political spectrum of the country, submitted its proposals for devolution to the President, two days ago. Complex arrangements for devolution and power sharing, that also involve constitutional changes and consultation of the people, are inevitably, an incremental process. It is necessary to remind the international community, that this is only a beginning of an evolving process, which requires its fullest and continuing support.

Abrogation CFA: Compelling необходимость - посол Бернард Goonatilleke
Automatically translated into Russian thanks to WorldLingo
Abrogation согласования пожара переставать была compelling необходимость, заявленное посол Sri Lankan в вашингтоне, Бернард Goonetilleke делая глубокий анализ перед группой для обсуждения вашингтона. Он добавил что прошлыми 20 сверхсчетными летами будут свидетельствование к факту что тигры только соглашаются обсудить как простой ploy; для того чтобы купить время перегруппировать, пополнить и усилить их воюя возможность
когда подходящ готово для того чтобы воевать, они гуляют далеко от переговоров, по мере того как они делали на каждой серии бесед. То не было всем; они были brazen достаточно для того чтобы принять жизни тех начали 2 второй тур переговоров viz. бывший индийский премьер-министр Ганди и президент Premadasa и very nearly принял жизнь президента Kumaratunga, в всех 3 примерах используя бомбардировщики суицида. Когда вещи были никакой идти их дорога, они обвинили сообществ как был партизански и неправосудны.

Полнотекстовое речи Goonetilleke посола дается ниже:

Я privileged, делил с вами, некоторыми мыслями на попытках Sri Lanka на улаживание конфликта и мирныа переговоры с тиграми высвобождения Tamil Eelam или LTTE, которое, FBI более раньше этот месяц введенный как, «один из самых опасных и deadly экстремистов в мире.»

Я жалею то Др. Мелок Питер, который должен был поговорить на «международном размере LTTE,» не смог быть с нами сегодня. Однако, как предназначено, я сфокусирую на согласовании Ceasefire, мирном процессе и роли сообществ, пока Др. Стэнли Samarasinghe поговорит на как Sri Lanka смогло реалистически разрешить конфликт.

Вы осведомленны что Sri Lanka будет multi-этническим, multi-вероисповедным народовластием, в действительности, одно из самых старых народовластий в South Asia. Вы также осведомленны что LTTE избегает народовластие, и предназначает, через террорисм, для того чтобы установить mono-этнические, mono-политические отдельно положение в севере Sri Lanka и восток. Это отдельно положение включит приблизительно 30% из landmass страны, и предназначено для Sri Lankan Tamils, которые, согласно переписи the1981, состоят из приблизительно 12% населенности графства. Большинство этих Tamils, incidentally, в реальном маштабе времени вне севера и востока.

Руководитель LTTE, Prabhakaran в речи 27-ого ноября, в прошлом году после того как я сказаны, и я закавычу, «мы боремся только для того чтобы возвратить наше суверенство в нашей собственной исторической земле где мы живем на столетия, суверенство которое мы потеряли к колониальным occupiers.» Суверенство, котор он поговорил кончаться в 1560, когда португалка нанесла поражение правителю Jaffna, Cankili 1, больше чем за 200 лет до США. Декларация Независимости. Заметьте правило того Cankili на том времени ограничил к Jaffna, и не удлинил к присытствыющим провинциям дня северным и восточным.

Требование LTTE для отдельно положения, вызванное «Tamil Eelam,» в лучшем, можно описать как «фиктивно,» для не был никогда, в любое время в истории Sri Lanka, «традиционного homeland Tamil,» как разрешение Vadukkodai 1976, объявленное после того как оно основаны на ошибочной заявке первой великобританской колониальной секретаршей Hugh Cleghorn.

Sri Lanka малым островом, домом до 20 миллионов, подобными в размере к West Virginia, или будет дважды размером острова Гавайских островов. Оно домашн к много этнические группы на сверх 2000 лет, которые проникли северно к югу и югу к северу над летами. Таким образом, Sinhalese, Tamils, причаливает, Burghers, Malays и другие общины, слишком многочисленнNp быть перечисленным, могут все rightfully востребовать остров как их традиционный homeland.

Согласование Ceasefire Sri Lanka или CFA и свой недавний abrogation находились very much в новостях these days. Мое панибратство с CFA бежит back to время своего представления в форме проекта Норвегией, к своей подписи в феврале 2002, к своей вставке, или больше к пункту, своему brazen нарушению LTTE, от дня одного. Я вспоминаю мое критическое замечание в предыдущем ноябре 2005, том glaring, котор дефект CFA была inordinate торопливость своего заключения, отказывая возможность, определенно к правительству Sri Lanka, глубоки всмотреться оно.

Eagerness для того чтобы заключить CFA с самым меньшим задерживает, был из-за факта, того Рождеством 2001, правительство согласовало неофициальный ceasefire начатый LTTE, и Норвегия, в своей премудрости, учитывала, что она желательно имело формальный договор быть подписанным прежде чем неофициальный ceasefire начал к unravel. В ретроспективе, по крайней мере некоторые из shortcomings CFA смогли быть адресованы, если партии имели больше времени рассматривать степени последствий отдельных статей согласования, то включая осуществимость timelines показанных в CFA.

3-его января 2008, правительство дало извещение abrogate CFA, который стал рабочим 17-ого января 2008. Since then, много близких наблюдателей конфликта Sri Lanka и мирного процесса, Co-Стулов конференции токио Donor viz. Норвегия, япония, США и EU, другие друзья Sri Lanka и гражданское общество, выражали заботу. Общ выражаемые сентименты что разведение от CFA escalate воевать, водящ к тяжелым вольнонаемным casualties и нарушению прав человека, что не будет воинского разрешения к конфликту, что разрешение можно найти только через переговоры, и что партии к конфликту должны возвратить к CFA.

Во первых, извещение о правительства abrogation 3-его января не было из ординарности, по мере того как статья 4.4 CFA обеспечила для любой партии для того чтобы разделить путем давать извещение о 14 дней к Норвегии. Действие правительства, котор будет abide согласование, контрасты с действиями LTTE по отношению к ранее truce, где LTTE начало враждебности после нескольких часов извещения, 18-ого апреля 1995.

Во-вторых, требование возвращения к CFA как спрашивать возвращение к миру делать-верить в котором Sri Lankans жило с 2002. Поистине, остановленные CFA раскрывают враждебности и сохранили много жизней. Однако, те которые знакомы с CFA вспомнили бы что LTTE начало нарушать согласование willy-nilly, в пределах неделей подписания его. концом апрелем 2007, тигры amassed каталог нарушений 3800 как обусловлено Nordic мониторами, по сравнению с некоторыми 300 мелкими нарушениями усилиями правительства. Я vividly вспоминаю как одно из тех первоначально нарушений приняло меня к Kilinochchi для встречи с последним Tamilselvan. Та встреча доказала, за любым сомнением, как fickle тигры были, о upholding насцентный CFA. В течении CFA, они включили в серьезных нарушениях truce such as, assassinating вмеру политиканы Tamil, должностные лица и члены вооруженных силы страны; убивать политических противниц; включать в бомбометаниях суицида; abducting civilians для ransom; и conscripting воины ребенка, несмотря на трехраздельное согласование подписанное с правительством и UNICEF. Оно было во время этого so-called «использованного ceasefire,» которому тигры assassinated министра иностранных дел Lakshman Kadirgamar, сделанного 2 попытками убить другой министр Tamil, Дуглас Devananda, использующ женские бомбардировщики суицида, и yet another женскому бомбардировщику суицида для того чтобы assassinate командир армии Sri Lanka. Я интересую, который страна, среди тех которые спрашивают, что Sri Lanka сегодня возвращает к CFA, согласилась бы продолжать с шарадой той природы, in the face of такие тягчайшие provocations.

Будет фактом что согласование ceasefire существовало until recently. Однако, нарушения перечисленные Nordic мониторами ясно устанавливают что тигры никогда не переставали сгореть. Не остать CFA, до своего недавнего abrogation, было согласованием на бумаге, представленной несуществующе тиграми, от дня одного. В этом backdrop, иронически что, после того как правительство служило извещение разделить от CFA, торжественно объявленное LTTE, оно uphold CFA 100%! Однако, никакие из тех критически решения правительства, мысли, котор оно приспосабливать для того чтобы спросить тиграм почему они не сумели uphold CFA 100% с inception.

В-третьих, критики предсказывают что разведение Sri Lanka от CFA привело к в увеличенных уровнях расправы. Если тигры были неподдельны о обсуженном выселке, то они имели золотистую возможность в ноябре 2005, когда президент Mahinda Rajapaksa был присягнут внутри как президент Sri Lanka. Президент, в его инаугурационной речи, сказал, «я вновь подтверждаю мои принятие окончательного решения & определение для того чтобы последовать мирный процесс для того чтобы достигнуть почетного мира который будет уважать устремленности всех общин в нашей стране…. Для того чтобы достигнуть этой благородной цели, мое правительство будет готово включить L.T.T.E. в обсуждать политическое разрешение, когда L.T.T.E. объявляет их готовность для того чтобы возобновить переговоры, которые они односторонно покинули.» Через 2 дня после инаугурации, Prabhakaran подтвердило президента Rajapaksa как прагматический человек и сказало что он даст ему время найти разрешение к конфликту.

Сделайте паузу на момент для того чтобы рассмотреть разницу между словами и документами тигров.

8 дней более поздно, 5-ого декабря 2005, тигры унесли их первое нападение шахты claymore против вооруженных силы страны. Это было последовано за путем убивать счеты civilians в изолированных селах, бомбить рыночного местя в Trincomalee, использовать бомбардировщик суицида для того чтобы assassinate командарм, убивать треть большинств старший сотрудник армии и взрывать шахты claymore пристреливая шину везя вольнонаемные пассажиры, принимая жизни над 60 пассажиров.

Таким образом, sane думать показал бы что не было abrogation CFA который вел бы к увеличенному расправе, но было everincreasing расправой и тягчайшие provocations, котор то вело правительство abrogate CFA.

В-четвертых, Sri Lanka делит взгляд своих друзей, США включенные, что конфликт можно только разрешить политически, воински. Президент Rajapaksa сказанное так на день его инаугурации, и, в виду того что, повторял его много времен. Если вы думаете что политическая верхушка говорит одна вещь, и воискао следует свою собственную повестку дня, командарм Sarath Fonseka, сказанное на средства резюмируя 12-ого января 2008, то и я закавычу, «предельно, любое разрешение быть политическ. Но может быть политическое разрешение only after LTTE lay down рукоятки. »

Пятое, on the subject of CFA, Sri Lanka не пытает никакие более менее чем 6 серий переговоров, с 1985. тех, только последние 3, в 1995, 2002/2003 и 2006 были дирижированы в окружающей среде CFAs. Это демонстрирует что CFA, пока был полезным инструментом, не необходим для переговоров, если партии к конфликту серьезны о разрешении. Необходимо должна дирижировать переговоры in good faith до тех пор пока не согласовать lasting разрешение к конфликту.

Окончательно, «ceasefire» своим очень определением, будет временно измерение, до тех пор пока он не заменить более постоянным расположением. Подобно, CFA подписал между правительством и LTTE было временное приостановление враждебностей до тех пор пока переговоры не заключить. После того как тигры односторонно двинули далеко от переговоров в апреле 2003, оно приняло Норвегии почти 3 лет для того чтобы принести их back to таблица. Когда они повторили их представление в октябре 2006, там показано меньшей перспективностью их возвращения. Ни те консервируют правительство уверенно что тигры были нисколько более менее fickle в будущих беседах мира, чем они во время последних 2 декад.

Таким образом, regrettable что сообществ не сумело понять сложную динамику которая играла вне над почти 3 декадами в Sri Lanka. С легкостью uninformed, некоторые страны повторно call on правительство и LTTE, для того чтобы избежать враждебности и возобновить беседы мира. Реальность что Sri Lanka пытало переговоры с тиграми на 6 по-разному случаях, viz., в 1985 на Thimpu с индийским посредничеством; в 1987 с премьер-министром Rajiv Ганди принимая руководство; во время 1989/90 с президентом Premadasa; в 1995 с президентом Chandrika Kumaratunga; во время 2002/03 с премьер-министром Ranil Wickremesinghe; и с президентом Mahinda Rajapaksa в 2006. Прошлыми 20 сверхсчетными летами будут свидетельствование к факту что тигры только соглашаются обсудить как простой ploy; купить время перегруппировать, пополнить и усилить их воюя возможность. Когда подходящ после того как я зацеплены для того чтобы воевать, они гуляют далеко от переговоров, по мере того как они делали на каждой серии бесед. То не было всем; они были brazen достаточно для того чтобы принять жизни тех начали 2 второй тур переговоров viz. бывший индийский премьер-министр Ганди и президент Premadasa и very nearly принял жизнь президента Kumaratunga, в всех 3 примерах используя бомбардировщики суицида.

Мы ought спросить, тогда, как серьезны были тигры, когда они сидели на столе переговоров. Я могу авторитетно поговорить встреч мы имели в Bangkok, Осло, Berlin, и Hakone 6, котор, между сентябрями 2002 и мартов 2003, по мере того как я был частью команды правительства. LTTE настояло что обе стороны фокусируют на пошловатых вопросах, или одолжить собственным словам последнего Balasingham, «экзистенциальные проблемы» ые civilians Tamil в севере и восточном первом, и only after разрешать их, для того чтобы обсудить вопросы водя к урегулирование спорного вопроса. Наша мольба что мы используем время обсудить оба вопроса одновременно упала на deaf уши.
На этом фоне тигра stonewalling, Норвегия сделала молодецкое предложить цену в Осло, в ноябре 2002, уговорить руководителя делегации LTTE согласиться на компромиссе, где LTTE согласовало терминология «партии соглашенные исследовать разрешение основанное на принципе внутренне самоопределения в зонах исторического habitation Tamil-говоря людей, основанного на федеральной структуре с соединенным Sri Lanka…» и, for the first time, соглашено начать обсуждения на субстантивных политических вопросах водя к политическому разрешению, such as: Сил-между центром и зоной, также, как внутри центр; Географическая зона; Предохранение от прав человека; Политический и управленческий механизм; Государственныа финансы; и законность и порядок. То был освежая прорыв, котор дали напряженной обстановке в Осло ранее вечер. То было также решение наземного ориентира, по мере того как LTTE согласовало подъем вниз от своего требования для отдельно положения, и правительство согласовало разрешение основанное на федеральной структуре, правительствах уступке последовательных суменных для того чтобы уступать к несовершеннолетию Tamil.

Последовало за в дальнейшем будет историей. Противовключение скоро build up против руководителя делегации LTTE в его собственном лагере, и он скачком закончил критическое посещение к Wanni, следуя за Prabhakaran надувая его для того чтобы вытянуть. Он возвратил к лондону, больному и сломленному человеку и пошел в изоляцию, разъединяя все соединения с LTTE, Норвегию и rest of the world. Более поздно, он painstakingly попытался объяснить там был никаким согласованием в Осло для разрешения основанного на федеральном расположении!

Окончательным собранием созванным в Hakone, японии, в марте 2003, был консервооткрыватель глаза, как той встречей уточюненной за любым сомнением которое LTTE reverted к своему старому положению не обсуждать NIKAKое существенные вопросы для того чтобы разрешить конфликт. На равенстве с вниканием достигл в Осло, международном советнике на правах человека, Ян Мартин, представил бумагу, и последнее Balasingham come up с причинами почему они не смогли согласовать международный контролировать прав человека. His response was that Sri Lanka’s national Human Rights Commission was equal to the task. When pressed to focus on other substantive issues agreed upon in Oslo, Balasingham sheepishly said he had no mandate to discuss any of those subjects, proving that he had been prohibited from engaging in discussing substantive issues by the LTTE leadership.

I have traced the history of negotiations, not to heap blame on late Balasingham, or even on the LTTE. All what I want to say is, that the LTTE had a clear strategy then, as it does now, and that is, to establish a separate state by hook or by crook, irrespective of the deaths it would cause to the Tamil people it claims to represent, and destruction to the country. After all, Prabhakaran has given permission to his cadres to kill him if he wavers from the commitment he made for a separate state. And, the slogan of the LTTE still remains “The thirst of the Tigers is the Homeland of Tamil Eelam.”

Against this backdrop, the question we ask from those who urge the government to seek a negotiated settlement is, are they asking us to negotiate with the LTTE once again? If the LTTE demand for a separate state is non-negotiable, what exactly are we going to negotiate with them? There are more questions. How can a democratically elected government hand over a part of its sovereign territory to an undemocratic entity like the LTTE, which engages in terrorism? What is the fate of the Muslim and Sinhala people, living in the areas claimed by the LTTE, as the traditional homeland of the Tamils?

Finally, we have to ask, who would guarantee that this time around, the LTTE will not walk away from the negotiating table. Some may even ask, if the players were different, for example, would the US negotiate with a terrorist group, which has used suicide bombers to assassinate one president, nearly killed another president, and assassinated several secretaries, including the Secretary of State? There are certain individuals, who try to draw parallels between the LTTE demands with the American demand for independence from Britain. However, in my view, the more appropriate comparison is to describe the LTTE to the secessionist Confederates, who tried to break away from the Union. As President Abraham Lincoln said in his First Inaugural Address on March 4, 1861,“Plainly, the central idea of secession, is the essence of anarchy."

Likewise, “Physically speaking, we can not separate. We cannot remove our respective sections from each other nor build an impassable wall between them” Sri Lankan government too, being a representative entity like the Union, finds secession wholly unacceptable, and seeks friendship of all its citizens, and genuine peace, as President Lincoln did, where all citizens in the country can co-exist as equals in harmony, as they did for many centuries. Throughout the conflict, Sri Lanka’s friends have remained steadfastly supportive of a negotiated solution to the conflict.

The Tigers, however, see this involvement as being partial toward the government. In his Heroes Day speech in November 2007, referring to the role of the international community, Prabhakaran, said, “This partisan and unjust conduct of the international community has severely undermined the confidence our people had in them. And it has paved the way for the breakdown of the ceasefire and the peace efforts.”

Despite the stance of Tigers, Sri Lanka is indeed appreciative of the positive role played by the international community in the war on terrorism. The ban on the LTTE, first by India, the U.S., the U.K., followed by Canada and the 27 member EU, has helped dampen the Tigers’ increasing ability to raise funds for their war chest.

The U.S. ban on one of the LTTE front organizations, the Tamil Rehabilitation Organization (TRO) in November 2007, was a significant blow to the Tiger fundraising capabilities. This kind of international action is critical to make the Tigers realize they do not have an endless fount of resources to carry on a relentless terrorist campaign to achieve its major political objective, a separate state, by force of arms.

The international community also needs to persuade the LTTE to return to the negotiating table, and to hang in there until a satisfactory comprise is reached. Only such action will drive home the message that undemocratic methods of seizing power as the Tigers currently employ, are unacceptable to the civilized world.
The international community needs to be cognizant that democracies cannot take extra-constitutional measures, and, political solutions to conflicts require discussion, debate and compromise before consensus is reached.

As you may be aware, after deliberating for one and a half years, the All Party Representative Committee (APRC), comprising the political spectrum of the country, submitted its proposals for devolution to the President, two days ago. Complex arrangements for devolution and power sharing, that also involve constitutional changes and consultation of the people, are inevitably, an incremental process. It is necessary to remind the international community, that this is only a beginning of an evolving process, which requires its fullest and continuing support.

Afschaffing CFA: Een meest Dwingende Noodzaak - Ambassadeur Bernard Goonatilleke
Automatically translated into Dutch thanks to WorldLingo
De afschaffing van houdt brandovereenkomst op was een meest dwingende noodzaak, de verklaarde Ambassadeur van Sri Lankan in Washington, Bernard Goonetilleke die een diepgaande analyse maakt voor een de besprekingsgroep van Washington. Hij voegde toe dat de afgelopen twintig oneven jaren verklaring aan het feit zijn dat de Tijgers slechts om als zuivere list overeenkomen te onderhandelen; om tijd te kopen om hun het vechten vermogen te hergroeperen bij te vullen en te versterken
wanneer voldoende klaar te vechten, lopen zij vanaf onderhandelingen, aangezien zij bij elke reeks besprekingen hebben gedaan. Dat was niet allen; zij waren koperachtig genoeg om het leven van zij te nemen die twee rondes van besprekingen namelijk in werking stelden de vroegere Indische Eerste Minister Gandhi en President Premadasa en nam heel dicht het leven van President Kumaratunga, in alle drie instanties aanwendend zelfmoordbommenwerpers. Toen de dingen geen het gaan hun manier waren, beschuldigden zij de internationale gemeenschap zoals zijnd partij en onrechtvaardig.

Het hoogtepunt - de tekst van de toespraak van Goonetilleke van de Ambassadeur wordt gegeven hieronder:

Ik ben bevoorrecht, met u, sommige gedachten op de pogingen van Sri Lanka tot conflictresolutie en vredesonderhandeling met de Tijgers van de Bevrijding van Tamil Eelam of LTTE kunnen delen, FBI vroeger deze maand waarals, „één van de gevaarlijkste en dodelijke extremisten in de wereld.“ introduceerde

Ik betreur dat Dr. Peter Chalk, die op de „Internationale Afmeting van LTTE moest spreken,“ kon niet met ons vandaag zijn. Nochtans, zoals bedoeld, zal ik concentreren me op de Ceasefire Overeenkomst, het vredesproces en de rol van de internationale gemeenschap, terwijl Dr. Stanley Samarasinghe zal spreken op hoe Sri Lanka het conflict kon realistisch oplossen.

U bent zich ervan bewust dat Sri Lanka een multi-etnische, multi-godsdienstige democratie, in feite, één van de oudste democratieën in Zuid-Azige is. U bent zich ook ervan bewust dat LTTE democratie, mijdt en, door terrorisme, bedoelt een mono-etnische, mono-politieke afzonderlijke staat in het noorden van Sri Lanka en het oosten te vestigen. Deze afzonderlijke staat zal ongeveer 30% van het uitgestrekte gebied van het land omringen, en is voorgenomen voor Sri Lankan Tamils, die, volgens telling the1981, uit ongeveer 12% van de bevolking van de provincie bestaan. De meerderheid van deze Tamils, overigens, leeft buiten het noorden en het oosten.

Leider LTTE, Prabhakaran in een toespraak op 27 bovengenoemd November, vorig jaar, en ik citeer, „wij worstelen om onze soevereiniteit in ons eigen historisch land slechts te herwinnen waar wij eeuwenlang, de soevereiniteit hebben geleefd die wij aan koloniale bewoners.“ verloren De soevereiniteit die hij van gebeëindigd in 1560 heeft gesproken, toen de Portugees versloegen de heerser van Jaffna, Cankili 1, meer dan 200 jaar vóór de V.S. verklaring van onafhankelijkheid. Merk op dat de regel van Cankili op dat ogenblik tot Jaffna beperkt was, en zich breidde niet tot huidige noordelijke en oostelijke provincies uit.

De vraag LTTE naar een afzonderlijke staat, in het gunstigste geval genoemd „Tamil Eelam,“, kan worden beschreven zoals „gefingeerd,“ voor er, op elk ogenblik in de geschiedenis van Sri Lanka, nooit een „traditioneel Tamil geboorteland was,“ als Resolutie Vadukkodai van 1976, verklaard die op een onjuiste eis door de eerste Britse koloniale Secretaresse Hugh Cleghorn wordt gebaseerd.

Sri Lanka is een klein eiland, huis aan 20 miljoen, gelijkaardig in grootte aan West-Virginia, of is tweemaal de grootte van het Eiland Hawaï. Het is naar huis aan vele etnische groepen meer dan 2000 jaar geweest, die het noorden aan zuiden en zuiden aan het noorden in de loop van de jaren migreerde. Aldus, legt Sinhalese, Tamils, Burghers, Malays vast en andere te talrijke gemeenschappen, om worden vermeld, kunnen allen het eiland als hun traditioneel geboorteland met recht eisen.

Ceasefire van Sri Lanka de overeenkomst of CFA en zijn recente afschaffing zijn zeer in het nieuws deze dagen geweest. Mijn vertrouwdheid met de looppas CFA terug naar de tijd van zijn presentatie in ontwerpvorm door Noorwegen, aan zijn handtekening in Februari 2002, aan zijn implementatie, of meer aan het punt, zijn koperachtige schending door LTTE, van dag. Ik herinner aan mijn kritieke opmerking begin November 2005, dat een het schitteren tekort van CFA de buitensporige haast van zijn conclusie was, ontzeggend de kans, in het bijzonder aan de overheid van Sri Lanka, om het diep in detail te onderzoeken.

Het enthousiasme om CFA met minste vertraging te besluiten, was toe te schrijven aan het feit, dat door Kerstmis 2001, de overheid met informele ceasefire goedgekeurd had die door LTTE in werking wordt gesteld, en Noorwegen, in zijn wijsheid, beschouwde als het wenselijk om een formele ondertekende overeenkomst te hebben alvorens informele ceasefire begon te ontrafelen. In terugblik, minstens konden de tekortkomingen van enkele CFA gericht te zijn, als de partijen meer tijd hadden om de vertakkingen van individuele artikelen van de overeenkomst, met inbegrip van uitvoerbaarheid van chronologie te overwegen die in CFA worden vermeld.

Op 3 Januari, 2008, gaf de overheid bericht om CFA af te schaffen, die op 17 Januari, 2008 operationeel werd. Sedertdien vele dichte waarnemers van het conflict van Sri Lanka en het vredesproces, Co-Chairs van de Conferentie van de Donor van Tokyo namelijk Noorwegen, Japan, de V.S. en de EU, andere vrienden van Sri Lanka en de burgerlijke maatschappij, hebben zorg uitgedrukt. Het algemeen uitgedrukte gevoel is geweest dat de terugtrekking van CFA het vechten zou stijgen, leidend tot zware burgerlijke slachtoffers en schending van rechten van de mens, dat er geen militaire oplossing aan het conflict is, dat een oplossing slechts door onderhandeling kan worden gevonden, en dat de partijen aan het conflict aan CFA zouden moeten terugkeren.

Eerst, was het bericht van de overheid van afschaffing op 3 Januari niet uit het gewone, als Artikel 4.4 van CFA die voor één van beide terug te trekken partij zich door 14 dagenbericht aan Noorwegen wordt verstrekt te geven. De regeringsacties om bij overeenkomst, contrasten met de acties van LTTE met betrekking tot het vorige bestand te verblijven, waar LTTE vijandigheden na verscheidene uren van bericht, op 18 April 1995 begon.

Ten tweede, is de vraag van een terugkeer naar CFA als het vragen een terugkeer naar wereld merk-gelooft waarin Sri Lankans sinds 2002 leefde. Waar, stopte CFA open vijandigheden en redde veel leven. Nochtans, zouden zij die met CFA vertrouwd zijn eraan herinneren dat LTTE begon overtredend de overeenkomst willens nillens, binnen weken na het ondertekenen van het. Tegen eind April 2007, hadden de Tijgers een catalogus van 3800 schendingen zoals die door de Noordse monitors, tegenover zowat 300 minder belangrijke schendingen door de overheidskrachten vergaard wordt bepaald. Ik herinner levendig eraan hoe één van die aanvankelijke schendingen me aan Kilinochchi voor een vergadering met recente Tamilselvan nam. Die ontmoeting bewees, boven om het even welke twijfel, hoe fickle de Tijgers, over het bevestigen van ontluikende CFA waren. Door CFA, namen zij in ernstige bestandsschendingen zoals, vermoordende gematigde Tamil politici, ambtenaren en leden van de strijdkrachten in dienst; moorde politieke tegenstanders; het in dienst nemen in zelfmoord het bombarderen; ontvoerende burgers voor losgeld; en conscripting kindmilitairen, ondanks de driezijdige overeenkomst die met de overheid en UNICEF wordt ondertekend. Het was tijdens dit zogenaamde „ceasefire,“ dat de Tijgers minister van Buitenlandse Zaken Lakshman Kadirgamar vermoordden, gemaakt tot twee pogingen om een andere Tamil minister, Douglas Devananda te doden, gebruikend vrouwelijke zelfmoordbommenwerpers, en nog een andere vrouwelijke zelfmoordbommenwerper aanwendden in een poging om de bevelhebber van het Leger van Sri Lanka te vermoorden. Ik ben benieuwd, wat het land, onder zij die vandaag Sri Lanka om aan CFA vragen terug te keren, zou overeenkomen om met charade van die aard, in aanwezigheid van dergelijke ernstige provocaties voort te zetten.

Het is een feit dat een ceasefire overeenkomst tot onlangs bestond. Nochtans, stellen de schendingen die door Noordse monitors worden vermeld duidelijk vast dat de Tijgers nooit ophielden in brand stekend. Wat van CFA, tot zijn recente afschaffing bleef, was een overeenkomst op papier, die overledene door de Tijgers, van dag wordt gemaakt één. In deze achtergrond, is het ironisch dat, na het overheid gediende bericht om zich van CFA terug te trekken, plechtig verklaarde LTTE, het CFA 100% zou bevestigen! Nochtans, geen van die kritiek van het besluit van de overheid, gedacht het pasvorm om de Tijgers te vragen waarom zij er niet in slaagden om CFA 100% sinds aanvang te bevestigen.

Ten derde, voorspellen de critici dat de terugtrekking van Sri Lanka van CFA in verhoogde niveaus van geweld zou resulteren. Als de Tijgers over een besproken regeling echt waren geweest, hadden zij een gouden kans in November 2005, toen President Mahinda Rajapaksa binnen als President van Sri Lanka werd gezworen. De voorzitter, in zijn inaugurele bovengenoemde toespraak, „ik bevestig mijn verplichting & bepaling opnieuw om het vredesproces na te streven om een eerbare vrede te bereiken die de aspiraties van alle gemeenschappen in ons land…. zal eerbiedigen Om dit edele doel te bereiken, zal mijn Overheid bereid zijn om L.T.T.E. in dienst te nemen. bij het bespreken van een politieke oplossing, wanneer L.T.T.E. verklaart hun bereidheid om onderhandelingen te hervatten, die zij unilateraal.“ verlieten Twee dagen na de inauguratie, erkende Prabhakaran President Rajapaksa als pragmatische mens en zei dat hij hem tijd zou geven om een oplossing aan het conflict te vinden.

Pauze voor een ogenblik om het verschil tussen de woorden en de akten van de Tijgers te onderzoeken.

Acht later dagen, op 5 December, 2005, voerden de Tijgers hun eerste claymore mijnaanval tegen de strijdkrachten uit. Dit werd gevolgd door scores van burgers in geïsoleerde dorpen te doden, het bombarderen van een marktplaats in Trincomalee, aanwendend een zelfmoordbommenwerper om de Bevelhebber die van het Leger te vermoorden, die het derde doodt de meeste hogere ambtenaar van het leger en claymore mijnen doet ontploffen richtend een bus die burgerlijke passagiers vervoert, die het leven van meer dan 60 passagiers nemen.

Aldus, het gezonde zou denken erop wijzen dat het niet de afschaffing van CFA was die zou leiden tot verhoogd geweld, maar het was het steeds grotere geweld en de ernstige provocaties dat de overheid ertoe brachten om CFA af te schaffen.

Ten vierde, deelt Sri Lanka de mening van zijn vrienden, de inbegrepen V.S., dat het conflict slechts kan politiek worden opgelost, niet militair. President Rajapaksa zei dat op de dag van zijn inauguratie, en, sindsdien, heeft het vaak herhaald. Als u denkt dat de politieke leiding één ding zegt, en de militairen zijn eigen agenda, de Bevelhebber Sarath Fonseka van het Leger nastreven, bovengenoemd bij media informerend op 12 Januari, 2008, en ik, „uiteindelijk citeer, om het even welke oplossing politiek zal moeten zijn. Maar er kan een politieke oplossing zijn slechts nadat LTTE wapens heeft bepaald. “

Vijfde, voor wat betreft CFA, Sri Lanka heeft niet minder dan zes reeksen onderhandelingen, sinds 1985 geprobeerd. Van die, werden slechts laatste drie, in 1995, 2002/2003 en 2006 geleid in een milieu van CFAs. Dit toont aan dat een CFA, terwijl het zijn een nuttig hulpmiddel, niet essentieel voor onderhandelingen is, als de partijen aan het conflict over een resolutie ernstig zijn. Wat essentieel is moet onderhandelingen in vertrouwen voeren tot een duurzame oplossing voor het conflict op akkoord is gegaan.

Tot slot „is ceasefire“ door zijn eigenlijke definitie, een tijdelijke maatregel, tot het door een meer permanente regeling wordt vervangen. Op dezelfde manier waren CFA die tussen de overheid wordt ondertekend en LTTE een tijdelijke opschorting van vijandigheden tot de onderhandelingen werden afgerond. Nadat de Tijgers unilateraal zich van onderhandelingen in April 2003 verwijderden, nam het Noorwegen bijna drie jaar om hen terug naar de lijst te brengen. Toen zij hun prestaties in Oktober 2006 herhaalden, er scheen weinig perspectief op hun terugkeer. Noch zeker de overheid dat kan de Tijgers minder fickle voortaan vredesbesprekingen zijn zouden zijn, dan zij zijn geweest tijdens de laatste twee decennia.

Aldus, is het bedroevend dat de internationale gemeenschap er niet in is geslaagd om de complexe dynamica te begrijpen dat uit over bijna drie decennia in Sri Lanka heeft gespeeld. Met het gemak van niet geïnformeerd, nodigen sommige landen herhaaldelijk de overheid en LTTE uit, om vijandigheden te mijden en vredesbesprekingen te hervatten. De werkelijkheid is dat Sri Lanka onderhandelingen met de Tijgers zes verschillende maal, namelijk, in 1985 in Thimpu met Indische bemiddeling heeft geprobeerd; in 1987 met Eerste Minister Rajiv die Gandhi het lood neemt; in 1989/90 met President Premadasa; in 1995 met President Chandrika Kumaratunga; in 2002/03 met Eerste Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe; en met President Mahinda Rajapaksa in 2006. De afgelopen twintig oneven jaren zijn verklaring aan het feit dat de Tijgers slechts om als zuivere list overeenkomen te onderhandelen; om tijd te kopen om hun het vechten vermogen te hergroeperen bij te vullen en te versterken. Wanneer voldoende aangepast om te vechten, lopen zij vanaf onderhandelingen, aangezien zij bij elke reeks besprekingen hebben gedaan. Dat was niet allen; zij waren koperachtig genoeg om het leven van zij te nemen die twee rondes van besprekingen namelijk in werking stelden de vroegere Indische Eerste Minister Gandhi en President Premadasa en nam heel dicht het leven van President Kumaratunga, in alle drie instanties aanwendend zelfmoordbommenwerpers.

Wij zouden moeten vragen, dan, hoe ernstig de Tijgers waren, toen zij bij de het onderhandelen lijst zaten. Ik kan gebiedend van de zes vergaderingen spreken die wij in Bangkok, Oslo, Berlijn, en Hakone, tussen September 2002 en Maart 2003 hebben gehad, aangezien ik deel van het overheidsteam uitmaakte. LTTE drong erop aan dat de twee partijen zich op banale kwesties concentreren, of om de eigen woorden van recente Balasingham te lenen, de „existentiële problemen“ die door de Tamil burgers in het noorden en het oosten, en slechts na het oplossen van hen eerst onder ogen worden gezien, om kwesties te bespreken die tot een regeling van het conflict leiden. Ons pleidooi dat wij de tijd gebruiken om beide kwesties gelijktijdig te bespreken viel op dove oren.
In dit perspectief van het stonewalling van de Tijger, maakte Noorwegen een moedig bod in Oslo, in November 2002, om de leider van de delegatie te overreden LTTE om met een compromis akkoord te gaan, waar LTTE die met de terminologie de „wordt goedgekeurd partijen overeenkwamen om een oplossing te onderzoeken die op het principe van interne zelfbeschikking op gebied van historische habitation van de tamil-Spreekt volkeren wordt gebaseerd, die op federale structuur met verenigd Sri Lanka wordt gebaseerd…“ en, voor het eerst, overeengekomen om besprekingen in werking te stellen over aanzienlijke politieke kwesties die tot een politieke oplossing, leiden zoals: Macht-delend tussen het centrum en het gebied, evenals binnen het centrum; Geografisch gebied; Rechten van de mensbescherming; Politiek en administratief mechanisme; Openbare financiën; en Wet en orde. Dat was een verfrissende doorbraak, gezien de gespannen atmosfeer in Oslo de vorige avond. Dat was ook een oriëntatiepuntbesluit, aangezien LTTE om neer van zijn vraag naar een afzonderlijke staat overeenkwam te beklimmen, en de overheid ging met een oplossing akkoord die op een federale structuur wordt gebaseerd, slaagden de een concessie opeenvolgende overheden om aan de Tamil minderheid toe te staan er niet in.

Wat daarna volgde is geschiedenis. De oppositie bouwde spoedig tegen de leider van de delegatie LTTE in zijn eigen kamp op, en hij beëindigde abrupt een essentieel bezoek aan Wanni, na Prabhakaran onder druk zettend hem om in te trekken. Hij keerde aan Londen, een zieke en gebroken mens terug en ging in isolatie, die alle verbindingen met LTTE, Noorwegen en de rest van de wereld scheidt. Later, probeerde hij nauwgezet te verklaren er geen overeenstemming in Oslo voor een oplossing die op een federale regeling wordt gebaseerd was!

De definitieve vergadering die in Hakone, Japan, in Maart 2003 wordt gehouden, was een oogopener, zoals die vergadering die boven om het even welke twijfel wordt verduidelijkt dat LTTE aan zijn oude positie van het bespreken van geen aanzienlijke kwestie om het conflict op te lossen was teruggekeerd. Op pari met het begrip bereikt in Oslo, legde de Internationale Adviseur op Rechten van de mens, Ian Martin, een document voor, en recente Balasingham kwam met redenen op de proppen waarom zij niet met internationaal toezicht op rechten van de mens konden akkoord gaan. His response was that Sri Lanka’s national Human Rights Commission was equal to the task. When pressed to focus on other substantive issues agreed upon in Oslo, Balasingham sheepishly said he had no mandate to discuss any of those subjects, proving that he had been prohibited from engaging in discussing substantive issues by the LTTE leadership.

I have traced the history of negotiations, not to heap blame on late Balasingham, or even on the LTTE. All what I want to say is, that the LTTE had a clear strategy then, as it does now, and that is, to establish a separate state by hook or by crook, irrespective of the deaths it would cause to the Tamil people it claims to represent, and destruction to the country. After all, Prabhakaran has given permission to his cadres to kill him if he wavers from the commitment he made for a separate state. And, the slogan of the LTTE still remains “The thirst of the Tigers is the Homeland of Tamil Eelam.”

Against this backdrop, the question we ask from those who urge the government to seek a negotiated settlement is, are they asking us to negotiate with the LTTE once again? If the LTTE demand for a separate state is non-negotiable, what exactly are we going to negotiate with them? There are more questions. How can a democratically elected government hand over a part of its sovereign territory to an undemocratic entity like the LTTE, which engages in terrorism? What is the fate of the Muslim and Sinhala people, living in the areas claimed by the LTTE, as the traditional homeland of the Tamils?

Finally, we have to ask, who would guarantee that this time around, the LTTE will not walk away from the negotiating table. Some may even ask, if the players were different, for example, would the US negotiate with a terrorist group, which has used suicide bombers to assassinate one president, nearly killed another president, and assassinated several secretaries, including the Secretary of State? There are certain individuals, who try to draw parallels between the LTTE demands with the American demand for independence from Britain. However, in my view, the more appropriate comparison is to describe the LTTE to the secessionist Confederates, who tried to break away from the Union. As President Abraham Lincoln said in his First Inaugural Address on March 4, 1861,“Plainly, the central idea of secession, is the essence of anarchy."

Likewise, “Physically speaking, we can not separate. We cannot remove our respective sections from each other nor build an impassable wall between them” Sri Lankan government too, being a representative entity like the Union, finds secession wholly unacceptable, and seeks friendship of all its citizens, and genuine peace, as President Lincoln did, where all citizens in the country can co-exist as equals in harmony, as they did for many centuries. Throughout the conflict, Sri Lanka’s friends have remained steadfastly supportive of a negotiated solution to the conflict.

The Tigers, however, see this involvement as being partial toward the government. In his Heroes Day speech in November 2007, referring to the role of the international community, Prabhakaran, said, “This partisan and unjust conduct of the international community has severely undermined the confidence our people had in them. And it has paved the way for the breakdown of the ceasefire and the peace efforts.”

Despite the stance of Tigers, Sri Lanka is indeed appreciative of the positive role played by the international community in the war on terrorism. The ban on the LTTE, first by India, the U.S., the U.K., followed by Canada and the 27 member EU, has helped dampen the Tigers’ increasing ability to raise funds for their war chest.

The U.S. ban on one of the LTTE front organizations, the Tamil Rehabilitation Organization (TRO) in November 2007, was a significant blow to the Tiger fundraising capabilities. This kind of international action is critical to make the Tigers realize they do not have an endless fount of resources to carry on a relentless terrorist campaign to achieve its major political objective, a separate state, by force of arms.

The international community also needs to persuade the LTTE to return to the negotiating table, and to hang in there until a satisfactory comprise is reached. Only such action will drive home the message that undemocratic methods of seizing power as the Tigers currently employ, are unacceptable to the civilized world.
The international community needs to be cognizant that democracies cannot take extra-constitutional measures, and, political solutions to conflicts require discussion, debate and compromise before consensus is reached.

As you may be aware, after deliberating for one and a half years, the All Party Representative Committee (APRC), comprising the political spectrum of the country, submitted its proposals for devolution to the President, two days ago. Complex arrangements for devolution and power sharing, that also involve constitutional changes and consultation of the people, are inevitably, an incremental process. It is necessary to remind the international community, that this is only a beginning of an evolving process, which requires its fullest and continuing support.

[كفا] إلغاء: أكثر يجبر حاجة - سفيرة برنارد [غونتيلّك]
Automatically translated into Arabic thanks to WorldLingo
كان الإلغاء من ال [سس فير] إتفاق أكثر يجبر حاجة, يفاد [سري] [لنكن] سفيرة في واشنطن, برنارد [غونتيلّك] يجعل تحليل معمّقة قبل واشنطن [ديسكوسّيون غرووب]. هو أضاف أنّ السابقة عشرون سنون غريبة شهادة إلى الحقيقة أنّ يوافق أنمار فقط أن يفاوض كحيلة مجرّدة; أن يشتري وقت أن يعيد, أن يستكمل وأن يقوّي هم يتنازع إمكانية
عندما على نحو كاف يتأهّب أن يتنازع, يمشي هم بعيدا من مفاوضات, بما أنّ هم قد أتمّوا في كلّ [سري] المحادثات. أنّ [ب] لم كلّ; هم كانوا نحاسيّة بكفاية أن يأخذ الحيوات من أنّ الذي يبدأ اثنان دورات المحادثات [فيز.] أخذ الرئيس وزراء سابقة هنديّة غاندي ورئيس [برمدسا] و [فري نرلي] الحياة الرئيس [كومرتثنغ], في كلّ ثلاثة مثل يستخدم إنتحار قاذفة قنابل. عندما كان أشياء ما من يذهب طريقهم, هم لاموا الالمجتمع الدولي بما أنّ يكون موالية وجائرة.

أعطيت ال [فولّ-تإكست] من سفيرة [غونتيلّك] خطبة أدناه:

أنا ذو امتياز, أن يكون يمكن أن يشارك مع أنت, بعض أفكار على سيريلانكا محاولات في نزاع قرار وسلام مفاوضة مع التحرير أنمار ال [تميل] [لم] أو ال [لتّ], أيّ, ال [فبي] [إرلير] هذا شهر يقدّم بما أنّ, "واحدة من ال أكثر خطرة ومتطرفات مميتة في العالم."

أنا على تأسّف أنّ [در.]. بيتر طبشور, الذي كان أن يتكلّم على "البعد دوليّة من ال [لتّ]," استطاع لم يكن مع نا اليوم. مهما, بما أنّ ينوى, ركّز على أنا سوفت على الوقف إطلاق النار إتفاق, السلام عملية والدور من الالمجتمع الدولي, بينما [در.]. سيتكلّم ستانلي [سمرسنغ] على كيف سيريلانكا استطاع في الحقيقة حللت النزاع.

أنت مدركة أنّ سيريلانكا [مولتي-ثنيك], ديموقراطيّة [مولتي-رليجووس], [إين فكت], واحدة من الديموقراطيّات قديمة في [سوث سا]. أنت أيضا مدركة أنّ يجتنب ال [لتّ] ديموقراطيّة, وينوي, من خلال إرهاب, أن يؤسّس [مونو-ثنيك], [مونو-بوليتيكل] منفصلة دولة في سيريلانكا شمال وشرق. سيحوي هذا دولة منفصلة تقريبا 30% من البلد [لندمسّ], ونويت ل [سري] [لنكن] [تميلس], الذي, وفقا ل [ث1981] تعداد, [كمبريز] تقريبا 12% من الإقليم السّكان. الأغلبية من هذا [تميلس], عرضا, حيّة خارج الشمال والشرق.

[لتّ] زعيمة, [بربهكرن] في خطبة في نوفمبر - تشرين الثّاني 27, [لست ر] يقال, ويقتبس أنا, "نحن نكافح فقط أن يستعيد سيادتنا في نا خاصّة أرض تاريخيّة حيث نحن قد عشنا لقرون, السيادة أيّ نحن خسرنا إلى [أكّوبير] مستعمرة." السيادة هو تكلّم من ينهي في 1560, عندما هزم البرتغالية [جفّنا] مسطرة, [كنكيلي] 1, أكثر من 200 سنون قبل الولايات المتّحدة الأمريكيّة [دكلرأيشن وف يندبندنس]. لاحظت أنّ [كنكيلي] قاعدة [أت ثت تيم] كان حدّدت إلى [جفّنا], ولم يمدّد إلى [برسنت دي] شماليّة ومحافظات شرقيّة.

ال [لتّ] طلب لدولة منفصلة, يدعى "[تميل] [لم]," [أت بست], يستطيع كنت وصفت بما أنّ "وهميّة," ل كان هناك أبدا, [أت ني تيم] في سيريلانكا تاريخ, "تقليديّة [تميل] وطن," ك [فدوكّودي] قرار من 1976, يفاد يؤسّس على إدعاء مخطئة بالسكرتيرة أولى بريطانيّة مستعمرة [هو] [كلغورن].

سيريلانكا جزيرة صغيرة, منزل إلى 20 مليون, مماثلة في حجم إلى [وست فيرجنيا], أو مرّتين الحجم من الجزيرة هاواي. هو قد كان بيتيّ إلى كثير مجموعة عرقيّة ل على 2000 سنون, الذي هاجر شمالا إلى جنوب وجنوب إلى شمال على السنون. لذلك, يرسي ال [سنهلس], [تميلس], [بورغرس], [ملس] وأخرى جماعات, أيضا يتعدّد أن يكون عدّلت, يستطيع كلّ بطريقة شرعيّة ادّعيت الجزيرة كوطنهم تقليديّة.

سيريلانكا وقف إطلاق النار قد كان إتفاق أو ال [كفا] وإلغاءه أخيرة [فري موش] في الأخبار [ثس دس]. يركض حالت ألفةي مع ال [كفا] [بك تو] الوقت من عرضه في [درفت فورم] بنرويج, إلى توقيعه في فبراير - شباط 2002, إلى تزويده, أو أكثر إلى النقطة, انتهاكه نحاسيّة ب ال [لتّ], من يوم واحدة. أنا أتذكّر ملاحظتي حرجة في نوفمبر - تشرين الثّاني مبكّرة 2005, أنّ يلمع خلل من ال [كفا] كان الصفة عجلة جامحة من استنتاجه, ينكر الفرصة, بشكل خاصّ إلى سيريلانكا حكومة, أن بعمق تفحّصت هو.

يؤخّر الشوق أن يستنتج ال [كفا] مع بعض, كان واجبة إلى الحقيقة, أنّ ب [كريستمس] 2001, الحكومة كان قد وافق إلى وقف إطلاق النار رسميّة يبدأ ب ال [لتّ], ونرويج, في حكمته, اعتبر هو مرغوبة أن يتلقّى إتفاق رسميّة يوقع قبل أن الوقف إطلاق النار رسميّة بدأ أن يحلّ. في استعادة ماضي, على الأقلّ بعض من ال [كفا] عيب نقص استطاع يتلقّى يكون خاطبت, إن الأحزاب تلقّوا كثير وقت أن يعتبر التفرعات من مواد فرديّة من الإتفاق, بما في ذلك استخداميّة المدّة وقت يشار في ال [كفا].

في يناير - كانون الثّاني 3, 2008, أعطى الحكومة إشعار أن يلغي ال [كفا], أيّ أصبح عمليّاتيّة في يناير - كانون الثّاني 17, 2008. [سنس ثن], كثير [كلوس وبسرفر] من سيريلانكا نزاع والسلام عملية, [ك-شيرس] من طوكيو مؤتمر متبرّع [فيز.] قد عبّر عن نرويج, اليابان, ال [أوس] والالاتّحاد الأوروبي, أخرى صديقات سيريلانكا والمجتمعة مدنيّة, اهتمام. قد كان العواطف عادة عبّر عن أنّ إنسحاب من ال [كفا] صعد يتنازع, يقود إلى ثقيلة ضحيّة مدنيّة وانتهاك الحقوق الإنسان, أنّ هناك ما من حل عسكريّة إلى النزاع, أنّ حل يستطيع كنت أسّست فقط من خلال مفاوضة, وأنّ أحزاب إلى النزاع سوفت رجعت إلى ال [كفا].

أولى, الحكومة [ب] إشعار الإلغاء في يناير - كانون الثّاني 3 لم من الالمألوف, بما أنّ مادة 4.4 من ال [كفا] زوّد ل إمّا حزب أن ينسحب ب يعطي 14 [دي نوتيس] إلى نرويج. الحكومة عمل أن يلبث بالإتفاق, تباينات مع ال [لتّ] أعمال [ويث رسبكت تو] المهادنة سابقة, حيث ال [لتّ] بدأ عداءات بعد عدّة ساعات الإشعار, في أبريل - نيسان 18 1995.

ثانية, الطلب من عودة إلى ال [كفا] مثل يرجو عودة إلى ال [مك-بليف] عالم في أيّ [سري] [لنكنس] عاش منذ 2002. يصحّ, يفتح ال [كفا] يتوقّف عداءات وأنقذ كثير حيوات. مهما, تذكّر أنّ الذي يكون [فميلير ويث] ال [كفا] أنّ ال [لتّ] بدأ ينتهك الإتفاق [ويلّ-نيلّي], ضمن أسابيع من يقع هو. ب [إند بريل] 2007, كان أنمار قد كدّسوا كاتالوج من 3800 انتهاكات بما أنّ يحدث بالمدربات [نورديك], [أس غينست] بعض 300 انتهاكات ثانويّة بالحكومة قوات. أنا بشكل مشرق أتذكّر كيف واحدة من أنّ انتهاكات أوّليّة أخذني إلى [كيلينوشش] لاجتماع مع [تميلسلفن] متأخّرة. أنّ برهن مجابه, إلى ما بعد أيّ شك, كيف متقلّبة الأنمار كانوا, حول يدعم ال [كفا] حديث التّولّد. طوال ال [كفا], شبك هم في جدّيّة مهادنة انتهاكات مثل, يغتال معتدلة [تميل] سياسيات, مسؤولات وأعضاء من القوات مسلّحة; يقتل مقاومات سياسيّة; يشبك في إنتحار قصفات; يخطف مدنيات لفدية; ويجنّد طفلة جنديات, على الرغم من ال [تريبرتيت غريمنت] يوقع مع الحكومة و [أونيسف]. هو كان أثناء هذا ما يسمّى "وقف إطلاق النار," أنّ الأنمار اغتالوا وزير الخارجيّة [لكشمن] [كديرغمر], يجعل اثنان محاولات أن يقتل آخر [تميل] وزير, دوغلاس [دفنندا], يستعمل أنثويّة إنتحار قاذفة قنابل, ويستخدم [يت نوثر] أنثويّة إنتحار قاذفة قنابل [إين ن تّمبت تو] اغتلت القائدة من سيريلانكا جيش. أنا أتساءل, أيّ بلد, بين أنّ الذي يسأل سيريلانكا اليوم أن يرجع إلى ال [كفا], وافق أن يستمرّ مع خدعة من أنّ طبيعة, بوجه هذا تحاريض خطيرة.

هو حقيقة أنّ وقف إطلاق النار تواجد إتفاق [أونتيل رسنتلي]. مهما, عدّل الانتهاكات بمدربات [نورديك] بوضوح يؤسّس أنّ الأنمار أبدا أوقفوا أطلق النار. ماذا بقي من ال [كفا], حتّى إلغاءه أخيرة, كان إتفاق على ورقة, يرجع غير نشط بالأنمار, من يوم واحدة. في هذا إطار, هو ساخرة أنّ, عقب خدم الحكومة إشعار أن ينسحب من ال [كفا], ال [لتّ] بشكل جليل يفاد, هو دعم ال [كفا] 100%! مهما, لا شيء من أنّ حرجة من الحكومة قرار, فكرة هو لاءم أن يسأل الأنمار لما هم [فيلد] أن يدعم ال [كفا] 100% منذ بداية.

ثالثة, يتنبّأ ناقدات أنّ سيريلانكا إنسحاب من ال [كفا] نتج في يزاد مستويات العنف. إن الأنمار كانوا قد كانوا أصليّة حول يفاوض استقرار, تلقّى هم [غلدن وبّورتثنيتي] في نوفمبر - تشرين الثّاني 2005, عندما رئيس [مهيندا] [رجبكسا] كان أقسمت داخل كرئيس سيريلانكا. قال الرئيس, في خطبته افتتاحيّة, "أنا أعاد تأكيد ي تعهد & تعيين أن يتتبّع السلام عملية أن يحقّق سلام شريفة أنّ سيحترم السفط من كلّ جماعات في بلدنا…. أن يحقّق هذا هدف نبيلة, سيكون حكومتي يتأهّب أن يشبك ال [ل.ت.ت.]. في يتناقش حل سياسيّة, عندما ال [ل.ت.ت.]. يفيد مبادرتهم أن يستأنف مفاوضات, أيّ هم من جانب واحد عن تخلّى." اثنان أيام بعد التدشين, اعترف [بربهكرن] رئيس [رجبكسا] كرجل عمليّة وقال أنّ هو أعطىه وقت أن يجد حل إلى النزاع.

توقّفت لعزم أن يفحص الفرق بين الكلمات والوثيق من الأنمار.

ثمانية أيام فيما بعد, في ديسمبر - كانون الأوّل 5, 2005, وفى الأنمارهم أولى كليمور منجم لغم هجوم ضدّ القوات مسلّحة. تبعت هذا كان ب يقتل علامات المدنيات في يعزل قرى, يقصف من [مركت بلس] في [ترينكمل], يستخدم إنتحار قاذفة قنابل أن يغتال الجيش قائدة, يقتل الثالثة كثير [سنيور وفّيسر] من الجيش ويفجّر كليمور منجم لغم يستهدف حافلة يحمل مسافرات مدنيّة, يأخذ الحيوات من على 60 مسافرات.

لذلك, سليمة أشار يفكّر أنّ هو [ب] لم الإلغاء من ال [كفا] أنّ قاد إلى يزاد عنف, غير أنّ هو كان العنف دائم تزايد وتحاريض خطيرة أنّ قاد الحكومة أن يلغون ال [كفا].

رابعة, يشارك سيريلانكا المنظرة من صديقاته, ال [أوس] يتضمّن, أنّ النزاع يستطيع فقط كنت حللت سياسيّا, لا عسكريّا. قال رئيس [رجبكسا] لذلك على اليوم من تدشينه, ويتلقّى, بما أنّ, يكرّس هو كثير أوقات. إن أنت تفكّر أنّ يقول القيادة سياسيّة واحدة شيء, والجيش يكون يتتبّع ه خاصّة جدول, جيش قائدة [سرث] [فونسكا], يقال في أوساط يلخّص في يناير - كانون الثّاني 12, 2008, وأنا أقتبس, "أخيرا, أيّ حل سيضطرّ كنت سياسيّة. غير أنّ هناك يستطيع كنت حل سياسيّة [أنلي فتر] قد عيّن ال [لتّ] [أرمس]. "

قد حاول خامسة, [أن ث سوبجكت وف] ال [كفا], سيريلانكا ما من أقلّ من ستّة [سري] المفاوضات, منذ 1985. من أنّ, فقط ال [لست] أوصلت ثلاثة, في 1995, 2002/2003 و2006 كان في بيئة [كفس]. هذا يعرض أنّ ليس [كفا], بينما يكون أداة مفيدة, أساسيّة لمفاوضات, إن أحزاب إلى النزاع يكونون جدّيّة حول قرار. ماذا يكون أساسيّة أن يوصل مفاوضات [إين غود فيث] إلى أن [أغر وبون] حل دائمة إلى النزاع.

أخيرا, "وقف إطلاق النار" بتعريفه جدّا, إجراء مؤقّتة, إلى أن استبدلت هو بأكثر ترتيب دائمة. بالمثل, وقع ال [كفا] بين الحكومة وال [لتّ] كان تعليق مؤقّتة عداءات إلى أن مفاوضات كان استنتجت. عقب تحرّك الأنمار من جانب واحد بعيدا من مفاوضات في أبريل - نيسان 2003, هو أخذ نرويج تقريبا ثلاثة سنون أن يحضرهم [بك تو] الطاولة. عندما كرّر هم أداءهم في أكتوبر - تشرين الأوّل 2006, هناك يبدى بعض توقع من عودتهم. لا يستطيع الحكومة واثقة أنّ كان الأنمار أيّ أقلّ متقلّبة في مقبلة سلام محادثات, من هم يكون أثناء المتأخّرة اثنان عقود.

لذلك, هو مؤسفة أنّ قد [فيلد] الالمجتمع الدولي أن يفهم العلم حركة معقّدة أنّ قد لعب خارجا على تقريبا ثلاثة عقود في سيريلانكا. مع السهولة من ال [أونينفورمد], [كلّ ون] بعض بلاد بشكل متكرّر الحكومة وال [لتّ], أن يجتنب عداءات وأن يستأنف سلام محادثات. الحقيقة أنّ قد حاول سيريلانكا مفاوضات مع الأنمار على ستّة مناسبات مختلفة, [فيز.], في 1985 في [ثيمبو] مع توسط هنديّة; في 1987 مع رئيس وزراء [رجيف] غاندي يأخذ الرصاص; أثناء 1989/90 مع رئيس [برمدسا]; في 1995 مع رئيس [شندريكا] [كومرتثنغ]; أثناء 2002/03 مع رئيس وزراء [رنيل] [ويكرمسنغ]; ومع رئيس [مهيندا] [رجبكسا] في 2006. السابقة عشرون سنون غريبة شهادة إلى الحقيقة أنّ يوافق أنمار فقط أن يفاوض كحيلة مجرّدة; أن يشتري وقت أن يعيد, أن يستكمل وأن يقوّي هم يتنازع إمكانية. عندما على نحو كاف يعشّق أن يتنازع, يمشي هم بعيدا من مفاوضات, بما أنّ هم قد أتمّوا في كلّ [سري] المحادثات. أنّ [ب] لم كلّ; هم كانوا نحاسيّة بكفاية أن يأخذ الحيوات من أنّ الذي يبدأ اثنان دورات المحادثات [فيز.] أخذ الرئيس وزراء سابقة هنديّة غاندي ورئيس [برمدسا] و [فري نرلي] الحياة الرئيس [كومرتثنغ], في كلّ ثلاثة مثل يستخدم إنتحار قاذفة قنابل.

نحن ينبغي أن يسأل, بعد ذلك, كيف جدّيّة كانوا الأنمار, عندما جلس هم في ال يفاوض طاولة. أنا يستطيع بسلطة تكلّمت من الستّة اجتماعات نحن تلقّينا في بنكوك, أوسلو, برلين, و [هكون], بين سبتمبر - أيلول 2002 ومارس - آذار 2003, بما أنّ أنا كنت جزء من الحكومة فريق. ألحّ ال [لتّ] أنّ الاثنان جوانب ركّز على على إصدارات عاديّة, أو أن يقترض [بلسنغم] متأخّرة خاصّة كلمات, "المشاكل وجوديّة" يواجه ب ال [تميل] مدنيات في الشمال والشرقيّة أولى, و [أنلي فتر] يحلّهم, أن يتناقش إصدارات يقود إلى استقرار من النزاع. حجتنا أنّ يستعمل نحن الوقت أن يتناقش كلا إصدارات في وقت واحد [فلّ] على آذان صمّاء.
ضدّ هذا خلفيّة النمر [ستونولّ], جعل نرويج شجاعة عرضت في أوسلو, في نوفمبر - تشرين الثّاني 2002, أن يقنع الزعيمة من ال [لتّ] وفد أن يوافق على حلّ وسط, حيث ال [لتّ] يوافق إلى العلم مصطلحات "الأحزاب وافق أن يستكشف حل يؤسّس على المبدأ من [سلف-دترمينأيشن] داخليّة في مناطق من مسكن تاريخيّة من ال [تميل-سبكينغ] [بيوبلس], يؤسّس على بنية فيديراليّة مع يوحّد سيريلانكا…" و, [فور ث فيرست تيم], يوافق أن يبدأ نقاشات على إصدارات جوهريّة سياسيّة يقود إلى حل سياسيّة, مثل: [بوور-شرينغ] بين المركز والمنطقة, [أس ولّ س] ضمن المركز; منطقة جغرافيّة; حقوق الإنسان حماية; سياسيّة وآلية إداريّة; مالية عامّة; وقانون وأمر. أنّ كان ينعش إختراق, يعطى الجو متوتّرة في أوسلو المساء سابقة. أنّ كان أيضا [لندمرك دسسون], بما أنّ ال [لتّ] وافق إلى صعود إلى أسفل من طلبه لدولة منفصلة, والحكومة وافق إلى حل يؤسّس على بنية فيديراليّة, امتياز حكومات متعاقبة [فيلد] أن يخوّل إلى ال [تميل] أقلية.

ماذا تبع بعد ذلك تاريخ. احتدّ معارضة قريبا ضدّ الزعيمة من ال [لتّ] وفد في ه خاصّة مخيم, وهو فجأة أنهى زيارة حاسمة إلى [ونّي], يتبع [بربهكرن] يضغطه أن ينسحب. هو رجع إلى لندن, مريضة ورجل مكسورة وذهب داخل عمليّة عزل, يفصل كلّ توصيلات مع ال [لتّ], نرويج وال [رست وف ث وورلد]. فيما بعد, حاول هو باجتهاد أن يفسّر هناك كان ما من إتفاق في أوسلو لحل يؤسّس على ترتيب فيديراليّة!

كان الاجتماع نهائيّة يمسك في [هكون], اليابان, في مارس - آذار 2003, عين فتاحة, بما أنّ أنّ اجتماع يوضح إلى ما بعد أيّ شك أنّ ال [لتّ] كان قد عاود إلى موقعته قديمة من لا يتناقش أيّ إصدار جوهريّة أن يحلّ النزاع. على تكافؤ مع التفهم يبلغ في أوسلو, قدّم المستشارة دوليّة على حقوق الإنسان, أيان مارتن, ورقة, [بلسنغم] متأخّرة تاح مع أسباب لما هم استطاع لم يوافق إلى دوليّة [مونيتور] من حقوق الإنسان. His response was that Sri Lanka’s national Human Rights Commission was equal to the task. When pressed to focus on other substantive issues agreed upon in Oslo, Balasingham sheepishly said he had no mandate to discuss any of those subjects, proving that he had been prohibited from engaging in discussing substantive issues by the LTTE leadership.

I have traced the history of negotiations, not to heap blame on late Balasingham, or even on the LTTE. All what I want to say is, that the LTTE had a clear strategy then, as it does now, and that is, to establish a separate state by hook or by crook, irrespective of the deaths it would cause to the Tamil people it claims to represent, and destruction to the country. After all, Prabhakaran has given permission to his cadres to kill him if he wavers from the commitment he made for a separate state. And, the slogan of the LTTE still remains “The thirst of the Tigers is the Homeland of Tamil Eelam.”

Against this backdrop, the question we ask from those who urge the government to seek a negotiated settlement is, are they asking us to negotiate with the LTTE once again? If the LTTE demand for a separate state is non-negotiable, what exactly are we going to negotiate with them? There are more questions. How can a democratically elected government hand over a part of its sovereign territory to an undemocratic entity like the LTTE, which engages in terrorism? What is the fate of the Muslim and Sinhala people, living in the areas claimed by the LTTE, as the traditional homeland of the Tamils?

Finally, we have to ask, who would guarantee that this time around, the LTTE will not walk away from the negotiating table. Some may even ask, if the players were different, for example, would the US negotiate with a terrorist group, which has used suicide bombers to assassinate one president, nearly killed another president, and assassinated several secretaries, including the Secretary of State? There are certain individuals, who try to draw parallels between the LTTE demands with the American demand for independence from Britain. However, in my view, the more appropriate comparison is to describe the LTTE to the secessionist Confederates, who tried to break away from the Union. As President Abraham Lincoln said in his First Inaugural Address on March 4, 1861,“Plainly, the central idea of secession, is the essence of anarchy."

Likewise, “Physically speaking, we can not separate. We cannot remove our respective sections from each other nor build an impassable wall between them” Sri Lankan government too, being a representative entity like the Union, finds secession wholly unacceptable, and seeks friendship of all its citizens, and genuine peace, as President Lincoln did, where all citizens in the country can co-exist as equals in harmony, as they did for many centuries. Throughout the conflict, Sri Lanka’s friends have remained steadfastly supportive of a negotiated solution to the conflict.

The Tigers, however, see this involvement as being partial toward the government. In his Heroes Day speech in November 2007, referring to the role of the international community, Prabhakaran, said, “This partisan and unjust conduct of the international community has severely undermined the confidence our people had in them. And it has paved the way for the breakdown of the ceasefire and the peace efforts.”

Despite the stance of Tigers, Sri Lanka is indeed appreciative of the positive role played by the international community in the war on terrorism. The ban on the LTTE, first by India, the U.S., the U.K., followed by Canada and the 27 member EU, has helped dampen the Tigers’ increasing ability to raise funds for their war chest.

The U.S. ban on one of the LTTE front organizations, the Tamil Rehabilitation Organization (TRO) in November 2007, was a significant blow to the Tiger fundraising capabilities. This kind of international action is critical to make the Tigers realize they do not have an endless fount of resources to carry on a relentless terrorist campaign to achieve its major political objective, a separate state, by force of arms.

The international community also needs to persuade the LTTE to return to the negotiating table, and to hang in there until a satisfactory comprise is reached. Only such action will drive home the message that undemocratic methods of seizing power as the Tigers currently employ, are unacceptable to the civilized world.
The international community needs to be cognizant that democracies cannot take extra-constitutional measures, and, political solutions to conflicts require discussion, debate and compromise before consensus is reached.

As you may be aware, after deliberating for one and a half years, the All Party Representative Committee (APRC), comprising the political spectrum of the country, submitted its proposals for devolution to the President, two days ago. Complex arrangements for devolution and power sharing, that also involve constitutional changes and consultation of the people, are inevitably, an incremental process. It is necessary to remind the international community, that this is only a beginning of an evolving process, which requires its fullest and continuing support.